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CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

13 May 1963

SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~-NRO Planning

1. General Schriever met with Dr. McMillan on 11 May 1963 to discuss the plan that the DNRO proposed to implement (Guidelines for the (TS) NRP) and its relationship to Air Force responsibilities for planning for wartime reconnaissance. As a result of this meeting, he directed that:

a. A revised version of the proposed "Guidelines for the (TS) NRP" be prepared together with a covering memorandum to Dr. McMillan outlining Air Force philosophy on this planning.

b. General R. N. Smith of SAC be called and informed of the outcome of the meeting.

The details of General Schriever's direction are contained in the following paragraphs:

2. General Schriever requested that General Smith be informed essentially as follows. (Since General Smith was completely familiar with the subject, this was accomplished by phone on 11 May.)

a. No definite agreement resulted from General Schriever's meeting with Dr. McMillan. General Schriever is somewhat skeptical that a satisfactory agreement can be reached solely with Dr. McMillan.

b. They did agree that General Schriever would submit revised version of the proposed DNRO plan which would place the responsibility for planning for war reconnaissance under the Air Force.

c. We would appreciate SAC's reaction to this approach and also would welcome a participant from SAC to finalize our plan. (I pointed out that General Ritland and I would be working on this Monday and suggested that General Smith might want to defer sending specific people in until General Ritland had a chance to review this task and to call General Smith. General Smith agreed and indicated that he and a couple of other properly cleared people could come in Monday afternoon.)

d. General Power should simply be kept informed at this time. General Schriever feels that his personal support and participation will probably be required before this matter is settled.

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3. The following is General Schriever's direction with regard to the revised plan:

a. The responsibility for planning for strategic wartime reconnaissance should be that of the Air Force no matter what vehicles, sensors, etc. are used. In particular planning for page 9, item f (retargeting and reconstituting forces) and page 10, item g (BDA and post strike) must be done by the Air Force. A group of those people properly cleared within the Air Force should be set up to accomplish this task. Personnel from SAC should participate. This group would be part of Forecast but would be "in the black" i. e., their relationship to Forecast would be considered as highly sensitive and would not be known by the "white" portion of Forecast or anyone not properly cleared. Special emphasis will be placed on proper security. In order to assure proper security as well as the appearance thereof, and to properly interface with the NRO planning, this study should be conducted in Washington.

b. The interlocking membership on the Study Management Council for the NRO plan should continue. The Forecast wartime reconnaissance study group should establish an interface with the NRO planning and, in fact, should use data coming out of the NRO planning activity to assist in their planning. This group would adapt and integrate NRO technology and capabilities to develop the capability for wartime reconnaissance. If appropriate, this group should act as the channel through which information and studies required by the NRO would flow.

c. The specific studies which are now proposed in the DNRO plan should be carefully reviewed. The Air Force should be made responsible for those dealing with operations and those development studies not requiring specialized, closely held information dealing with reconnaissance payloads. If properly handled, most of these can be done "in the white."

d. Planning for non-satellite tactical reconnaissance can and should be conducted in the white as part of Forecast.

e. Several additional words and phrases proposed in the NRO plan were marked by General Schriever as requiring change.

4. In addition, General Schriever requested that a covering memorandum to Dr. McMillan be prepared. The following points should be included as well as any others which are appropriate.

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a. The proposed plan by DNRO is not acceptable. It, in effect, prohibits the Air Force from planning with the operational commands for the capabilities required to successfully prosecute a war.

b. Our present combat capability will deteriorate and our future capability will be incomplete and ineffective if required wartime reconnaissance capabilities are not included.

c. The NRO is at a level of government not appropriate for the planning or conduct of operational wartime reconnaissance. Such planning is not the assigned responsibility of the NRO. Planning for the capabilities required by CINCSAC must be accomplished by the Air Force, AFSC, and SAC.

d. The thoughts in the VCS paper of 2 May regarding the Operational Aspects of the National Reconnaissance Office.

e. A "security curtain" must not be used to inhibit proper planning for and development of wartime reconnaissance capabilities. Conversely, the Air Force must agree to and completely support the special security aspects of such activity to the letter.

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