MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ALLEN

SUBJECT: SS-5 Activity (April 27 through May 7)

I have summarized below, the more significant items of SS-5 activity during the period of your absence. I would appreciate an opportunity to review and discuss with you. I have not arranged them in any order of importance.

PFIAB Report to the 40 Committee: Dr. Naka asked us to examine our normal semi-annual report to the President's FIAB with a view toward sending the most recent one to the 40 Committee and expanding distribution to include the Committee on a recurring basis. We have reviewed the report and have prepared a memo for Dr. McLucas which would apprise the 40 Committee of its existence and solicit their views as to whether or not they would like to see it on a regular basis.
Briefing for Dr. Martin: I briefed Dr. Martin on April 28. The briefing consisted of a review of the organizational environment, the charter, and NRO organization, followed by a detailed briefing on national satellite reconnaissance policy. Dr. Martin was attentive and interested; he had many questions which I was able to answer to his satisfaction.

General Bennett Proposal on Decontrol and Downgrading: You mentioned before leaving that Dr. McLucas was deciding whether or not he should send a summary of the U.S./Soviet dialogue on the ERS resolution in the U.N. to Mr. Laird and Mr. Packard. We received the folder back on April 28 and were provided a memorandum from Dr. McLucas to Messrs Laird and Packard for transmittal of the summary. We had the McLucas memo autopenned before classifying in the TK system, adjusted the classification of our summary accordingly and transmitted the complete package with the McLucas note.

You also signed a memorandum to Admiral Showers, before leaving which we had agreed to hold pending John Hughes' return and a discussion of the subject. John returned on Friday, May 1 and immediately became involved in the Cambodia situation. I did not get to talk with him until Friday evening. I discussed our proposed memo to Showers, explaining to John our need for the information. John agreed with the request and suggested I send it on. I did so.

On Monday, May 4 we received a copy of Dr. Foster's response to Mr. Packard on the Bennett proposal. As I mentioned to you on Tuesday, Foster took a very strong, positive position and suggested for Mr. Packard's signature to General Wheeler, a memo which expressed concern that the Bennett proposal would represent a major departure from present policy with possible far-reaching implications. The Foster-suggested memo would ask DIA, before recommending such a departure, to look, with USIB, at all the factors of the issue to 1) identify alternative security policies and 2) evaluate them in terms of value and risk; and to do this by forwarding a modified proposal directly to the USIB.
Dr. Foster noted for Mr. Packard that he had not coordinated his response with Dr. McLucas or Mr. Froehlke and asked for Mr. Packard's comments. We have no further word on Mr. Packard's reaction. We have readied the paper for Dr. McLucas' perusal (without staffing.)

I called John Hughes again on Tuesday, to tell him of your plans to revisit USAFE and USAREUR. He had no objections and did not consider it necessary to forewarn of your visit. He agreed it was important that we learn as much about the situation as possible. He mentioned he had received our memo to Showers, and iterated that the questions were appropriate. I asked if he had seen the Foster response. He indicated he had. He asked my feelings--I told him I agreed with it and considered it a much more reasonable and healthy approach.

John asked me if Dr. Naka had done anything further (than having the Bennett proposal discussion stricken from the May 1 breakfast schedule) about the scheduling of a Bennett proposal discussion with the Service ACSIs at a Froehlke breakfast session. I told him that Dr. Naka agreed that it needed to be done in the presence of Dr. McLucas and the Service ACSIs (who normally attend only the first Froehlke meeting of the month) unless as Dr. Naka mentioned "it is settled out of court."

IDEALIST Billets: I have had an exchange of messages with General Ross and his people on this subject. OSA's response represents a complete abdication of its responsibilities in this area--and as usual, leaves me holding the bag. I need to discuss this further.

Lockheed Request to Colonel Buzard re Dr. Stampfl: As you know Lockheed was pressing Colonel Buzard for permission to apprise Dr. Stampfl, Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) of their activities on the Colonel Buzard did not want to permit this involvement and asked our help. I talked with General Smart's office to ascertain whether
Bennington Request on Mr. Disney: We received a DDR&E request to fill out Disney with C. and McGough suggested we shelve it as unjustified and not essential. I learned from Dr. Naka and Colonel Sweeney that Bennington was involving Disney in a Foster exercise that related the restriction of cloud cover to the perennially stated need. I approved Disney's access immediately. Wally McGough was very upset. I related the facts. None of this bothers me as much as the justification for the access. I would like to discuss with you.

Berger Involvement in Historical Coverage: You left with me a proposed letter which General King had suggested Dr. McLucas sign to General Grussendorf. I have prepared an LHSM and have rewritten the request to Grussendorf for Berger's services.

