MEMORANDUM

November 29, 1973

GENERAL KULPA

Dr. Hall is in the process now of staffing a memorandum for Dr. Schlesinger's signature at the SECRET level to the Defense Intelligence Community which lays down some strict rules of conduct within DOD SECRET precepts. This correspondence should be signed out as soon as possible.

BUD COYLE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Modification of the Security Controls for the Products of Photographic Reconnaissance Satellites

Dr. Kissinger's letter of November 23 forwarding the President's approval to decompartment certain photographic reconnaissance satellite products is certain to cause some confusion among people presently cleared for access to the original TALENT-KEYHole compartments. It is anticipated that it will be some time before guidelines will be furnished relating to the exact details of the decompartmentation and redefinition of products and program aspects which must remain compartmented. Foremost, perhaps, is inadvertent acknowledgement at the SECRET level of our high-altitude SIGINT collectors—which was specifically excluded from the decompartmentation proposal.

Until new guidelines are furnished by USIB, I believe it is necessary to caution all cleared people in the DOD and have prepared the letter at the right for your signature.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter at the right.

John L. McLucas
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Modification of the Security Controls for the Products of Photographic Reconnaissance Satellites

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger, subject as above, November 23, 1973

I wish to insure that the decompartmentation of photographic satellite reconnaissance products proceeds strictly according to the provisions of the reference letter. Specifically, I note that the President has approved SECRET acknowledgement of only the U.S. photographic satellite reconnaissance program, and partial decompartmentation of the photographic product. It should be strictly understood by all DOD people who are cleared for either or TALENT-KEYHOLE information that the Presidential approval does not permit acknowledgement of the United States SIGINT satellite program, nor may photographic product be downgraded beyond the existing USIB guidance for sanitization and decontrol until such time as the Director of Central Intelligence approves specific guidelines. Please insure that this information is conveyed immediately to all people in DOD who are or TALENT-KEYHOLE cleared.

James R. Schlesinger

cc: Service Secretaries
    Director, Central Intelligence
    Director, National Security Agency
    Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)