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181, file POC-A-5
Copy No. 22 of 76
TCS-9558-6671

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29 August 1966

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB-D-41. 12/23

SUBJECT : Recommendations 18(6)(9a) and 18(6)(b) of the
11 July 1966 Report of the NSAM 156 Committee

REFERENCE : USIB-D-41. 12/23 (COMOR-D-7/51)
17 August 1966, Limited Distribution

1. In restricted session at the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) meeting of 25 August with the Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office (DD/NRO) in attendance, the Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) began the Board's consideration of this subject by a brief explanation of the reference report. He noted that when COMOR had looked at both of the recommendations it found that the ultimate disposition of either item was not crystal clear at this time. COMOR, however, had been able to reach unanimous agreement on an initial procedure for dealing with Recommendation 18(6)(b). In discussing Recommendation 18(6)(a) involving the question of removing the fact of the U. S. satellite reconnaissance program from codeword control to a SECRET or TOP SECRET classification, Mr. Tidwell commented that on the surface it may seem silly not to do this since the Russians know that we have such a program. However, looking at the problem in detail, COMOR (except for the State Member) felt that there was such a danger in uninformed discussion of this program that it would be better to clear a few additional State and NASA people so that any discussion would be based on accurate knowledge. After these additional people had been cleared and had looked at the situation, COMOR would in six months see if the problem had been solved or whether there was a need to take further steps.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

uncontrolled

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Memo to Holders
USIB-D-41. 12/23
(COMOR-D-7/51)
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2. In response to the Chairman's request for reactions, the Acting State Member said that he hoped the other members had read Tab A of the reference which was a good expression of State's point of view. Mr. Denney then called attention to some of the features of the COMOR report as follows:

a. Regarding the first sentence of paragraph 2, he did not think this was a true statement. First, there were many indications that the Soviets do have an adequate idea of the success of the U. S. satellite program. Secondly, we will never know whether the Soviets developed their very good system by their own efforts entirely, or whether there have been some breaches in our security controls.

CIA does not have such information

b. With reference to the third sentence of paragraph 2, which states in effect that removal from compartmental controls of the fact of the program or of its product would "increase the security risk," Mr. Denney pointed out that nowhere else in the COMOR report was there an explanation or discussion of how the security risk would be increased. He thought this was the \$64 question that the Board should address. Nevertheless, the report does mention but does not balance two existing security risks which would be reduced by relaxation: (a) the third sentence of paragraph 3 does mention the existence of loose talk by uncleared officials but the report does not discuss how serious this problem is and (b) the last two sentences of paragraph 3 mentioned but did not weigh the existing risk of warnings by TALENT Security Officers to uncleared persons.

3. Mr. Denney then observed that the COMOR report contains no discussion of the benefits of the relaxation of KH products; such as general convenience, cost, saving, mapping, shortcuts, the importance to NASA, etc. In short, since there was no discussion and weighing of the security risks as against benefits of various kinds, Mr. Denney believed that the report is not responsive to the USIB request to give "due consideration to the broad implications of the NSAM 156 Report from the intelligence viewpoint."

*Security is never intended to save:
Time
Money
Energy
Security is important.*

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4. On the merits of the question the Acting State Member felt it was important to distinguish between relaxation concerning the fact of the program and relaxation of controls on the products:

This is in error. In 1960 we were advertising satellites to the world, in detail.

a. On the fact of the program: in 1960 the problem was to keep the existence of the program secret from the Soviets because of the danger that Soviet knowledge of it might bring some kind of retaliation. In 1966 the problem is completely different; that is, to avoid official public statements about the program which might jeopardize national policy to gain international acceptance of it. Today the Soviets have knowledge and have not retaliated--hence that part of the problem has disappeared.

b. On the protection of the product, there have been a number of reasons for that. One was to keep the fact of the program secret, and this reason no longer applies. The second reason was to conceal the quantity and quality of the program, and it seems that the Soviets know most of the essential facts on these points. The third purpose in 1960 was not to give the Soviets help on developing their own program. Now we could give them the KH-4 product and probably the camera and not help them much.

CIA has no such info.

