MEMORANDUM FOR SS-5

31 July 1973

The Coordinated Review by the Intelligence Organizations of the DOD of OMB Staff Report and the DCI Plan of Action is an extremely sophisticated (and well written) document.

It scares me.

I believe it inserts the DNRO directly into the DCI-ASD(I) power struggle--on the ASD(I)'s side. The title page indicates coordination with the DNRO and implies that the NRO is a DOD intelligence agency. Throughout the text the NRO is lumped with DOD intelligence agencies. The review frequently takes issue with the DCI Plan of Action. DOD (ASD(I)) recommendations and planned actions appear to have far reaching impact on the intelligence management structure, particularly on where real or exercised authority resides (I infer a shift toward ASD(I)). Key sections are paragraph VI, Review of Management Improvement Recommendations--Management Focal Point, starting on page 93, particularly pages 98, 99 and 100; Review of the Collection Strategy Recommendation, starting on page 101; Review of Cross Program Budget Recommendation, starting on page 106; and Review of Management Information System Recommendation, starting on page 110.

In decreasing order of preference, recommend that:

a. The NRO disassociate itself from the review;

b. insert a disclaimer--the introduction now indicates that all views are reflected in the review--insure that "all reported views were not held by all agencies," is added; or

c. Non-concur in the review.
The attached specific comments are insignificant in comparison to the above.

1 Attachment

cc--Mr. Singel
General Kulpa
Mr. Murphy
SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON DOD REVIEW OF OMB STAFF REPORT

Page 46, mid page. A SIGINT Committee ad hoc group is studying assessment/elevation mechanisms. NRO is represented on this group. A preliminary report has been provided to the parent committee. A DOD/NRO study appears redundant.

Page 47, mid page. It is stretching the point to indicate a benefit.

Page 48, top of page.

Page 50, paragraphs 2 and 3.

Page 50, paragraph 4.

Page 59, last sentence (continues on page 61). The views of other intelligence community members on the telemetry tasking mix would be valuable.

Page 82, mid page.

Page 82, last sentence of first paragraph.

Page 89, 2/3 down. This is a real problem, not solved by NSA's defensive eloquence.

Page 89, 2/3 down. The number of radars associated with missile systems is not small when one considers all missile systems.
Page 82, top. See above comment on <redacted> relation.

Page 95, top.

This is semantics, but important.