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November 28, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: November 21 Letter from Chairman, COMOR, re
KH-4 [REDACTED] Launch Rates

1. The attached memorandum was delivered to me by [REDACTED] on the afternoon of 21 November. I advised [REDACTED] that Dr. Flax could not accept this as an official statement of USIB requirements and initiate any contractual actions in response thereto.

2. Later that day, Mr. Reber and I discussed this with Dr. Flax. He emphasized that he could not accept this document as a statement of USIB requirements, that it was not the optimum way to develop requirements, that programmatic reasons in addition to coverage requirements determined launch rates, etc. Several possible courses of action for the DNRO were discussed.

3. Subsequently, Mr. Reber called Mr. Bross and recommended withdrawal of the letter. Mr. Bross indicated he had not seen it.

4. On the morning of 22 November, I again advised Mr. Tidwell that Dr. Flax could not accept his letter as a statement of USIB requirements. [REDACTED] stated he had discussed this with the Director on the evening of November 21 and the Director felt it was a proper action.

5. On 22 November, I discussed the letter with Col Hall, DIA, and cautioned him to be careful in the COMOR discussions since I believed CIA was determined to make the requirements not exceed [REDACTED] successful launches per year because they felt DOD requirements were too high. I also discussed the letter with Gen Carroll the evening of 22 November and expressed the same opinion to him. Gen Carroll was quite surprised at the letter since the subject had not been discussed in USIB. Gen Carroll indicated he probably would discuss this with Mr. Helms.

[REDACTED]

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6. On the morning of Nov 23, I discussed the letter with Mr. Sheldon and Mr. Bross, recommending its withdrawal and strongly protesting this unilateral CIA action.

7. [REDACTED] introduced the letter in COMOR on the morning of November 23, prefacing his remarks that he was not trying to "end-run" the COMOR but had been directed to document the CIA position by the DCI. According to the NRO Staff representative at the meeting, the end result was "a lot of unhappy COMOR members."

8. On November 23, Mr. Bross called Dr. Flax indicating that perhaps the letter should be returned to him without action.

9. In the afternoon of November 23, at the ExCom meeting, The DCI advised Dr. Flax that this letter should not have been sent him--poorly worded, improper channel, etc--and to forget it. Later in the meeting, Mr. Sheldon indicated that the CIA not only felt the future [REDACTED] launch rate was too high but doubted the need for any [REDACTED] capability after [REDACTED] was operational. Dr. Flax and I both expressed amazement that there was no future need for [REDACTED] resolution.

10. The original and copy 2 of the letter were returned to Mr. Bross...."without action, per his discussion with Dr. Flax and subsequent remarks by the DCI at the ExCom"..... on November 28.

Attachment

[REDACTED] 56647-66

James T. Stewart
Major General, USAF
Director, NRO Staff

1. SS-1
2. SS-5
3. SS-4