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CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

August 10, 1973

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14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL KULPA

SUBJECT: Intelligence Inputs to the AABNCP

As you are aware the WWMCCS people are looking at intelligence collection system inputs to the AABNCP. Although the JCS has been the pusher in this area, the ASD(I) is also involved. Last week you and I discussed the advisability of [redacted] briefing Mr. Everett, President of Mitre, and his Vice President, Mr. Jacobs for [redacted] for discussions on this subject. We authorized temporary accesses and [redacted] talked to them on Wednesday (I have had no feed back yet).

This morning Colonel Wally Henderson called and sent Lt Colonel Norm Sparks up to see me. While I did not realize it, Dr. Hall has written to Admiral Moorer stating that the ASD(I) will conduct the study of the application of intelligence collectors to the AABNCP. I don't believe this gives us any problem, but it does give us two organizations to work with. It turns out that the study effort which Mitre is being asked to perform will come out of an FCRC MTS allocation obtained by the ASD(I). For FY 74, he has [redacted] worth of effort at Mitre. For the present study it is estimated that six people will spend three to four man-months on this effort; all presently have SI/TK accesses.

At Attachment 1 is the Statement of Work for the study. [redacted] systems to be looked at are [redacted] and [redacted]. The ASD(I) and JCS people have both expressed a desire to perform the study at the TK level. They have produced a list of information elements required for each candidate system (Atch 2). When they looked at the TK system

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
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description manuals, however, they found that they are unable to answer the majority of their questions. Hence, [REDACTED] visit to me. He asked how we might proceed to get the desired information.

I don't think we can support the study adequately at the TK level. On the other hand I think we really should support the study and this leads to the conclusion that [REDACTED] accesses are in order for the Mitre people performing the study. I recommend that we support the study, and that we name [REDACTED] as the NRO Staff focal point. I would expect him to provide an interface with the Mitre people on the operational aspects of the NRO collectors. In addition, during the follow-on effort which will look in more detail at how our systems might be modified to provide data to the AABNCP, he should definitely be the point of contact.

I would like your concurrence in this approach. I think it is consistent with Dr. McLucas' philosophy and something we should support. Before commenting to the ASD(I), however, I think we should sit down with [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] perhaps hear their pitch and see if they have any comments. We don't want to be caught between the ASD(I) and the JCS.


FREDERICK L. HOFMANN
Lt Colonel, USAF

P.S. I have now talked to [REDACTED] Their visit with Messrs. Everett and Jacobs was very well received. [REDACTED] is fully in accord with granting [REDACTED] access for the study (apparently it is Wally Henderson who wants to work at the TK level--I will get with him on the subject). It appears that the study will be run by the JCS people, even though the manpower allocation comes out of the ASD(I) shop (I imagine Wally Henderson will view himself as a co-project officer, however). On Monday, when his action officer is back, we will work on setting up the briefing [REDACTED] offered us--try to get it at the earliest convenient time. I mentioned that I was proposing a contact point on our Staff; [REDACTED] added that it might be well for this person to sit in on their regular Tuesday meetings and other appropriate discussions. I think we will probably want to do this.

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301


INTELLIGENCE

7 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR PROJECT LEADER, PROJECT NO. 8480,
MITRE CORPORATION

SUBJECT: Analytical Support

MITRE is requested to perform the analysis as described in the attached
task statement and to furnish a written report by 15 October 1973.


Wallace D. Henderson
Colonel, USAF
Director for Indications and
Warning, ODASD(IWS)

Attachment

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ARE DETACHED

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TASK TITLE: Data Tap (U)

PURPOSE: (S) Determine the utility of data from selected National Programs for satisfaction of trans SIOP information requirements of the NCA.

BACKGROUND: (TS) The OJCS has postulated that most of our National Programs have a potential for trans SIOP intelligence gathering and direct readout to the AABNCP. However, each of these systems has been designed to provide specific types of information for other purposes. Future modifications would possibly greatly increase AABNCP readout capability. As a first step in determining utility, all systems will be screened and any systems where the AABNCP link is obviously technically or economically impracticable will be eliminated. The remaining systems output will then be examined for the utility of the data they provide. The programs surviving both checks will be studied to determine the modification, and costs thereof, required to provide a useful direct readout to the AABNCP.

(U) ASD(I) will perform the first check and separately furnish a list of systems to be examined. MITRE is requested to test for the utility of data from the selected programs. The modification studies will be performed by appropriate system contractors.

SUB-TASKS:

1. (U) Review of Selected National Programs. The programs selected by ASD(I) will be reviewed to learn the quantity, quality and timeliness of the information currently provided and expected to be available in the 1980's. Features to be determined include mission requirement, targets, geographic coverage, observables, response time, environmental constraints, security constraints, system availability and system product.

2. (U) Review of NCA Information Requirements. The potential information required to support the NCA and CINC decision process aboard the AABNCP will be postulated. The minimum essential command and control information for option selection, control of escalation and assured termination of nuclear operations will be postulated. The sensitivity of the information requirements to a representative spectrum of scenarios in strategic nuclear warfare will be investigated.

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The level of detail, accuracy and timeliness are parameters to be considered. Maximum utilization should be made of the results of the MITRE work in FY 73 on European warning and work in FY 74 on updating the 1966 Post Attack Intelligence Study.

3. (U) Comparison of Requirements and Capabilities. On the basis of results of sub-tasks 1 and 2, the extent to which the selected program capabilities, projected for the 1980's, meet the NCA information needs will be examined. This evaluation should result in a relative ranking of the utility of the programs for satisfying NCA information requirements and the identification of the major deficiencies of the programs in this respect.

PRODUCTS:

1. (U) A written report, not longer than 50 pages, containing a description and results of the analysis and recommendations concerning further study of system modifications necessary to meet "Data Tap" objectives.

2. (U) Briefings, as required, during the course of the analysis and subsequent to the completion of the task.

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LIST OF CANDIDATE SYSTEMS

FOR EACH SYSTEM

- MISSION:**
- 1 Mission Requirements (SICR)
 - 2 Targets (i.e., events or systems)
- PAYLOAD:**
- 3 Sensing System
 - 4 Telemetry
 - 5 On board processing
 - 6
- SUPPORTING FACILITIES:**
- 7 Ground facilities - computers/displays/
 - 8 C² Links
 - 9 Personnel Requirements
- OPERATIONAL CONCEPT:**
- 10 Mission Control of Payload (e.g., Mode Selection)
 - 11 Command Link
 - 12 Observables
 - 13 Info. processing (capacity) - Required data base
 - 14 Display
 - 15 Users/Products (current and projected)
- OVERALL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE:**
- 16 Lifetime/Availability/Deployment
 - 17 Geographic Coverage
 - 18 Vulnerability (Redundancy < sensor
grnd system >)
 - 19 Response Time
 - 20 Environmental Limitations
 - 21 Security Constraints
 - 22 Quantity & quality of *data information*

Current plans for 80's