Air Force General Counsel Access: You asked me before leaving on April 27 to talk with Colonel Ratkovich about the access request on Mr. Stempler. I visited Colonel Ratkovich prior to our visit with General Carpenter but forgot to mention the results. Colonel Ratkovich was not upset; he understood the tight controls that we are trying to effect but indicated that Stempler, none the less, was being involved by the Secretary in almost every meeting the Secretary had with the ACSI people. It appeared to me that Stempler was being used by Seamans in a manner similar to that in which the President uses Mr. Mitchell. In this light, I told Colonel Ratkovich that we had no problem with the request and that I would proceed to authorize the access. I have done so.

or not Stampfl had a need for these discussions and learned that not only was there no need but NASA did not intend for Stampfl to be involved in these activities. I also mentioned this matter to Dr. Naka at Staff Meeting this morning. He agreed that the Lockheed marketing people should not be allowed to brief Stampfl. I called Buzard and passed this guidance on to him.
Outstanding Unit Award for Detachment 11 (Our Commo Group):
As a result of our discussions with General Carpenter, I forwarded the request to Dr. Seamans with your cover note along with the descriptive LHSM we prepared for Dr. McLucas. Apparently Colonel Simokaitis in Dr. Seamans' office did not notice our statement that "we had discussed with General Carpenter." So he sent it to the Chief for a review prior to Dr. Seamans' approval. Unfortunately, neither Colonel Otis Moore, in the Chief's office, or the Chief noted our coordination with General Carpenter--because I received, late Friday, May 1, the word that the Chief needed more information. Lt Colonel Bacon hadn't noticed our pre-coordination either. On Monday, May 4, I stopped by to see Colonel Moore and asked if I could help. He mentioned that Seamans' office had sent it over for the Chief to see before signature. He suggested that you (or you and I) talk with the Chief. I said fine--but indicated you were away until Friday. He said the Chief's schedule was also jammed up and asked me the urgency. I replied there was no real urgency--and added that we had already discussed with General Carpenter to effect the pre-coordination. He was surprised, and indicated that that would probably solve the problem. He will check with the Chief. I asked Lt Colonel Bacon to follow up. I asked Lt Colonel Hausenfleck to check also.

On May 5, Lt Colonel Bacon called to say he was returning the award folder to me. Evidently Colonel Moore, on the basis of my discussion with him had checked it out with General Carpenter, who confirmed that we had discussed it with him, that he agreed--but that since the Chief has been out this week, and he planned to be out next week, he would not have an opportunity to review it for the Chief. He (General Carpenter) has suggested that you discuss with General Ryan just as we had done with him. I have not set an appointment for you. Should I do so?

Call from Mr. Kriegsman: Mr. Kriegsman called to express his thanks for a very complete, well informed briefing on the SOC presented by Colonel Sweeney and his people on
Monday, April 27. Mr. Kriegsman asked that I pass the information on. I have mentioned Kriegsman's call to Colonel Sweeney.

Program 647 MGS: Colonel Porter, 647 SPO and Major Brendel, General Hedrick's representative on 647 met with us to discuss the West Coast submission of a Form 1391 for the 647 construction activities. We resolved the issue to our mutual satisfaction and dispatched a wire to the 647 SPO/SAFSP-3 with our instructions.

Palley Departure: I had the opportunity, since I was not going to be able to attend the Wednesday evening, April 29 going-away session for Palley to have lunch with him and to express your regrets for not being able to attend either and to express both our thanks for his fine cooperation and excellent support of our activities. As a matter of interest, Mr. Palley has announced that he will become President of Martin Metals, a wholly owned subsidiary of Martin-Marietta located in Wheeling, Illinois (just outside Chicago). This company manufactures metals for aircraft and rocket engine casings. It has, as I mentioned before, been losing about $1 million per year for the last five years; its gross sales are estimated to be about $10 million annually. Palley's job is to show a profitable balance sheet over the next two years at which time Martin will decide whether to continue and expand its activities or dispose of it.

On a subject related to Palley's departure--Howard Barfield will pick up the Palley effort in an acting AD capacity. We have already begun to bring Howard up to speed on SACC/MSFPC generally and open items (such as the guidelines and the possible NSAM 156/40 Committee review) specifically. We have had two sessions with Howard with another planned for May 7.

Possible NSAM 156 Review of NASA Activities: I have had two calls on this subject, one from Mr. Krueger and one from Mr. David Williamson. I am satisfied with their tentative approach on the issue. It is essentially the
one we suggested to them. I have attached an M/R which describes the issue and background (TAB A).

Cost Savings in NRO Communications: As a result of our cleaning up loose ends of circuitry, rerouting traffic, and solidifying our plans for the SOCOMM switch, we have been able to reduce our overall circuitry costs by annually. We will probably have to apply this savings to our efforts at the since requirements have increased over those initially planned. We do not feel our overall communications budget will decrease over the next two to three years; however, we do plan to absorb additional customer requirements into our SOCOMM FASTRAN capability in a manner similar to our arrangements for the SOC. This latter activity will certainly enable a savings in our NRO contractual costs presently being carried by the program directors. We intend to insure that each time we take on one of these customer requirements a corresponding reduction is realized in the cost of the contracts with that customer.

