

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

8 APR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS  
THROUGH MR. PLUMMER

SUBJECT: ACDA Briefing

At the right is a reply to Dr. Ikle's request that the NRO and the Air Force jointly assist ACDA in the preparation of an MBFR verification briefing for presentation to [redacted] and [redacted] Defense people.

We have established a small group to work the problem and ACDA has agreed to furnish an overall briefing outline so that we can visualize better the type and form of information desired.

Since release of classified and compartmented intelligence information to foreign governments is under the purview of the DCI and of high interest to USIB, we suggest in your reply that Dr. Ikle plan to formally advise USIB of ACDA's plan.

The proposed reply has had the concurrence of Generals Huyser, Collins and Lawson and has been coordinated with Dr. Wade of OSD(ISA).



Colonel, USAF

CLASSIFIED BY [redacted] DECLASSIFY ON [redacted] EXEMPT FROM  
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CAT. [redacted]  
CONTINUE SYSTEM COPY 882 DECLASSIFY ON RMP DDT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control No. Internal  
COPY 1 OF 1 COPIES  
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

Dr. Melucas

TOP SECRET

CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON 20330



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

14 April 1975

Dr. Melucas has seen.

Dr. Fred C. Ikle  
Director  
U. S. Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Ikle:

Your 14 March 1975 letter regarding peripheral monitoring of MBFR involving the [redacted] and using high altitude aircraft or RPVs is quite [redacted] most opportune for us. Because of possible [redacted] considerations, I have asked Jim Plummer to [redacted] the NRO and Air Force interface with ACDA on this particular activity. Bert Aschenbrenner from your organization, the Air Force and the NRO Staff have already met on this subject. ACDA presented a briefing on 31 March 1975 which provided a better appreciation of the purpose and scope of the ACDA proposals. As a result of that briefing, a positive relationship has been established among participants and work is now proceeding with the context of the proposed briefing.

It is clear that a main consideration regarding these proposals will be the application of necessary security to protect exposure of sensitive technology. The security considerations should determine whether the limits for this technology exposure to [redacted] should be at the SECRET, TK, [redacted] level. However, before we get too far [redacted] this proposed briefing, I feel that you should formally notify the USIB of what is intended in the proposal and then plan to notify the NSC at some later date if it turns out to be a feasible action.

[redacted signature block]  
John L. Melucas

CLASSIFIED [redacted] EXEMPT FROM  
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CAT.  
5041 AND DECLASSIFY ON [redacted] DET.

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND  
METHODS INVOLVED

CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY  
[redacted]  
Def [redacted]  
Control [redacted] 2826-75

HANDLE WITH CARE  
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON 20330



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

14 April 1975

Dr. Fred C. Ikle  
Director  
U. S. Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Ikle:

Your 14 March 1975 letter regarding peripheral monitoring of MBFR involving the [redacted] and using high altitude aircraft or RPVs is quite [redacted] and most opportune for us. Because of possible [redacted] considerations, I have asked Jim Plummer to coordinate the NRO and Air Force interface with ACDA on this particular activity. Bert Aschenbrenner from your organization, the Air Force and the NRO Staff have already met on this subject. ACDA presented a briefing on 31 March 1975 which provided a better appreciation of the purpose and scope of the ACDA proposals. As a result of that briefing, a positive relationship has been established among participants and work is now proceeding with the context of the proposed briefing.

It is clear that a main consideration regarding these proposals will be the application of necessary security to protect exposure of sensitive technology. The security considerations should determine whether the limits for this technology exposure to [redacted] should be at the SECRET, TK, [redacted] level. However, before we get too far [redacted] regarding this proposed briefing, I feel that you should formally notify the USIB of what is intended in the proposal and then plan to notify the NSC at some later date if it turns out to be a feasible action.

[redacted]  
John L. McClucas

[redacted] EXEMPT FROM  
SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATE-  
GORY SET DECLASSIFY ON INF DET.

WARNING NOTICE — SENSITIVE  
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND  
METHODS INVOLVED

Copy 2 of \_\_\_\_\_ Copies  
Page 1 of \_\_\_\_\_ Pages.

HANDLE WITH  
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control Doc. [redacted] 2826-75