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To Stewart!
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Access to this document will be restricted to those persons cleared for the specific projects.

This is typical of the kind of work which the AF has been guilty of for years and is in line with your desire to get the CIA out of the reconnaissance business — I will oppose this with all the resources at my command.

WARNING

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MEMORANDUM

10 March 1965

Dr. Fubini

The attached represents my ideas for a possible letter to Mr. McCone from Mr. Vance regarding the continuing NRO/CIA management problems. It is entirely consistent with the proposals you made to Mr. Vance recently (does not include, however, at this time, a redo of the Staff).

Dr. McMillan suggested I "try it out" on you.

If the attached is not a good approach, we will put on the "thinking caps" and try again... In any event, I think we should try something.

James T. Stewart
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, NRO Staff

Draft

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TOP SECRET
Dear John

For the past several months, it appears to me that you and I have had to devote an unreasonable amount of time to management matters in the CORONA Program. I suggest that we resolve this and any related management problems without further delay and, henceforth, focus our ExCom attention to significant policy aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program.

I have given considerable thought to the various CORONA differences and believe that diametrically-opposed management philosophies in the CIA and NRO are a basic cause of all of the problems. In my opinion, these two approaches are not amenable to a harmonious operation wherever individual project responsibilities are split between Program Directors.

As I see it, the CIA management philosophy is one of almost completely centralized technical management and operational control. The DNRO, on the other hand, delegates responsibility and authority for complete projects to the appropriate NRO Program Director in the field. The two philosophies work well on projects such as IDEALIST, OXCART, GAMBIT, 417; etc, but clash head-on in the split-responsibility of the CORONA Program. The only workable solution appears to be the assignment of
total responsibility for complete projects to the appropriate Program Director.

With regard to the CORONA Program, I have reviewed most carefully the contributions of the DOD and the CIA to its prosecution. I find that the CIA performs some covert contracting services, manages "software" support by the LMSC AP Facility, provides some computer support to the NRO Staff, and has a very small CORONA technical staff at Langley. I find that the DOD, on the other hand, also provides contracting services, does overall system engineering and technical direction, operates the launch facilities, command and control networks, and recovery forces, and has a great many people involved (both technical and operational).

In view of the above, the only logical solution is to assign total responsibility for the CORONA Program to Gen Greer. I understand he can assume the covert contracting function without difficulty. I assume that you will desire to assign the experienced technical people on your staff to him and station them in Los Angeles; this would permit the best possible utilization of these CIA skills. Computer support of the NRO Staff can continue as in the past.

This action will clarify the responsibility for all satellite programs by consolidating them under the appropriate
Program Director. In the space reconnaissance area, your staff probably should direct their attention only to studies and science/technology efforts as a part of the total NRP.

In analyzing the overall NRO, I find that the bulk of the aircraft technical and operational management assets are either CIA employees or AF personnel assigned directly to the CIA. With one exception--TAGBOARD--operational and advanced aircraft projects are now the total responsibility of the Director, Program B. In view of the close relationship of the TAGBOARD and OXCART projects, it would appear prudent to assign them both to Program B in lieu of the present arrangement.

This adjustment of aircraft programs would then complete the realignment of responsibilities, with complete satellite projects assigned to Program A, and complete/related aircraft projects to Program B. This assignment of responsibilities would permit a harmonious operation even with the differing management philosophies.

In line with all of the preceding, therefore, I propose that the following decisions and actions be effected 1 April:

a. Responsibility for existing CIA-let CORONA contracts with Itek, LMSC, and GE be reassigned to the Director, Program A.
b. The Director, Program A, station qualified technical representatives at all of these facilities.

c. CORONA technical personnel on your staff, who you feel can be spared, be reassigned to Director, Program A, and stationed in Los Angeles.

d. Computer support by CIA to the NRO Staff be continued.

e. Responsibility for TAGBOARD be reassigned to the Director, Program B.

f. The CIA staff support the NRO in space matters with appropriate studies and science/technology efforts that are an integral part of the total NRP.

g. Future space system projects be assigned to the Director, Program A.

h. Future aircraft system projects be assigned to the Director, Program B.

The above appears to be completely compatible with the 13 March 1963 CIA-DOD agreement re the NRP. However, I feel that document does suffer somewhat by not spelling out, in more definitive terms, the roles and missions of the participants.
In that vein, an addendum might be in order. I suggest, therefore, that we establish a small ad hoc group under General Stewart to prepare a proposed annex for our approval.

Please let me have your views within a few days. I feel it is most urgent that we settle these management problems at once and get on to more pressing affairs.

Sincerely,

Cyrus Vance