5. Mr. Denney agreed that the analogy to COMINT in justifying special compartmented security measures existed in 1960 but argued that no such analogy pertains in 1966 for two reasons. First, revelation of the fact of the program or its product now will not cut off the source. Second, unlike policy on COMINT, it is Government policy to gradually gain world-wide acceptance of satellite photography.

assume would just

But getting acceptance should be recognized as secondary to getting product!

6. The Acting State Member said that one sometimes hears the argument, and he understood that it was made in the COMOR discussions, that once a paper has been classified then the burden is on those who wish to downgrade it to show some positive benefit. Mr. Denney believes this overstates the intent of Executive Order 10501 which underlies the whole classification system and which in Section 3 calls for avoiding overclassification and in Section 4 for continuing review of classified material to downgrade or declassify that which no longer requires security protection in order to protect the integrity of the system. He expressed the concern that continuing to hold the fact of the reconnaissance program in a special security compartment is prejudicial to the integrity of the system.

and is this!

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ns/mo to Holders
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7. Although the COMOR report does not do so, the Acting State Member believed that USIB should weigh the security risks versus the benefits as follows:

a. With regard to relaxation of the fact of the program, on balance State proposes a SECRET level for the three propositions specified in the next to the last paragraph of Tab A. Mr. Denney thought that accepting something close to that formula would enhance the security of the system.

b. Regarding relaxation of the product, he thought that as to the KH-4 product, the original reasons for special handling have been greatly eroded. Therefore, there is much less security risk to weigh against the many benefits to be gained. Mr. Denney said that he was prepared to leave to the special Tidwell committee the question of how fast and how far to go in downgrading.

8. General Davis commented that it seemed to him that Mr. Denney had some good arguments. On the three propositions General Davis thought in the not too distant future these might be a good plan. However, he understands that what NASA wants and how they plan to use it is not clear. Therefore, General Davis believed that the COMOR Recommendations were the appropriate initial steps, after which the Board can consider the problem following NASA study.

9. The DIA Member believed that most of the comments by Mr. Denney were applicable to the paper the Board had previously considered on Security Handling of Satellite Reconnaissance Materials.* In defense of COMOR, General Carroll mentioned that the Board did get into the pros and cons in considering the earlier paper. Speaking of NASA, the DIA Member thought that it was all the more urgent to hold the line on the existing system since we did not know just how far they might want to go at this point. General Carroll was concerned that we might rapidly be on the way to losing our intelligence shirt, and felt that we should be most cautious about relaxing security controls until we could review the full intelligence implications in a more practical perspective. Regarding downgrading to SECRET, the controls over

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*See USIB-D-41. 12/15 (COMOR-D-7/42) 13 September 1965;
USIB-D-41. 12/18 (COMOR-D-7/45) 13 June 1966; USIB-D-41. 12/19
(COMOR-D-7/47) 11 July 1966.

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dissemination of this classification are practically nonexistent, therefore, General Carroll believed that the fact of the program would then be known all over the Government. He agreed that the COMOR Recommendations were only an interim action, but he did not believe that we should go farther at this time.

10. The Chairman asked that the minutes show that the Acting State Member had made an extremely able presentation of the State Department viewpoint. It was thoughtful, tactful and on the mark. As to the broad implications of the NSAM Committee's Recommendations, however, Mr. Helms thought that the Board had now looked carefully at those. The Chairman said that he would like to close consideration of this item by accepting the majority COMOR Recommendations in USIB-D-41. 12/23 which he understood the other Members of the Board, except the Acting State Member, approved.

11. Mr. Helms then expressed his feelings on this matter. He noted that it was very complicated, and that a lot of issues as well as departmental questions and interests were involved. He stated that by temperament he did not like the necessity for compartmented handling, and he hoped that sometime soon the community can get a more rational means. However, we do have the system which has been in existence for some years. Mr. Helms emphasized that we are now heavily dependent on satellite photography and therefore we now have to adhere to the protection of that asset by minimum changes in our classification system. Mr. Helms recognized that the effort of the policy makers to push for the acceptance of satellite photography was a proper course of action. However, he believed that the intelligence community was right in taking a restrictive view on relaxation. He pointed out that the Soviets had known we were flying the U-2 over the USSR but never said anything publicly about it until one had been shot down. He thought that the same attitude would apply to our satellite reconnaissance. Mr. Helms said he would not like to embarrass the Soviets by telling them how good our photography of the USSR is. Moreover, Mr. Helms stated that regarding ~~10158~~ he did not have the slightest doubt that this was a real breakthrough which he thought we must keep and cherish. Mr. Helms noted that recently when he had testified on this subject

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
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before Congressman Mahon and his CIA Appropriation Subcommittee, he had been very severely enjoined to keep this very valuable intelligence asset as secret as possible. Mr. Helms stated that, last but not least, as Director of Central Intelligence, he was charged with the security of intelligence sources and methods, and would therefore have to come down in support of maintaining our classification system as tight as possible.

