- FOR DR WAKE TELP

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

19/18

MEMORANDUM

Attacked is some background susterial which includes history, connected and recommendation relating to the webnesday NSAM 156 Working Grove meeting. The meeting is cut for 2 PM at State, Year 7244. If you have any questions or comments place call me. otherwise, I think that we are presty well see.

Buk,

I'd like to descens with you the "white" it tellite and what to do about it if we have descens it at 154 whose with it be descensed

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
TALKING NOTES FOR

NSAM 156 COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP MEETING "IMPACT OF SALT RATIFICATION ON NRP"

HISTORY

- September 9, 1968 Ambassador Bohlen circulated a pre-SALT draft statement of a State/ACDA paper, "Disarmament Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy," to the NSAM 156 Committee. Key points: 1) SALT Delegates authorized to use the term "information-gathering satellites" when discussing "national means of verification." 2) Noninterference with "national means" should be conceptually established. 3) A case for disclosure, beginning with downgrading of "fact of" was stated.
- September 16, 1968 Meeting of NSAM 156 Committee. Key points: 1) Proposed arms agreement would not involve explicit reference to observation satellites. 2) Any briefing on verification should be integrated with a general briefing on the specific arms limitation proposal.

 3) The matter should be presented to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals (an interagency national policy advisory group at that time -- Sec State; Dir, ACDA; SecDef; Chairman, JCS; Chairman, AEC; DCI; Asst to Pres, S&T).
- September 19, 1968 The paper was sent to the Committee of Principals. No reaction was noted on this paper.
- March, 1969 The Verification Panel of the NSSM 28 Working Group was formed. (Composed of DepSecDef, Under Sec State, Dep Dir, ACDA, DCI, NSC.)
- May 1, 1969 Ambassador Johnson, for the NSAM 156 Committee, forwarded the 1968 paper to NSSM 28 Steering Committee stating that the paper did not establish any basic new policy but rather set tactical guidelines for SALT handling of observation satellites. Ambassador Johnson also stated



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that prior to consultation with Congress or our Allies, discussions should be held among the involved agencies on the best means for implementing the guidelines set forth in the paper.

May 14, 1969 - The NSSM 28 Steering Committee approved the paper. Key points: 1) Information-gathering satellites provide the only feasible means of monitoring a strategic arms limitation. 2) It is vital to U.S. security interests to preserve the full integrity and unimpeded operation of information-gathering satellites. 3) It is still sound policy to avoid a confrontation on observation satellites. 4) Authorizes the delegation to state to the joint delegation that "national means of verification" includes the use of "information-gathering satellites." 5) The delegation is enjoined not to reveal the effectiveness of satellite intelligence systems. 6) In initial consultations with NAC, we should define "national means of verification" as primarily referring to "information-gathering satellites." 7) Consideration should be given at a later date to briefing on U.S. capabilities to monitor an agreement.

July 30, 1969 - DCI intelligence guidance for the SALT Delegation. Key points: 1) Avoid disclosing specific capabilities and weaknesses of U.S. collection systems.

2) Keep the Soviets uncertain about the precise state of U.S. knowledge concerning Soviet strategic systems.


3) Avoid disclosure of the specific assumptions and judgements about Soviet systems used in developing U.S. strategic war plans. 4) Let the Soviets take the lead in discussing Soviet weapons systems and their characteristics. 5) Confine references to U.S. intelligence information to those points on which we are confident the Soviets know we are informed (e.g., parade photography, etc.) 6) Avoid any references to specific intelligence sources and methods, however innocuous they may appear.

April 15, 1970 - DCI reaffirmed the previous intelligence guidance. This guidance has remained stable for the talks since then.



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- 4. Legal requirements of Ratification of SALT dictate that virtually all forms of agreement go to the Congress for review. The President can initiate unilaterally an "understanding" or gentleman's agreement, but politically, this would be seemingly unwise. Thus, a treaty or agreement, or both, will be subject to fairly intensive Congressional review. A Treaty must pass two-thirds of the Senate and a formal agreement must pass a majority vote of the Congress. It appears that one likely SALT outcome will be a Treaty on Defensive (ABM) Systems and an Agreement on Offensive Systems, i.e., to agree to take this issue on in seriousness.
- 5. Lastly, it is desired to know for certain the extent and depth of discussions held between 1969 and now to the Congress and also to the North Atlantic Council of Ministers on "national means." Dr. Steininger has been contacted on this question. Also of interest, is the extent and depth of informal discussions held at the Talks on the subject.

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
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The problem of SALT Ratification appears to be fairly straight-forward from the NRO viewpoint. We desire that the SALT ratification, when it comes, is done with the least amount of spotlight on the NRP as possible. We do not desire that this process be used as a means to disclose the "fact of" either by design or default. We also do not desire that the process be "solved" by employing a "white" satellite for public consumption. It is recommended that the following facts be determined:


- 1) The extent of dialog with the Congress to date.
- 2) The extent of dialog with the NAC to date.
- 3) An estimate of the liklihood of enjoining key members of Congress to hold the discussions at low profile and close discussions to the press.

A plan should then be evolved so that, in advance of hearings, the spotlighting on the NRP may be consciously held to a minimum while affording the Congress a meaningful review of the terms of a treaty and/or an agreement.






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COMMENTS

The prior iteration of the 156 Committee and its association with the present gives rise to several comments:

- 1. Since there was no Verification Panel at that time, it was without question that the 156 Committee should deliberate the question of SALT and the national reconnaissance policy. When the NSSM 28 Committee was formed, the 156 Committee transmitted its recommendations to the forerunner of the Verification Panel. The Verification Panel adopted these recommendations, and since then, the Verification Panel has worked the negotiating issues for the SALT Delegation. "National means of verification" has, from the outset, been described in unexplicit terms by tacit agreement being called "national technical means of verification." The policy for discussion of this area still remains the responsibility of the 156 group.
- 2. At the outset of the earlier iteration of the problem in 1968, ACDA/State felt that this was an occasion to put through the "fact of" disclosure. The original paper was beaten down through the efforts of NRO/CIA/OSD but there may be a ressurection of the idea on this go-around. Jack Shaw, of State, who is a SALT de egate now, was and will be the Secretary of the 156 proceedings on this subject. He is felt to be an advocate of "fact of." It is thought, however, that there has been enough recent support of not revealing "fact of" that the idea can be discarded for the present subject.
- 3. NASA has informed that they would be desirous of reopening the issue of a "white" bi-lateral verification satellite, operated by NASA in the "world" interest. Although the idea had merit some time ago, if an early agreement is reached, there would not be enough time available to permit "white development" of a verification satellite. Further, since it is outside the subject area presently under consideration, it probably would be best not to discuss it at this session.



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