MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL BRADBURN

SUBJECT: An NSCID For the NRP

The President's letter of November 5, 1971, on Organization and Management of the U. S. Foreign Intelligence Community directed that the Staffs of the NSC, DCI and OMB, in consultation with the PFIAB, make appropriate revision to NSCIDS and other directives. Historically the NRO has been able to function without an NSCID but with the strong support of various individuals and organizations; at present there is no Directive being prepared under the auspices of the NSC for this purpose. There are several reasons why such a document is needed.

The NRO has thus far been generally successful in resolving jurisdictional disputes by pointing to the August 11, 1965 charter, claiming that since it is more recent (than various NSCIDS) it represents the later thinking of the signatories. With a general revision of all the NSCIDS, however, that argument loses—unless there is a similar document for the NRP.

The change in the overall organization of the intelligence community outdates the charter in part. If retained, the NRP charter should differentiate between the DCI in his "new" role, and the operating head of the CIA. And the DNRO should sit as a voting member on the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee on matters affecting the NRP, just as on the USIB.

The definition of responsibilities of the NRP for overflight reconnaissance could also stand some close scrutiny, and needs revision.
Should the NRP have a greater chartered role in satisfaction of tactical collection requirements? The tone of the President's letter—and the specific references to tactical intelligence—would make this idea worthy of further consideration. The statement that "Future assignments of roles and missions within the intelligence community cannot be made satisfactorily by compromises among agencies" seems to dictate, more strongly than ever, that the NRP be covered by an NSCID, to present its mission and charter side-by-side with all other intelligence gathering entities.

At the same time we need to look at the other elements of the framework created around the NRP over the years. Contained in various documents from DOD Directives to letters and even informal agreements, they should be scrutinized for possible incorporation in an NSCID, revised Directives, or deletion.

The creation of an NSCID for the NRP could obviate the need for a separate charter. Toward that end, attached is a revised draft of an NSCID to serve as a point of discussion. Since the target date for revision of NSCID is December 1, our intentions should be made known soon if such a Directive is desired.

I understand that the OASD(I) will permit us to look at the revised draft NSCID package after Dr. Hall has talked to OMB, about Monday or Tuesday (November 22 or 23).

Lt Colonel, USAF
The National Reconnaissance Program of the United States is a national responsibility, and must be so organized and managed as to aggressively and imaginatively exploit to the maximum technology, operational resources, and facilities of the Government to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the National Security Council and of the several departments and agencies of the Government.

Therefore, in the interest of national security and pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council authorizes and directs that the National Reconnaissance Program of the United States be conducted as prescribed herein.

1. Definition

The National Reconnaissance Program is a single, covert, national program, covering the development, management, control, tasking and operation of all projects, whether
current or planned, for collecting intelligence, mapping and geodetic information by spacecraft; or through aircraft or drone overflight of denied territory. Included are all platforms and image-forming sensors of reconnaissance quality non image forming sensors designed for reconnaissance purposes, or signal and electronic intelligence devices. Excluded are normal non-satellite peripheral reconnaissance operations.

2. Over-All Management

The Secretary of Defense is designated as the Executive Agent of the Government for the National Reconnaissance Program with the ultimate responsibility and authority for the management and conduct of the Program.

The National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology will guide and participate in the formulation of the National Reconnaissance Program and approve or modify the Program and its budget.

The National Reconnaissance Office, established as a separate and independent operating agency of the Department of Defense, is responsible for implementing the National
Reconnaissance Program. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office will sit with the USIB and the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee on matters affecting the Program. He shall be responsible only to the Secretary of Defense for conduct of the program.

3. Responsibilities

The Secretary of Defense shall:

a. Develop a single National Reconnaissance Program.

b. Direct and coordinate the activities of all Government agencies participating in the National Reconnaissance Program.

c. Prepare the budget for the entire National Reconnaissance Program and shall defend the program before all reviews necessary to secure its approval.

d. Manage and administer all funds for the National Reconnaissance Program.

e. Recognize the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence for the coordination of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No.
f. Respond solely to the intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No.

g. Obtain appropriate clearances from higher authority for all National Reconnaissance Program satellite missions, and for all aircraft or drone denied territory overflight missions (regardless of agency conducting the mission).

h. Process, title, produce and deliver the collected product to the users as specified by the United States Intelligence Board.

i. Establish, maintain and operate a National Reconnaissance Office as a separate, covert operating agency of the Department of Defense.

j. Appoint the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office who will report to him and be responsive to his instructions.

k. Establish appropriate boards or committees for the monitorship and periodic review of the activities of the National Reconnaissance Office.
1. Enter into such agreements with other departments or agencies as required in the implementation of this directive.

m. Recognize the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence methods from unauthorized disclosure.

n. Establish within the Department of Defense separate units to conduct assigned portions of the National Reconnaissance Program, under direct control of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.

o. Task the personnel, facilities and other resources of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies as required to support the conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program.

The Director of Central Intelligence shall:

a. Appoint the Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense.

b. Provide security policy guidance and support to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office in the
protection of sensitive National Reconnaissance Program activities.

The Director, Central Intelligence Agency shall:

Establish, in coordination with the Director National Reconnaissance Office, separately identifiable units within the Central Intelligence Agency responsible for the conduct of those assigned portions of the National Reconnaissance Program. These units will function under the direct control of the Director, National Reconnaissance Office.

4. In the fulfillment of their respective responsibilities for the production of intelligence, the several departments and agencies shall not duplicate the intelligence collection and research activities of the National Reconnaissance Office and shall make full use of existing capabilities of this element of the intelligence community.

5. To insure that all efforts involving satellite-borne reconnaissance-like sensors are dealt with in a manner which will protect the interests of the United States Government including the National Reconnaissance Program, all departments and agencies must deal with the National Reconnaissance Office on all such activities. Activities are defined to include
feasibility studies, potential application studies, developments, tests, uses, plans for symposia and conferences, and papers and presentations on this subject area.