12. In light of the above discussion, the Chairman determined that, based on the consensus of USIB except for the Acting State Member, the COMOR Recommendations in paragraph 6. a., b. and c. of USIB-D-41. 12/23 were approved.


JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

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18 26
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Policy: 18 Points ✓
Functions: NASA

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD


SUBJECT : Recommendations 18(6)(a) and 18(6)(b) of the
11 July 1966 Report of the NSAM 156 Committee

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-41. 12/21 (COMOR-D-7/48)
14 July 1966, Limited Distribution
b. USIB-D-41. 12/22 (COMOR-D-7/49)
29 July 1966, Limited Distribution

1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), meeting as an ad hoc group to study the subject recommendations (circulated to USIB Principals by reference a.) in response to paragraph 8 of reference b., has submitted the attached report for consideration by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

2. Recommendations by COMOR for Board action are contained in paragraph 6 of the attached memorandum, along with the footnote thereto on page 6 in which the State Member of COMOR concurs in Recommendation 6 c. but does not concur in Recommendations 6 a. and 6 b. for the reasons set forth in Tab A hereto.


3. The attached report will be scheduled on the agenda of the USIB meeting for 25 August 1966.


JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

Attachment

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Attachment
USIB-D-41.12/23
(COMOR-D-7/51)
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Recommendations 18(6)(a) and 18(6)(b) of the
11 July 1966 Report of the NSAM 156 Committee

1. COMOR, meeting as an ad hoc group for the purpose of studying recommendations 18(6)(a) and 18(6)(b) of the NSAM 156 Committee's report, has recognized that the intelligence community is facing a rapidly evolving situation in which it must continue to conduct the necessary reconnaissance in support of priority national intelligence requirements. This new situation is created in part by the following:

a. The successful execution over a period of approximately six years of a satellite reconnaissance program that has resulted in repetitive coverage of the entire Sino-Soviet bloc and in at least one-time coverage of over ten and a half million square miles of the earth's surface outside of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The impact of a program of this size is felt far beyond the confines of the intelligence community.

b. The implementation of a large-scale program leading to the establishment of a highly accurate world-wide geodetic net which has resulted in coverage of most of the earth's surface by DAFF photography and other applicable photography taken by the index camera systems of reconnaissance vehicles.

c. The successful acquisition of spectacular photography of large portions of the earth's surface by the NASA GEMINI program operating on a completely unclassified basis.

d. Publication of other unclassified photography of the earth, moon, and Mars as a result of unclassified programs conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union.

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e. A considerable increase in interest on the part of other Government departments and agencies, and on the part of the United States scientific community, in the contributions that can be made to scientific and technical problems by the use of earth sensing devices carried in satellite platforms. This interest has led to and has been encouraged by unclassified discussion by NASA of some of the applications that might be considered in a NASA-operated program.

f. The growing awareness that the Soviets are conducting a satellite reconnaissance program.

g. The publication of numerous articles in scientific and technical journals, and in the public press, describing or purporting to describe various aspects of the United States satellite reconnaissance program.

2. Against this background the intelligence community has operated a security system which appears to have been successful in preventing the Soviet Union from adequately assessing the successes achieved by the United States reconnaissance program. The intelligence community has also developed an elaborate set of procedures which has made it possible to use the information obtained by satellite reconnaissance for a wide range of purposes without undue security risk. In view of our success in achieving widespread use of our reconnaissance products while at the same time maintaining essential security, we are reluctant to recommend steps that would increase the security risk to our national reconnaissance program without having a very clear idea of the benefits to be obtained by such an increased risk.

