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IS) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.


THE NRO STAFF

April 11, 1974


MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL GRANGER, OSD(ISA)

SUBJECT: NSAM 156 Committee Talking Paper

Here is a talking paper on the NSAM 156 Committee and also one on the NSSM 72 effort, as of the first of this year. I believe that they dovetail. I would like to answer your questions should you have any. We are holding on any discussion with Mr. Plummer pending your and General Schoning's desires.



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NSAM 156 COMMITTEE

o Formed in May 1962 by President Kennedy to form a <u>U.S.</u>

<u>position on National Reconnaissance</u> which avoids dangers of restricting ourselves in international negotiations on disarmament and peaceful uses of outer space, compromising highly classified programs, or providing assistance of significant military value to Soviet Union.

- MEMBERS: Johnson - State

Nitze - OSD Charyk - DNRO Seamans - NASA

Wiesner - White House Kaysen - White House

Scoville - CIA Fisher - ACDA

- NSCA 2454 issued in July 1962 with 18 points of policy vis-a-vis U.S. Reconnaissance Programs which would:
 - -- Maintain freedom of action unilaterally to conduct reconnaissance satellite operations.
 - -- Prevent foreign political or physical interference with operations.
 - -- Prevent accidental or forced disclosure of details of program.
 - -- Avoid situation in the context of reconnaissance program which would be embarrassing.
 - -- Facilitate resolution of conflicts which arise between technical and security requirements and international commitments and foreign policy objectives.







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o In February 1963 studied <u>disclosure policy on U.S. satellite</u> reconnaissance capability pursuant to NSAM 216.

- MEMBERS: Johnson - State
Thompson - State
Cline - CIA
Nitze - OSD
Byroade - ACDA
Clay - JCS
Charyk - DNRO

Hilsman - State

- Recommend against disclosure since it is of doubtful and declining value in crises.
- o In January 1964 studied possible disclosure of satellite reconnaissance.

- MEMBERS: Johnson - State
McMillan - NRO
Scoville - ACDA
Wheelon - CIA
Cline - CIA
Thompson - State
Chayes - State
Hughes - State

- REPORTED TO: Rusk - State
McNamara - OSD
McCone - CIA
Fisher - ACDA

Bundy - White House Wiesner - White House Welsh - White House Johnson - White House


Webb - NASA Murrow - USIA

- Concluded that no additional action to disseminate more knowledge of the program beyond the level already disseminated in summer of 1962, e.g., all NATO heads of government, Foreign Ministers, and NAC Permreps were told officially of the reconnaissance satellite program... the fact that we had it, that it was developing well and



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was directly benefiting the alliance, and finally that the U.S. must maintain it at all costs.

- o In July 1966 studied political and security aspects of nonmilitary application of satellite earth-sensing -- requested by OMB and OST.
 - MEMBERS: Johnson State

McNaughton - OSD

Flax - DNRO Fisher - ACDA Sheldon - CIA

Keeny - White House Johnson - White House Welsh - White House Segmens - NASA

- Concluded that 1962 policy valid. Also recommended that the U.S. should:
 - -- Continue to protect NRP
 - -- Consider a major political initiative advancing concept of advancing economic betterment through space activities.
 - -- Allow NASA to proceed with tentative experimental program subject to limitations established between NASA and NRO.
 - -- Encourage NASA to consider relative merits of aircraft over satellites.
 - -- Ask USIB to review compartmentation.
 - -- Permit non-military programs to profit from achievements of NRP.
- o In September 1968 through May 1969 studied disarmament aspects of satellite disclosure policy.
 - MEMBERS: Bohlen State

Warnke - OSD Flax - DNRO Fisher - ACDA Duckett - GIA

Keeny - White House







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Johnson - White House Welsh - White House Paine - NASA Hughes - State

- Draft paper advocated declassification of fact of and forthright discussions with Russians State.
- ACDA supported this view seeing it a necessary step.
- Final position stated that term "national means of verification" only should be used in the negotiations with no public statements or press announcements to amplify and that Washington should guide.
- This paper was forwarded to NSSM 28 Committee, e.g., the progenitor of the Verification Panel. This position was adopted for SALT I.
- o In September 1971 studied SKYLAB earth terrain camera use -- request of NASA.
 - MEMBERS: Johnson STATE

Farley - ACDA Helms - CIA Packard - OSD McLucas - NRO Low - NASA

David - White House Kissinger - White House

- Approved 190-B camera for use as an exception to guidelines established 1966 and subject to final review prior to mission.
- Subcommittee reviewing on-going mission at request of 40 Committee.
- o In January April 1972 studied <u>impact of SALT ratification</u>
 on NRP security -- request of NRO.







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- MEMBERS: Johnson - State

Farley - ACDA Helms - CIA Rush - OSD McLucas - NRO

Fletcher - NASA

David - White House Kissinger - White House

- Similar disputes on need to disclose as seen in May 1969 paper on guidance.
- Disclosure question turned over to Verification Panel.
 Inspite of sentiments about the imperative to disclose,
 Kissinger decided that it wasn't necessary. This decision
 proved sound.









NSSM 72 COMMITTEE

- o Directed in September 1969 as an Ad Hoc Group on international space cooperation.
 - To prepare report on possible forms of international cooperation with friendly countries and Soviet Union.
 - Paralleled President's remarks to the UN.
 - Reports through under secretaries committee mechanism.
- o Studies undertaken by NSSM 72.
 - Cooperation between U.S. and USSR in space activities NSDM 70, July 1970.
 - Sensitive technology listing NSDM 71, November 1970.
 - International space cooperation, technology and launch assistance, NSDM 181, August 1972.
 - Opportunities and prospects for international cooperation in space science and exploration status not known.
 - International cooperation in outer space activities communications status not known.
 - International cooperation in outer space activities, technology developments and flight operations status not known.
 - Practical applications data from ERS under present consideration as "The ERS Problem and Our Options".
- o The ERS Problem and Our Options Study.
 - Paper has bone through several versions over 18 months or so was being done without specific terms of reference, as an "initative" by the group -- studied organization, acquisition and dissemination options for ERS data.







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- Appeared to be insensitive to reconnaissance policy.
- "Right to observe" a big issue here ERS is an acknowledged overt program which is drawing criticism as well as praise.
- NSC pointed out lack of statement of U.S. goals and lack of reference terms in paper.
- Study is stopped pending NSC/Interior/NASA statement of terms.
- The Fletcher to Shultz letter in part may have been an attempt to foreclose some options.
- o (An unresolved issue when does ERS activity begin to resemble reconnaissance activity?)





