# TOP SECRET



# 151 NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.



THE NRO STAFF

â

December 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Messrs Warnke and Halperin

## PROBLEM:


To prepare for your meeting with Messrs Warnke and Halperin.

#### BACKGROUND:


On November 29, you received a memorandum from Ambassador Kohler (see Attachment 1), calling for a DOD-initiated meeting of the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee. Since the memorandum caught us by surprise, our immediate concern was to find out who in the DOD had called the meeting and what was on his mind.

Our investigation showed that Dr. Morton Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Plans and Arms Control), ISA, had called the meeting. We are also told that the business of the meeting was to have been consideration of a proposed U.S. initiative for the U.S. to negotiate privately with the Soviets for a joint public disclosure of both nations' satellite reconnaissance capabilities. It was also likely that the episode of the Lindsay paper would figure in these discussions, since Mr. Raymond Garthoff (State) told us that Dr. Halperin was very unhappy over the NRO's "Gestapo tactics" in commandeering and classifying all copies of that paper.

On November 29, you discussed the proposed NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee meeting with Mr. Warnke and he told you he had never heard of it. You asked me to investigate the possibility of postponing the meeting until the DOD members had a chance to get together on the DOD initiative. Mr. Garthoff was pleased to cancel the meeting.



TOP SECRET
EXECUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRAPHIC
TOP STREETING SECRETARY





# PRESENT SITUATION:

Messrs Warnke and Halperin are to meet with you on December 19 at 1400 hours to discuss this entire matter. We see several possible avenues of discussion:

- 1. The initiative may turn out to be a proposal to the Soviets, pretty much as disclosed to us by an ISA staff member.
- 2. It may involve using the Lindsay paper, as written or in some new form, to create an image of U.S. "openness."
- 3. It may be a disarmament proposal, requiring an exposure of our policing capability (satellite reconnaissance) to strengthen its credibility.
  - 4. It may be a complete surprise.

# ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION:

There are several courses of action open to us in response to ISA's proposal.

- 1. We can hear the proposal and agree to calling an NSAM 156
  Ad Hoc Committee meeting. Unless the proposal is fairly innocuous we should avoid this response. The NRO is an organization representing the DOD and the CIA; as such it has an obligation to insure that proposals affecting it are staffed in both organizations. The fact that the initiative is DOD-inspired puts our relationship to the Ad Hoc Committee in a completely different light from previous meetings, where proposals originated with the White House, the State Department, and with the BOB/PSAC (jointly). Even if we were assured that Mr. McNamara agrees with the proposal (and we will probably be told something like that by Dr. Halperin), we owe it to the other half of the NRO to coordinate.
- 2. We can hear the proposal and insist that we must coordinate it with the DOD and CIA. Under Mr. Nitze's and Mr. McNaughton's regimes, proposals of Ad Hoc Committee variety were almost always coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (which also includes the DIA). This was a surprisingly rewarding coordination; many good ideas were developed in the process. Other reasons for following this course of action are indicated in 1, above.



TAB CTATT

10. JLUSSL:
EXCLUSES FROM ANNOMATIC REGRAMME
EXCLUSES FROM ANNOMATIC REGRAMME
EXCLUSION FROM ANNOTATION

MARKETINE BASE OF ASTRONOMERICAN

MARKETINE BASE OF ASTRONOMERICAN

MARKET PROPERTY OF ASTRONOMERICAN

MARKETINE BASE OF ASTRONO

CONTROL NO	
COPYOf	COPIES
PAGEOF	_ PAGES


CONTROL SYSTEM

TOP SECRET

EXCLUSES FROM AUTOMATIC RESEASONS

MO MORETIME ALON IN MOST MICROSIMS

HAMMOR HO		
)P7		
4(	٠٠	P46E6




Additionally, this group, except for yourself and Dr. Seamans, is essentially uninformed on the real issues: the basis of NRP security; the true threat of NASA's earth-sensing program; the fallacy of "legit-imization"; and present inter-nation attitudes regarding satellite reconnaissance. To most of these people, satellite reconnaissance is a space stunt which we will disclose some day; they do not understand it as pure espionage, which can never be disclosed unless one is willing to forfeit a capability.

4. We can hear the proposal and temporize. A strong case can be made for deferring any initiative at this time. We are replacing a Secretary of Defense, an Under Secretary of State (Political Affairs), an Associate Administrator of NASA, and the CIA representative. Why not wait until the dust settles? Disarmament has no suspense date.

## RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend that we examine critically the future role of the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee in the life of the NRO. We should be able to find our security policy answers in consultations with the JCS, the DIA, the DCI, the ExCom and the 303 Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee, although superb in 1962, looks somewhat tarnished in 1967. If we are forced to the Ad Hoc Committee, we should invoke our obligation to coordinate thoroughly with the DOD and CIA. We should brief all Ad Hoc Committee members throughly prior to any meeting and should insist that the Committee's findings go to its principals (Secretaries of Defense and State and DCI) prior to going to the White House.





П

TOP SECRET

04110F HO	_	
		P4461

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE . WASHINGTON

ILAXDLE VERSE CONTROL SYSTEM

27 Kovember 1967

-880117

MENDRANDUK 70 : DOD - Mr. Poul Marake

ACDA - Nr. Adrian Fisher

CIA - Xir

White House - Kr. Spurgeon Leoney, Jr. - Mr. Charles Johnson

KASC - Mr. Edward C. Welch


KASA - Kr. Robert C. Scemens, Jr.

SUBJECT . : Consideration of Policy on Classification of

Satellite Reconnaissance

The Department of Defense has suggested that the KSAN 156 Ad Hoc Committee meet to discuss various aspects of our policy with respect to classification of satellite recommissance activities. I am therefore inviting you to meet in my office conference room at 4:50 PK on Monday, December 4.





£203#7

047-67 Copy 5 of 15