3. Both the State Department representatives and the NASA representatives consulted by COMOR have stated that they would derive considerable benefit in the conduct of their business if they could discuss the fact of reconnaissance at SECRET or TOP SECRET level. It is clear, however, that all of NASA managerial problems in this regard could not be met unless the fact of reconnaissance could be discussed on an unclassified basis. State Department representatives also point out that there is a risk to both the U. S. political position and to the security of the U. S. reconnaissance program as a result of inadvertent error on the part of personnel who are not aware of the fact of our reconnaissance program

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or the requirement to keep it secure. The Department's representatives feel that if the necessary U.S. officials could be informed of and could refer to the fact of reconnaissance on a SECRET or TOP SECRET basis, they would be prevented from making these inadvertent mistakes. The State Department's position is supported to some extent by the practice of TALENT Security Officers who warn uncleared intelligence personnel who may have engaged in dangerous speculation concerning the U.S. program. The warning amounts to tacit confirmation of the fact of the existence of a U.S. reconnaissance program.

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4. At the present time the Department of State (less ACDA and AID) has a total of 173 personnel who are cleared for BYEMAN or TALENT-KEYHOLE information and thus have some knowledge of the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program. NASA has a total of 124 cleared for these same categories. Since the admission of the fact of U.S. reconnaissance at the SECRET or TOP SECRET level is an action that cannot be reversed, we believe that it would be advisable first for the State Department and NASA to see if the internal managerial problems causing them to favor the release of this information could be handled by granting an increased number of T-KH clearances to key personnel in their departments. If after an adequate practical test this approach does not solve the problem, we believe that the intelligence community should consider authorizing TALENT Control Officers to brief selected personnel at the TOP SECRET or SECRET level concerning the fact of U.S. reconnaissance. This has already been accomplished in the case of briefings given to NATO members and certain heads of State.

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5. Recommendation 18(6)(b) concerns the use of T-KH photography by NASA and asks that the problem be examined in terms of the selective removal of appropriate photography from codeword control or, alternatively, clearance of an increased number of NASA personnel in order that they may use the photography under existing codeword controls. In our examination of this problem we have concluded that it is too early to decide the optimum manner for NASA to exploit KH photography. We have concluded instead that the problem should be approached on a step-by-step basis and that the nature of the final step should be determined at a later date on the basis of experience acquired in the completion of the intervening steps. We can foresee at least the following at this time:

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(COMOR -D-7/51)
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a. Clearance of a panel of personnel, selected by NASA, representing all of the various disciplines of interest to NASA, this panel to be thoroughly briefed in the material now under codeword control and on the various exploitation efforts currently being employed by cleared personnel.

b. If after Step No. 1, NASA and the intelligence community conclude it to be desirable, Step No. 2 would be the establishment of a TALENT-KEYHOLE center at NASA headquarters and possibly at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston. This would permit NASA to receive its own copy of reconnaissance materials collected within the KEYHOLE system and would enable them to request the clearance of additional numbers of personnel to study the products and to become thoroughly familiar with both the products and exploitation procedures under codeword control to determine if further exploitation by NASA is desirable or feasible.

c. Step No. 3, the exact nature of which cannot be determined at this time, would be developed on the basis of experience required under Steps 1 and 2 above and might include the development of procedures for the sanitization, decontrol, downgrading, or declassification of certain types of KEYHOLE material, the actual sanitization or downgrading to be accomplished by NASA within the TALENT-KEYHOLE centers established under Step No. 2 above as approved by the DCI. *

6. ** Recommendation. It is recommended that:

a. ** To meet the recommendation in NSAM 156, 18(6)(a), the Department of State and NASA select an increased

*It should be recognized that any relaxation of strict security controls to accommodate NASA would also apply to other Government agencies who have similar needs for wider use of reconnaissance products.

**See footnote on following page.

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
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number of key personnel for clearance in the TALENT-KEYHOLE system to see if the risk of uninformed discussion can be controlled by this means.

b.* COMOR review the situation at the end of six months to determine whether the problem has been solved or whether there should be a briefing of additional persons at the TOP SECRET or SECRET level.

c.* To meet the recommendation in NSAM 156, 18(6)(b), NASA be invited to select a panel representing those scientific and technical disciplines of interest to NASA to be cleared for access to TALENT-KEYHOLE information in order that they may study current TALENT-KEYHOLE materials at NPIC and exploitation procedures used by NPIC, the Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy community, etc., and make recommendations to NASA concerning the desirability of increased NASA participation in the TALENT-KEYHOLE program.



