Material preapred by Mr. Friedman for meeting with Mr. McNaughton 13 January 65

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#### MEMORANDUM

#### Proposed Insertions for NSAM 311 Paper Whether or Not KH-6 Matter is Raised

(These changes are in addition to those transmitted by Tab B of ISA memoto Mr. Vance, dated 15 December 1964.)

1. Add to paragraph f. of summary memo:

"..., although it is probable that even this requirement can be reduced somewhat (say, to 80-85% monthly or 90% every 45 days) without significantly increasing the risk to U.S. security interests. "

(Change paragraph 2 of the 311 paper to accord, )

2. Change paragraph (i) of the summary memo as follows:

"i. Cloud-free KH-4 photography of about 75 per cent of Cuba could be obtained monthly at an additional expense e<sup>1</sup> for an additional about 50 per cent coverage could be obtained monthly (or 75 per cent bi-monthly) at no increase in cost. In each case, a modification of existing KH-4 practices would be required. KH-4 options are:

KH-4 COVERAGE FROM WESTERN TEST RANGE VS ADDED COST PER YEAR

90% Coverage 90% Coverage 90% Coverage 75% Coverage 75% Coverage Every <u>30 Dave Every 45 Dave Every 60</u> Days Every 30 Days Every 60 Days

100% cloud free photo graphy

At least 70 cloud-free photography

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KH-4 photography probably would not permit detection of single MRM MRBM field sites of the unpatterned type. It probably would (along with other intelligence) raise sufficient suspicions of the deployment of a number of such weapons as to justify the use of U-2 or drone capability that could be retained on standby.


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For flights westbound from Western Test Range, double the costs 2/ in each case.

(Change paragraphs (ii) and (iv) on pages 7 and 8 of the 311 paper to accord.)


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3. On page 9 of the 311 paper, change "19" in the second line to "21."




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### Page 7

(ii) Cloud-free KH-4 photography of about 75 per cent of Cuba could be obtained monthly at an additional expense of the second multiple or about 50 per cent coverage could be obtained monthly at no increase in cost. In either case, a modification of existing KH-4 practices would be required.

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#### MEMORANDUM

#### Proposed Additional Insertions for NSAM 311 Paper Relating to KH-6 Matter

1. Add following to paragraph g. of summary memorandum:

"Alternatively, the U.S. might consider stopping the U-2 flights if it became U.S. policy to take such action as one means of reducing East-West tensions:

(1) While at the same time protecting U.S. security interests by using an equivalent substitute reconnaissance capability;

(2) By being willing to slightly reduce the requirement for Cuba reconnaissance coverage by an extent that would not significantly increase the risk to U.S. security interests.

#### 2. Change second sentence of paragraph 6. a. to read:

"Accordingly, the U.S. should not consider a change in current surveillance arrangements\* until: (1) there is significantly increased danger of a U-2 shoot-down or (2) it is decided to eliminate the U-2 flights as a major policy decision, either to reduce East-West tensions or for other reasons, and U.S. security interests could be protected by use of an equivalent adequate substitute reconnaissance capability (see par. 7 below).



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#### 3. Add following to revised paragraph (i) of summary memo:

"<u>KH-6 photography</u> can provide photography adequate (5-foot resolution) to detect unpatterned site MRBM deployments and could satisfy the existing requirement for Cuba coverage (90% monthly) at an added cost of ually. (Coverage of the world areas noted above would be provided.) KH-6 options are:

KH-6 COVERAGE FROM WESTERN TEST RANGE

Added Cost Per Year
90% Coverage
90% Coverage
90% Coverage
90% Coverage
75% Coverage

Year
Every 30 Days
Every 45 Days
Every 60 Days
Every 60 Days

100% cloud-frephotography
At least 70%
Image: Coverage Solution of the second seco

cloud-free photography\*

\* Since one flight furnishes more than 90% coverage of 100% cloud-free photography, the 70% column is redundant.

(Substitute the above for par (v) on Page 8 of 311 paper and renumber present par (v) as par (vi)).

4. Add following as new paragraph 7 in 311 papger (at Page 14) and renumber paragraph 7 and paragraph 8:

- 7. Use of Satellite Coverage Under Changed Circumstances.
  - a. Change in U.S. Policy to Reduce Tensions. It is conceivable

that under certain circumstances, the United States might wish to take

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positive steps leading to a reduction in the probability of a confrontation with Cuba over the overflight issue. Such circumstances might include:

(1) A new round of efforts to reduce East-West tensions in which both sides take concrete steps to eliminate areas of friction.