Mr. Risley and the General Advisory Committee for Arms Control and Disarmament: On Thursday, April 30, Dr. Naka, Colonel Sweeney and I met with Mr. Risley, who was visiting to arrange first for a dry-run of our intended briefing to the General Advisory Committee and the follow-on formal briefing to what Risley estimated to be about ten members of that Committee. This guy Risley continues to disturb me. As you know Mr. Ladner was not successful in following your direction that Risley be dealt with rather harshly, but instead, acquiesced to continuing Risley's access on the basis that Risley said he was sorry and that Mr. Marvel (the State) allowed as to how he had forgotten to apprise Mr. Risley of the security surrounding the identification of this organization. I can't really believe this since Risley has, for some time, been briefed TKH. I was able to apprise Dr. Naka of this complete story prior to our meeting with Mr. Risley. Mr. Risley's approach in the meeting was one of attempting to put the NRO in a position
of expounding on SALT, its verification, and the complete technical details of the NRO ability to support such verification. I remarked that we should not be asked to provide such a briefing, since we should not be upstaging the activities of Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lynn (and their respective panels) in this area. I suggested that any briefing we provide to this group be limited to a factual description of our organization, charter, and operational activities in an intelligence collection role. Dr. Naka agreed. He scheduled the dry-run of such a briefing for Mr. Thomas Fina and Mr. Risley to be given on Wednesday, May 6 by Capt Geiger and myself. Dr. Naka plans to attend. We can, at that time, decide on the appropriateness or the worthwhileness of such a briefing to the group represented by Fina and Risley. I get the impression that this Committee does not serve a very meaningful role. Interesting to note, they hang somewhere between State and ACDA, with neither really sponsoring their activities.

On May 6, Captain Geiger and I gave our standard briefing to these gentlemen as we had agreed. Dr. Naka was present for my part (the front end). When I finished, Dr. Naka asked Fina if he felt this portion was appropriate for the Committee. Fina replied--no.

Bob proceeded then to present the systems portion. Very few questions, but quite a bit of "unspoken communication" between Fina and Risley. Bob had not planned to talk AR/AT, or specifically EOI. When he finished, Fina asked "now that you've reviewed operational and developmental systems, what about future planning--are you doing anything in real time readout, for example?" Bob then discussed EOI. At the close of the session then, I asked Mr. Fina the same question Dr. Naka had asked on my portion--is this portion of the briefing appropriate? Fina stated that rather than do this type briefing, he felt it best for he and Risley to think more about what the Committee needs for their review of SALT verification capabilities, and come up with a list of questions which they would then address to the "appropriate" agency (CIA, NPIC, NSA, NRO) for response with briefings tentatively set by Fina for May 28. He
mentioned that he had received briefings on "hardware and hardware capabilities" from the other agencies (CIA and NPIC) and he would have to decide just who should respond to which questions. The alarm rang here—and I considered it necessary to caution him on the question of the appropriateness of a discussion of the capabilities and potential of our operational and planned systems and hardware by agencies other than us.

He appeared to accept the cautionary word. He indicated that he would be in touch with us (with Dr. Naka I presume) as soon as possible on the questions and briefing plans.

I feel very uneasy about this one—I suppose because I really don't understand all I should about the exercise. We certainly were unsuccessful in our attempts with Risley (and Fina) to learn more.

**CIRIS and Your Reputation:** I am somewhat concerned over the continued infamous references by Admiral Bowen to your judgments about CIRIS. You will recall in our briefing of Admiral Bowen on February 19 you took the opportunity to express our concerns about the TOD/CIRIS. On March 2, 1970 you expressed officially these concerns about the usefulness of this data previously provided for the TOD and asked Admiral Bowen's help in understanding the reasons for the non-usefulness of our previous submissions. About a week later, Vance and Morrison prepared a paper for Admiral Bowen/Mr. Froehlke on the projected role of the DASD(I) in NRO affairs. Mr. Froehlke, in his discussions of the paper with Dr. McLucas, specifically on "CIRIS and fiscal guidance", mentioned the problems the NRO had with providing this data and the ability (or willingness) to provide it. During this particular meeting Mr. Froehlke marked in the marginalia that "General Allen was concerned over non use of this data." Dr. Naka has just received from Admiral Bowen a memorandum dated April 27, 1970 in which Admiral Bowen does it again—and I quote "Lew Allen has questioned the usefulness of data previously provided to the TOD as a forerunner of CIRIS." This statement is
totally unnecessary. Moreover, it has obviously been seen by Mr. Packard with whom Froehlke reviewed the Bowen memo before dispatch. Admiral Bowen has never responded constructively or otherwise. He simply continues to set you up as a "potential cause" for the failure of Seidel's inadequate reporting system. I think it is now time for us to call a halt to the continued references to your concern. I suggest that since Dr. Naka has established a "communications channel" with Admiral Bowen on CIRIS and the CDIP resources review, that we should ask him to kindly request Admiral Bowen to cease making such references.