William A. Tidwell
Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

*The State Member concurs in recommendation 6c as a means of providing further clarification of NASA needs and closer coordination with the intelligence community. He agrees to this first step without prejudice to the Department's previously stated position concerning the selective decontrol of satellite reconnaissance products. For reasons set forth in Tab A, the State Member does not concur in recommendations 6a and 6b, believing that removal of the fact of a U.S. satellite reconnaissance program from codeword control would enhance our political and security interests.

Attachment:
Tab A

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Attachment
SIB-D-41.12/23
(COMOR-D-7/51)
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Tab A

Department of State Comment on
Recommendation 6a of NSAM 156 Committee Report

The State Member believes it is increasingly clear that the system is diverging from its original purpose, and that the divergence is likely to grow in the next five years or so.

At the time of the September 1960 Presidential Directive there was a critical need to hold very closely all evidence of the operation and the product in order to conceal the existence of the program. At that time the U-2 incident was still fresh, and it was prudent to impose elaborate controls over products in order to keep the fact that the program was getting under way from becoming another international cause celebre. At the time the U. S. was concerned lest any revelation of the fact of a satellite reconnaissance program lead to Soviet efforts 1) at interference, 2) at camouflage, or 3) to use it to bring pressure on the U. S. to desist or to embarrass the U. S. at international forums. Thus, the objective of the elaborate measures begun in 1960 was to exercise careful control over the knowledge of the fact of satellite reconnaissance in order to prevent leaks and premature disclosures from interfering with a long range goal of getting the Soviets to accept satellite reconnaissance as a fact of life, and ultimately as a legitimate and perfectly legal activity.

Thus, the original purpose for elaborate control of the fact that the program existed was to protect the program from adverse foreign, and especially Soviet, reaction. Today that purpose would be better served by a far less restrictive classification on the fact that the program exists. The danger today is not of clandestine compromise of the simple fact of space reconnaissance, but of ill-considered public statements. The Soviets know we have a program; no one is concealing the fact from Brezhnev or from the readers of his speeches. It is important to protect the program from public statements which could elicit adverse foreign reactions or generate pressures for disclosure of detailed information.

A large and growing number of American officials who are not privy to the T-KH system know or can very reasonably infer that there is an American satellite reconnaissance program. What they do not know is that they are not supposed to talk about it, and they may not understand how considerations arising from that program bear upon their own work.

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JSIB-D-41.12/23
(COMOR-D-7/51)
17 August 1966
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Tab A

One suggestion mentioned at the COMOR meeting was to clear many more people. This seems imprudent, and even self-defeating to the purpose of compartmentalization. Many of the people in the increasing number of civilian agencies which are developing an interest in satellite photography do not have a need to know the highly sensitive aspects of the T-KH system. And some may for a variety of reasons not qualify for clearance to T-KH materials.

It seems much more logical to adjust the classification to meet the needs. Namely, the State Member suggests a SECRET classification for these three propositions: 1) the U.S. has a classified satellite reconnaissance program, 2) because this program is a valuable national security asset, details are kept highly classified and are not available to personnel without special clearances, and 3) it is a matter of national policy that the subject of satellite reconnaissance not be discussed in public by American officials. *unfortunately*
SECRET
at
Sec'd
Security
(questioning from Canada)

Another suggestion made at the COMOR meeting was for a sort of junior T-KH clearance, consisting of a statement about the fact that the program exists, to be read to individuals whose names would be recorded. Upon reflection, we are convinced that this would be needlessly restrictive. We believe that it would be much more useful to permit reference to the existence of the American program to appear in classified papers as required. This will be useful here in State as well as in other agencies where considerations of how certain programs or policies may touch upon the reconnaissance program will have to be reviewed. We believe that clarity in internal government papers at the SECRET level will be extremely useful in assuring that the national interest in the reconnaissance is borne in mind by those who might otherwise neglect that consideration. The fact of satellite reconnaissance is already known at the SECRET level; the State Member believes that we are not contributing materially to security by keeping specific reference to the existence of a U.S. program from being made at that level, so much as we are risking muddling questions on which we have the greatest interest in clarity.