(2) A fundamental change in U.S. policy toward Cuba designed to bring Cuba back into the inter-American community.


(3) A positive U.S. response to Cuban overtures to reduce friction with her American neighbors such as a marked curtailment of subversive activities in Latin America.

(4) An attempt by the U.S. to dampen-down certain potential crisis areas because of increased tension in other areas (such as Vietnam or the Congo).

b. <u>Alternative Programs</u>. If any of the above circumstances apply, the U.S. could consider several actions to achieve the desired results:

(1) Reducing the stated requirement for interpretable photography from 90% every four weeks to a lower figure, or extending the time period of coverage. This would increase the risk of offensive missiles escaping detection, but the actual increase in risk may be difficult to measure and it may be relatively small. Moreover, we do not have 100% assurance of detection now. Such a reduction in the requirement w ould open up alternative areas of collection, such as main reliance on

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KH-4 photography supplemented <sup>De</sup> the prequired, with U-2 or drones held on a standby basis only, and including peripheral photography. The charts at pages \_\_\_\_\_\_ above indicate the options available utilizing currently operational systems.

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(2) Providing essentially the same coverage as at present but re-activating the KH-6 system, whose resolution (5 feet) is adequate to identify mobile missile deployments. The capabilities are shown on this chart:

KH-6 COVERAGE (CLOUD-FREE) AND COSTS

90% Coverage 90% Coverage 90% Coverage 75% Coverage Every 30 Days Every 45 Days Every 60 Days Every 60 Days (15) Flight units to be procured annually to achieve required number of successful launches (80% reliability factor). c. Discussion of Alternatives. Because of the inadequate resolu-

tion of the KE ncreasing the frequency of flights the design of the desi

utilizable coverage for the costs involved.

The KH-6 system, on the other hand, offers the prospect of providing the required coverage (94% of Cuba, cloud-free, monthly)

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with utilizable photography at a cost which is reasonable if other benefits are considered. An orbit can be selected which will cover from 24<sup>0</sup> north latitude to 24<sup>0</sup> south latitude. In addition to providing full coverage of Cuba, such crisis areas as the Congo, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, and Southern China (in the area of Chinese air-buildups on the South Vietnamese Border) can be covered with 5 foot resolution photography. This additional coverage alone would go a long way toward justifying the formation of the set of the system could provide even greater coverage of other world areas -- from 34<sup>0</sup> north latitude to 34<sup>0</sup> south latitude.)

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If present KH-4 provide provide provide to the extent permissible by using the KH-6, costs attributable to the KH-6 will be reduced commensurately. Interesting trade-offs can be contemplated if Cuban coverage is varied to provide greater China coverage. Similarly, costs for increased coverage of China which may be necessary in the future can be absorbed by the new system.

d. <u>Political Scenario</u>. The manner in which the U.S. would go about terminating U-2 flights over Cuba would depend in large measure on the circumstances pertaining at the time the action was contemplated.

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In those circumstances in which the U.S. took the initiative in reducing tensions such as those in paragraphs 7. a. (1), (2), and (4), above, it would be necessary to satisfy two somewhat conflicting objectives. On the one hand, the U.S. would hope to establish that in ceasing the U-2 overflights, we were in fact making a meaningful gesture toward reducing tensions. At the same time the American people and the Congress would have to be assured that the U.S. was not taking undue security risks vis-a-vis Cuba. This could be managed by briefing the Congressional leadership on the adequacy of the substitute measures. Selected Allies could also be briefed, perhaps as a follow-up to the earlier McCone briefings. At the same time, we would take the public posture that the U.S. has adequate new techniques to assure itself against the re-introduction of missiles, that cessation of the U-2 flights will assist in reducing tensions and that a quid-pro-quo involving Communist concessions is a part of the proposal. It would be essential, of course, to avoid any impression that the U.S. was retreating under duress.

e. <u>Recommendations</u>. The following recommendations are made in light of the above considerations:

(1) Ready the KH-6 system for utilization in the satellite program. (Approximately 6 months required).

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(2) Procure additional KH-6 sets to enable the system to run on a 15 launch sets per year basis. Present on-shelf capability would be exhausted about the time new production comes in.

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(3) Begin as soon as possible KH-6 launches on a random basis to gain operational experience with the system.

(4) Prepare to phase out U-2 operations on a gradual basis as the KH-6 is phased in if any of the circumstances in 7.a., above dictates such action.

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