DOD Directive 5160.32: You will recall this as the directive which gives the Air Force the lead crew responsibility in space—the one which the Navy has continually protested. We have seen the latest proposal, by DDR&E, with about 4 options: 1) cancel; 2) let it stand as written; 3) let Air Force be responsible for surveillance and warning systems plus all launch vehicles, launch and support operations; or 4) let Air Force be executive agent for all military space systems plus the launch and support operations.

We tend to favor Option 4 and have so advised Colonel Nelsen. In any event, we will still need to exercise through Mr. Packard an exception to the provisions of any directive for our continuing effort. We'll watch it closely.

NRO/DIA/USAF Management Agreement: As you know, I had given my version of this, the agreement, to Mr. Brubaker and Cdr Ralph in DIA and to Lt Col Jackson in AF, for their review and comments in early April. After some two or three weeks delay in their hands, I finally got the agreement back with a couple of very insignificant (certainly not worth three weeks) comments, which I agreed to accommodate in a final version. I had the final prepared on April 30 and sent it to Jerry Moskowitz for his review and concurrence/comments. NSA has now decided it would prefer to coordinate in a separate memo rather than on an added line in the agreement. I have no hangup here. Just have a little difficulty
keeping abreast of NSA desires. I plan to have the principals (McLucas/Bennett/Ryan) sign as soon as I have NSA's concurrence. We will keep you apprised.

Financial Data on Lockheed Contracts: We are still plagued with this task—and have submitted to OASD/Comptroller some additional info on fund status of Lockheed's eight (white) open contracts. For the time being, they (OASD/C) are satisfied.

Replacement for Capt Meceda: Gordon Bass is busily pursuing this item. He has about 5 good to excellent candidates. He is shooting for a May 15 identification of the one or two candidates he wants to interview. Looks like late August for a replacement date.

CIRIS Manpower Data: I have provided you a copy of the manpower data I submitted to Jim Marshall for his use in the CIRIS.

CIRIS/NRP Issues: I was visited by Cdr Martin (Froehlke's office) on May 4. Jim Marshall, Gordon Bass and I discussed with him, generally, our concerns about the NRO data inputs to CIRIS. I do believe, after one hour, we convinced him that he too should be concerned. His real purpose in his visit was to ascertain 1) if and 2) when he might have information on the issues we will bring before ExCom on July 15. Again, we are going to be terribly out of sync with them, since they will, at that very same time begin the (estimated two week) CDIP review for FY 1972—we will be wrestling with FY 1971 issues. I don't really see how he can fit any of this info into his review. I did not commit to anything—but rather suggested to Martin that I discuss the possibilities with you. He is awaiting our word.

U-2C's and NASA: General Smart responded to Dr. McLucas' office with "definite interest" and asked for an interface. We prepared a response for Dr. Naka's signature naming Colonel Hartley in both an overt and covert role.
Amrom Katz Consultancy: This matter has taken a slight (but serious) turn in course. I am not expounding the details here. Major Rose is preparing a summary brief on this particular matter for you. We have effectively stopped any further action until you have had an opportunity to review Ray’s brief.

Commo Computer Transfer: As you know, we experienced a bit of difficulty recently in attempting to move a 9300 from (closing down) to (for use in the 50K bit circuit for Bradburn). Problem: Our briefed point of contact in the Directorate of Data Automation suddenly became a regulation-conscious manager and refused to recognize a reasonable, appropriate, cost-effective, high utility move of the 9300. We were forced, by him, to resort to a decision by Mr. Schedler (as senior ADPE official for AF) waiving the provisions of a recent Packard directive controlling such moves; which
created another--Problem: Maj Gen Morris, Dir of Data Automation was caught unaware of the action and embarrassed when asked to explain by Lt Gen Crow--the briefed contact has never apprised Gen Morris (his boss) of the action. I met with Gen Crow, about three weeks ago--explained the situation to his satisfaction, in the presence of the briefed contact, a Mr. Burke. I asked Gen Crow for permission to brief Gen Morris since Mr. Burke was really not providing the support we required, also in Mr. Burke's presence. Gen Crow appreciated the importance, agreed to the briefing and asked me to proceed. I briefed General Morris on May 1. He was extremely attentive and receptive—summarized his recognition of the importance of our activity—guaranteed his complete support and asked that we feel free to call him at any time on any issue. Most important—he means it. I anticipate no further problems in this area.