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15 April 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

**SUBJECT: Operations Aspects of the NRO**

In regard to the operations aspects of the NRO, I believe that some clarification of policy is in order. I also believe that the present organizational arrangements are inadequate with respect to capability for operational planning and analysis, and would like to suggest a solution.

The policy question concerns the definition of denied area overflight, and NRO responsibility during active military hostilities. I am proceeding on the basis that denied area overflights are any overflights of sovereign territory for which specific permission must be obtained from the 5412 Special Group or higher authority. As to when the NRO should cease to be responsible for such aircraft overflights, I recommend the policy that this responsibility will be transferred from the Director, NRO to the appropriate military commander upon decision of the Secretary of Defense or higher authority that the area in question has become an active theater of military hostilities.

In regard to the NRO capability for operations planning and analysis, I attach a paper describing a solution which I recommend. I suggest that you discuss this with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Signed

**Brockway McMillan**  
**Director**  
**National Reconnaissance Office**

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is justifying his overall management of the NRP to the monitor and not to the Secretary of Defense. Other agencies - e.g., CIA and the President's Scientific Advisor, - turn to the monitors rather than the DNRO for information about the NRO and to suggest or request actions by the NRO. This diffusion of authority is detrimental to the establishment of proper management relationships between Secretary of Defense, DNRO, DoD, and CIA.

5. Within the intelligence community at large, there is a real difficulty in getting a statement of collection requirements and technical requirements that is both convincing to a thoughtful person, and convertible without extensive "interpretation" into procurement, scheduling, and research and development decisions.

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