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-(S)-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON D.C.

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January 4, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PLUMMER


Mr. Plummer has seen.

SUBJECT: NSAM 156 Committee Review

At the right at Tab A is a copy of a recent letter sent by Dr. Ikle, Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Ambassador Porter, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The letter requests him as Chairman of the NSAM 156 Committee to undertake a review of the present national space policy, NSCA 2454. A parallel letter making essentially the same request was forwarded by Dr. McLucas to Ambassador Porter on November 29 (Tab B).

You, as DNRO, are a member of the NSAM 156 Committee along with Secretary Clements, Mr. Colby, Dr. Ikle, Dr. Fletcher and Dr. Kissinger, wearing his NSC hat. The 156 Committee has been continually active, and has reviewed several problems connected with NRO, NASA, and SALT.

We plan to brief you in detail on the philosophy and function of the 156 Committee at the time of our next policy briefing session with you. This memorandum is for information only.



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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

December 21, 1973

OFFICE OF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Subject: The 156 Committee and National Earth Observation Policy

As you know, the present national political and informational policy governing United States space activities in earth observation was drawn up by the NSAM 156 Committee in 1962. The last major review of this policy was in 1966 in the context of the non-military applications of earth sensing. The review concluded that the 1962 policy was valid in terms of protecting the National Reconnaissance Program. It also concluded that NASA should proceed with its planned experimental programs.

Since 1966, the nation has witnessed major advances in the use of space, specifically in the areas of national security, domestic application and international cooperation. I believe that it is now time, especially because the civilapplication programs have sufficiently matured, to update the present national policy. I am particularly interested in assuring that the continuing ability of the United States to use space freely for arms control verification is not jeopardized by decisions or actions which are focused on single segments of the national space effort.

Implications of the recent decisions with respect to partial decompartmentalization of satellite-obtained photo-reconnaissance, and the downgrading of "the fact of satellite photo reconnaissance" to Secret must be kept in mind in connection with the proposed review.

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The MBFR negotiations demonstrate continuing concern and pressure, on the part of our NATO allies, in obtaining information about and from "national technical means." A review of our policy in respect to such pressures, its modification, or reaffirmation is very much in order, both to deal with our allies and to work out a preferred approach on verification issues in the Vienna talks.

Accordingly, I propose that the NSAM 156 Committee undertake a review and make recommendations with respect to the following:

- a.) An update assessment of the arms control and intelligence implications of earth observation activities in light of disclosure problems and possible political risks.
- b.) A policy sorting out our priorities between arms control, intelligence, and other objectives of earth observation.

Fred C. Ikle

Fred C. Ikle

Attachment: Draft Terms of Reference

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TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR

STUDY OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS OF EARTH OBSERVATION

- I. Using NSCA 2454, July 1962, as a point of departure, develop a policy with respect to the United States earth observation programs which will:
- A. Permit the U.S. to sustain the conduct of our national reconnaissance activity for national intelligence and arms control.
- B. Prevent forced disclosure of details of the U.S. verification and reconnaissance program.
- C. Permit the U.S. to avoid confrontations in which U.S. space activity might be condemned as illegal or provocative.
- D. Permit the U.S. to derive maximum benefit from non-reconnaissance earth observations as well as from national reconnaissance end products.
- E. 'Avoid disruption of space-oriented programs of cooperative scientific investigation.
- F. Facilitate the resolution of any conflicts which might arise between the technical and security requirements of the U.S. reconnaissance activity, domestic requirements, and the international commitments and foreign policy objectives of the United States in a fashion which is in the overall best interests of the national security of the United States.
- II. The policy should incorporate the following:
- A. A comprehensive statement of United States' goals, actions and criteria with respect to political protection and successful continuation of:
 - 1. National reconnaissance and arms control verification.

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- 2. National earth observation for U.S. Government needs.
- 3. National earth observation for domestic and foreign scientific investigations.
- B. Considerations of the activities of the NSSM 72 Committee in respect to sharing the products derived from international civil satellite programs and the relationship of such programs to continuation of U.S. national reconnaissance programs.

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
November 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Impact of Photoreconnaissance Satellite Decompartmentation

In view of the recent approval which authorizes the DCI to plan for partial decompartmentation of satellite photo-reconnaissance, I believe that it would be appropriate to consider the impact of this action in the overall context of current national reconnaissance policy.

Accordingly, I propose that the NSAM 156 Committee review the present policy, NSCA 2454, in order to formulate updated political and informational guidelines which are reflective of the current environment. An assessment of the current environment should include growing domestic desires to exploit space derived data freely, international reactions to civil space programs, Sino-Soviet space philosophies, and estimates of U.S. toleration to political risk should international confrontation develop.



cc: SEC DEF DCI NASA ACDA



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