

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DIRECTORATE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS (OSAF)
AF UNIT POST OFFICE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90048**

4 November 1965



REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

SUBJECT: NRO Management Documents

to: Deputy Director, NRO (Mr. Reber)

1. As requested by your 22 October memorandum on the above subject, here are my comments on the proposed series of management documents in general, and the 20 October draft of GMS-1 in particular.
2. I agree that some documentation of general NRP management concepts can serve useful purposes, such as: basic guidance to all elements of the NRO, and avoidance of misunderstanding concerning authorities and responsibilities. In the attached pages, I have included a number of specific comments which I will be happy to discuss further if desired.
3. In past practice, and as reiterated in paragraph 6c of the draft GMS-1, the NRO has operated under streamlined management procedures and with the minimum number of personnel. I firmly believe that in documenting our management procedures, we should strive for the minimum documentation and that we should avoid overemphasis on detail. If our procedures are spelled out in detail, we will have set in motion a trend toward increased paperwork, a diversion of talent and attention from operations to administration, inevitable increases in personnel required, and the eventual impairment or loss of our quick reaction capability and project-oriented can-do attitude.
4. As to overall philosophy of NRP documentation, I recommend adoption of the following principles:
 - a. Keep the paperwork as low as possible.
 - b. Avoid trying to make all procedures for all programs and projects uniform. There is no advantage in forcing uniformity across diverse projects being conducted within different services and agencies. I think we should be careful to keep the emphasis on making projects work rather than making procedures uniform.
 - c. Don't lose essential flexibility by formalizing unnecessarily.

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d. Avoid the "completeness complex." The justification for each document should be that it actually helps get the NRO job done, and this should be self-evident, rather than that it makes documentation of all procedures complete.


e. Use the services of formal management documents very sparingly -- to cover matters which require general distribution, and infrequent amendment or revision. Use simple wires or letters to concerned individuals for all else.

5. I appreciate very much the opportunity to comment on these proposed documents prior to publication.



JOHN L. MARTIN, JR
Brigadier General, USAF
Director

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Comments



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b. I suggest that enabling documents which are listed in paragraph 2 be cross referenced in the body of the directive to support all key provisions which require the issuance of internal directives within the individual services and agencies participating in the NRO (such as those supporting par 6b, for instance). The adequacy of these documents will determine the worth of the GMS document.

c. The phrase "through overflights" in par 3a should be changed to "through satellites or overflights," Overflight by aircraft is not in the same category as overflight by satellite; the latter has been, and is still being, argued publicly by the US in the UN as being perfectly legal.

d. Suggest "intelligence requirements" in par 3b be changed to "intelligence collection requirements," to be consistent with the basic NRO charter.

e. Reference par 4, we often have semantics problems with certain security words. The old DISCOVERER project was clandestine. However, for several years now, the satellite reconnaissance part of the NRP has not been, and is not now clandestine; it is merely highly classified. Aircraft overflights are clandestine.

f. Reference par 7c, this description of the functions of the NRO staff omits entirely one of its major functions, namely that of assisting the Program Directors by performing for them those duties and tasks which necessarily must be carried out in Washington. This point is of varying importance to the different Programs of the NRO, for reasons noted below, but is of major importance to SAFSP. When SAFSP was established in September 1960, all intervening Air Force echelons were eliminated, including the entire Air Staff at Hq USAF and the entire AFSC staff. (Eliminated, not merely condensed into a miniature Air Staff). Yet, major Air Force and AFSC resources are involved, and there are numerous tasks that the Director, SAFSP must have done in Washington. Therefore, SAFSS was established simultaneously for two purposes: (1) to assist the Secretary as he might require (2) to assist the Director, SAFSP as he might require for those aspects of his responsibilities that required actions in the Washington area. I served 4 years on the Staff, with this arrangement of responsibilities, under which we literally worked for the Director, SAFSP, in whatever function he required Washington assistance, in addition to serving the Under Secretary, as he required. The subsequent establishment of the

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
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NRO has not altered this original need or the initial responsibility of the staff to perform it. With the establishment of the NRO, this function was formally extended to cover all NRO Program Directors equally, to the extent that they require it (as outlined in the basic NRO organization memorandum of 23 July 1962, which is the principal NRO document which GMS-1 will supersede). However, in practice, no Program Director requires much of this function except SAFSP, as all of the others and major portions of their resources are located in Washington. Therefore, I recommend that the lead sentence in par 7c be changed to read, "The functions of the NRO Staff are (1) to assist the DNRO, as he requests, in the management and conduct of the NRP, and (2) to assist the NRO Program Directors, as they request, in accomplishing Washington area functions and tasks in support of their assigned responsibilities."

