MEMORANDUM FOR COLON

SUBJECT: NRO Annex to the STG Report

I met with Jack Shaw, this morning, to show him our NRO Annex to the STG Report and obtain his (and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson's) concurrence in that portion of the report which discusses the Arms Control Satellite.

Jack's proposed changes are at Tab A. Our experience here is rather like that with Don Steininger on the aircraft/satellite issue: we can mention aircraft but shouldn't expand on how good they are. Shaw thinks it's all right for us to mention an Arms Control Satellite but we should drop those sentences which explain why we think it's a good idea ("You pre-judge the findings of the Committee").

I think we have no choice but to follow Jack's desire and will make changes as indicated in Tab A to our hard copy of the report.

Jack thinks Ambassador Johnson would be willing to hold an NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee meeting right after the final NSSM 28 Committee meeting. Of considerable more importance, I think, is Jack's open hostility to the Arms Control Satellite idea ("I believe it will cause us more problems than simple disclosure!"). This means that Ambassador Johnson has not been and will not be exposed to our rationale, unless we take special action to make that possible.

As I see it, we have a situation like this:
Mr. Packard  Thought we knew how he felt, but not sure now. Has never had our briefing.

Mr. Helms  Not sure he has had anything except a quick phone call from Ambassador Johnson. Has never had our briefing.

Dr. DuBridge  Didn't even want us to write about it. Has never had our briefing.

I recommend that, in accordance with Dr. DuBridge's comment, Dr. McLucias should call a luncheon meeting of the ExCom, with Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and Dr. Tom Paine as special guests (no aides or camp-followers to be present). At that luncheon, you should brief the group as to why we feel so strongly about an Arms Control Satellite. This will prepare the key participants for the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee meeting.

PAGE L. WORTHMAN
Colonel, USAF

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possible, the survey of a nation can be carried out faster by aircraft
than by satellites, aircraft can be selectively employed, and they need
offer no political risks. An intensive program of earth-sensing from
aircraft over selected cooperating countries could provide a useful
assessment of the utility of earth resources surveys prior to embark-
ing on a very expensive satellite program.

Second, NASA has concluded that its initial earth resources satellite
will be more cost-effective if it uses an electronic imaging system,
rather than film-recovery cameras. It is quite possible that highly
refined electronic imaging sensors will permit economy and improvement
in NRP operations in the future. It may be appropriate and mutually
advantageous for NASA to make a significant commitment to advancing
the technology of high resolution electronic sensors to replace film-
camera systems.

NRP Relationships with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

The US-USSR discussions of 1968 regarding a Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty brought the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
directly into satellite reconnaissance policy considerations. Concerned
that the USSR would not agree to on-site inspection, AGA proposed to
negotiate with the USSR on the assumption that the United States was
prepared to accept "enforcement by maximum, or if necessary, exclusive reliance on national means of verification..." (for the United States, this expression means "satellite reconnaissance"). In addition, in order to support its proposal, ACDA recommended declassifying the fact that the U.S. is conducting satellite reconnaissance, disclosing to the Soviets that reconnaissance satellites are our main reliance for verification, briefing Congress on our reconnaissance capabilities, and informing the press and public -- gradually but officially -- along the same lines. After discussion within the United States Intelligence Board and key affected government agencies, it was decided that disarmament discussions with the USSR could proceed effectively, and possibly more effectively, by restricting the U.S. delegation to use of the expression "national means of verification" with no reference to our satellite reconnaissance program. It was pointed out that disclosure is an irreversible step which could have profoundly adverse effects on national security. Furthermore, to single out one or some intelligence collection methods now and to pass only that or those to the Soviets, Congress, and the American public would be dangerous and misleading and could evolve a genuine "credibility gap."

An alternative approach exists which could give ACDA the advantages
of satellite reconnaissance without adverse effects on the security
protection required by the National Reconnaissance Program. In this
approach, the United States would be prepared to negotiate with the
Soviets on the basis of an Arms Control Satellite which would be
developed by NASA for the ACDA. This satellite could be defined, on
the basis of developments of the past decade, such that its performance
would be highly credible to the Congress, the press, and the public.

Whether operated internationally, bilaterally (NASA and the Soviet
Academy), or nationally (NASA alone) the approach offers significant
advantages. By working outside the National Reconnaissance Program,
ACDA would not need to confront the Soviets (and the rest of the world)
either publicly or privately, with the reality of the U.S. intelligence
program and would avoid an irreversible confrontation with other nations,
Congress and the American public. This approach would also allow the
United States to continue its covert reconnaissance program (the NRP)
as a unilateral and essential source of basic intelligence. A separate
ACDA/NASA program would protect existing intelligence security and
could achieve a measurable step toward legalizing satellite observation
at little or no risk to U.S. national interests.

In Summary

The United States government is deeply dependent on overflight