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~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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REF ID: A660116

THE NRO STAFF

July 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONE [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: NRO Annex to the STG Report

I met with Jack Shaw, this morning, to show him our NRO Annex to the STG Report and obtain his (and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson's) concurrence in that portion of the report which discusses the Arms Control Satellite.

Jack's proposed changes are at Tab A. Our experience here is rather like that with Don Steininger on the aircraft/satellite issue: we can mention aircraft but shouldn't expand on how good they are. Shaw thinks it's all right for us to mention an Arms Control Satellite but we should drop those sentences which explain why we think it's a good idea ("You pre-judge the findings of the Committee").

I think we have no choice but to follow Jack's desire and will make changes as indicated in Tab A to our hard copy of the report.

Jack thinks Ambassador Johnson would be willing to hold an NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee meeting right after the final NSSM 28 Committee meeting. Of considerable more importance, I think, is Jack's open hostility to the Arms Control Satellite idea ("I believe it will cause us more problems than simple disclosure!"). This means that Ambassador Johnson has not been and will not be exposed to our rationale, unless we take special action to make that possible.


As I see it, we have a situation like this:

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Mr. Packard

Thought we knew how he felt, but not sure now. Has never had our briefing.

Mr. Helms

Not sure he has had anything except a quick phone call from Ambassador Johnson. Has never had our briefing.

Dr. DuBridge

Didn't even want us to write about it. Has never had our briefing.

I recommend that, in accordance with Dr. DuBridge's comment, Dr. McLucas should call a luncheon meeting of the ExCom, with Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and Dr. Tom Paine as special guests (no aides or camp-followers to be present). At that luncheon, you should brief the group as to why we feel so strongly about an Arms Control Satellite. This will prepare the key participants for the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee meeting.



PAUL L. WORTHMAN
Colonel, USAF

Presented to Mr. Helms on Fri, 11 Jul 64.

*Headed for a memo addressed to himself
to be used in conversations with Mr. Packard.*



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possible, the survey of a nation can be carried out faster by aircraft than by satellites, aircraft can be selectively employed, and they need offer no political risks. An intensive program of earth-sensing from aircraft over selected cooperating countries could provide a useful assessment of the utility of earth resources surveys prior to embarking on a very expensive satellite program.

Second, NASA has concluded that its initial earth resources satellite will be more cost-effective if it uses an electronic imaging system, rather than film-recovery cameras. It is quite possible that highly refined electronic imaging sensors will permit economy and improvement in NRP operations in the future. It may be appropriate and mutually advantageous for NASA to make a significant commitment to advancing the technology of high resolution electronic sensors to replace film-camera systems.

NRP Relationships with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

The US-USSR discussions of 1968 regarding a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty brought the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency directly into satellite reconnaissance policy considerations. Concerned that the USSR would not agree to on-site inspection, ^{The Committee of Principals} ~~AGDA~~ proposed to negotiate with the USSR on the assumption that the United States was



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prepared to accept "enforcement by maximum, or if necessary, exclusive reliance on national means of verification..." (for the United States, this expression means "satellite reconnaissance"). In addition, in order to support its proposal, ^{-the Department of State ✓} ACDA recommended declassifying the fact that the U.S. is conducting satellite reconnaissance, disclosing to the Soviets that reconnaissance satellites are our main reliance for verification, briefing Congress on our reconnaissance capabilities, and informing the press and public -- gradually but officially -- along the same lines. After discussion within the United States Intelligence Board and key affected government agencies, it was decided that disarmament discussions with the USSR could proceed effectively, and possibly more effectively, by restricting the U.S. delegation to use of the expression "national means of verification" with no reference to our satellite reconnaissance program. It was pointed out that disclosure is an irreversible step which could have profoundly adverse effects on national security. Furthermore, to single out one or some intelligence collection methods now and to pass only that or those to the Soviets, Congress, and the American public would be dangerous and misleading and could evolve a genuine "credibility gap."

[Handwritten notes and signatures]

An alternative approach exists which could give ACDA the advantages



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of satellite reconnaissance without adverse effects on the security protection required by the National Reconnaissance Program. In this approach, the United States would be prepared to negotiate with the Soviets on the basis of an Arms Control Satellite which would be developed by NASA for the ACDA. This satellite could be defined, ^{in the} ~~on~~ the basis of developments of the past decade, such that its performance would be highly credible to the Congress, the press, and the public.

~~Whether operated internationally, bilaterally (NASA and the Soviet Academy), or nationally (NASA alone) the approach offers significant advantages. By working outside the National Reconnaissance Program, ACDA would not need to confront the Soviets (and the rest of the world) either publicly or privately, with the reality of the U.S. intelligence program and would avoid an irreversible confrontation with other nations, Congress and the American public.~~ This approach would ~~also~~ allow the United States to continue its covert reconnaissance program (the NRP) as a unilateral and essential source of basic intelligence. ~~A separate ACDA/NASA program would protect existing intelligence security and could achieve a measurable step toward legalizing satellite observation at little or no risk to U.S. national interests.~~

In Summary

The United States government is deeply dependent on overflight

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