g. Also, reference par 7c, in the second sentence, the qualification "for NRP matters" should be deleted. All personnel serving on the Staff should be responsible and responsive solely to the Director, NRO Staff without any qualification. (note the provisions of the 11 August agreement concerning allegiance to parent service or agency).

h. Reference par 7c(2), the phrase "establishing both long and short range launch schedules" should be altered to conform with reality. The long range mission planning rates are established by the DNRO in the process of his budget and program approval, not by the Staff. The long range schedules are subsequently established by the Director, SAFSP in the process of contracting for the hardware, and these schedules are part of the contracts. The Staff establishes the desired short range schedules; the actual schedules followed throughout the complex of contractors, launch base, etc., are established by the Director, SAFSP, with the objective of following the desired schedule as closely as possible. In the relatively simple THOR based CORONA system, we succeed quite well; in the more complex systems we do not have this same degree of flexibility.

i. Also, reference par 7c(2), recommend "selection between available on-orbit target options," which fully describes the Staff's responsibility for each project, rather than "on-orbit payload tasking selections."



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j. Reference par 7c(7), "Managing" is not the correct word unless "scheduling" or "tasking" is added in front of "the processing." The actual processing and production is managed by contractors (EK), and by the Commander SPPL, who is responsible directly to the Director, SAFSP. Also, management of the R&D referred to is not assigned to the Staff; it is assigned to a joint three-man CCB which is chaired by a member of the Staff. ~~SPPL~~

k. Reference par 7e, and also first par 9, subpar d(4), my additional duty is Deputy Commander, SSD, for Satellite Programs, not Vice Commander.

l. Reference par 7g, the wording of this paragraph is contradictory to explicit provisions of the 11 August Agreement. It clearly presupposes the assignment to the CIA of the responsibility for development, procurement and operation, for entire satellite projects, as well as partial responsibility for split-management satellite projects. It should be reworded to be consistent with the Agreement.

m. Reference par 8, I recommend adding a sub-paragraph stipulating that, until the DNRO has approved the actual development of a project, that no code name or individual special clearance will be used, in order to avoid proliferation of code names and individual clearances for studies and proposed projects not actually approved for development.

n. Reference par 8e, the last part of the last sentence is incredible, and surely must be an error. The DNRO cannot possibly discharge the system engineering and integration responsibilities described in the DOD-CIA NRP Agreement; he must delegate this responsibility for each project to a single Program Director, along with the necessary authority. This point should be made clear in the GMS-1 directive.

o. Reference first paragraph 9, subpar c, the phrase "under their jurisdiction" is not clear, and does not provide the necessary latitude to get the job done. I recommend that "determine need-to-know for clearable persons actively working on NRP matters under their jurisdiction" be changed to "determine need-to-know and clear clearable persons when the need-to-know is based upon a responsibility assigned to them by the DNRO."

p. Reference first paragraph 9, subpar d(4), change "Office of Special Projects, Secretary of the Air Force (SAFSP)" to "Directorate of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force (SAFSP)," and change "Director, SAFSP" to "Director of Special Projects (SAFSP)," These are consistent with existing orders, documents, stationery, etc.

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q. Reference second paragraph 9, subpar d, this clearly means that no NRP communications will go to the Sec Def, Deputy Sec Def, or Sec AF without specific prior DNRO approval. Does it also mean that no CIA NRP communications will go to the DCI except through the DNRO? If it doesn't, the paragraph will not be correct as written, and should be changed to reflect the actual situation, or deleted.

r. Reference par 10, I recommend that a specific identification be made of all the particular NRO documents that are being superseded, and that these documents be listed explicitly, rather than using the blanket phrase "supersedes any conflicting NRO documents, past or present." The latter course is unquestionably easier, but is contradictory to the main purpose of the new documents. If various parts of some documents are to be rescinded only where they conflict with the new series, but otherwise remain in effect, the tasks of complying is made much more difficult. There is more room for misunderstanding since each must, on his own, decide which parts of old directives have been superseded by new ones, and to what extent. Furthermore, I think the past documents which are being superseded should be reviewed comparatively with the new ones at the time the new ones are written. There are a number of NRO agreements and internal NRO documents and directives that have been issued previously, which have been effective to varying degrees. It would seem that the old adage that "he who is ignorant of history is doomed to repeat it" should be respected in this new undertaking by reviewing all of the old documents, in the actual process of writing the new, and specifying explicitly those that are being superseded, and to what extent.

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