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~~ISI~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

AKK

7 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

SUBJECT: USIB Activity on NSAM 156 Committee Recommendations

Purpose:

To apprise you of the status of NSAM 156 Committee Recommendations (6)(a) and (6)(b).

Background:

In its final report of July 11, 1966 (Tab A) the NSAM 156 Committee recommended that the USIB be asked to review two specific questions with a view toward facilitating NASA's studies of non-military earth-sensing applications. These were:

(6)(a) The question of removing reference to the fact that the U. S. has an operational satellite reconnaissance program from code-word control, retaining either a SECRET or TOP SECRET classification.

(6)(b) Selective removal of appropriate photography from code-word control for classified use by selected NASA and other cleared personnel studying the potentialities of non-military earth-sensing activities, or, alternatively but less desirably, clearance of an increased number of NASA personnel for such use of those materials under present codeword control.

On July 29, 1966, the COMOR was tasked by USIB to meet as an ad hoc group to study these recommendations.

On August 17, 1966, COMOR submitted its report (Tab B) for consideration by the USIB. The COMOR recommendations were as follows:

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a. To meet the recommendation in NSAM 156, (6)(a), the Department of State and NASA should select an increased number of key personnel for clearance in the TALENT-KEYHOLE system to see if the risk of uninformed discussion can be controlled by this means.

b. COMOR should review the situation at the end of six months to determine whether the problem has been solved or whether there should be a briefing of additional persons at the TOP SECRET or SECRET level.

c. To meet the recommendation in NSAM 156, (6)(b), NASA should be invited to select a panel representing those scientific and technical disciplines of interest to NASA to be cleared for access to TALENT-KEYHOLE information in order that they may study current TALENT-KEYHOLE materials at NPIC and exploitation procedures used by NPIC, the Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy community, etc., and make recommendations to NASA concerning the desirability of increased NASA participation in the TALENT-KEYHOLE program.

The COMOR report noted that the State Member concurred in recommendation c., above, as a means of providing further clarification of NASA needs and closer coordination with the intelligence community. The State Member agreed to this first step without prejudice to State's previously stated position concerning the selective decontrol of satellite reconnaissance products. The State Member did not concur in recommendations a. and b., believing that removal of the fact of a U. S. satellite reconnaissance program from codeword control would enhance our political and security interests. The State Member's rationale supporting his nonconcurrence is contained in an attachment to the COMOR report and is well worth reading (Tab B).

Present Status:

On August 25, the USIB met to consider recommendations of the COMOR on this matter. The minutes of the meeting are extensive and follow my own notes closely, often following the speaker's words verbatim on key points. Mr. Helms' position was forcefully firm: 'As your Chairman, I must maintain security and maintain it as tightly

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as possible. I am coming down firmly on the side of maintaining our classification system." (Tab C)

Other key comments by Mr. Helms:


1. "We are heavily dependent on satellite reconnaissance and must cling to it and protect it as fiercely as we can."
2. "The Soviets have learned to live with private embarrassment; embarrassment not forced out into the public. We must learn to live with the Soviets and not to embarrass them by telling the world how good our photos are."

Mr. Helms seemed to be deeply impressed by a recent encounter with Congressman Mahon, to whom he had shown ██████████ photography. Mr. Mahon viewed the pictures with interest and then said, "You're going to protect these, aren't you? You're not going to show them to a lot of government officials, are you?"

Comment:

Any special security system is under attack from the moment it is born. The TKH and BYEMAN systems are exceptional only in the insistence of the erosive forces. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, the secrets they are designed to protect are unusually dramatic. Second, the TKH and BYEMAN systems take no note whatsoever of Secretarial prerogative. In all "normal" security systems, the Secretary of a department (such as State) has very wide latitude in how he classifies, declassifies, or processes security information; in the BYEMAN and TKH systems he has none, all final authority being vested in the DCI.

One should recognize that the attacks will continue as long as there is a special security system. In such a circumstance, it is important to know where the DCI stands and he has cast an unequivocal vote.



PAUL E. WORTHMAN
Colonel, USAF

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