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MEMORANDUM OF RECORD

SUBJECT: Brief Report of Meeting with General Greer at Aerospace, 21 October 1963

1. The meeting was to discuss the need for retaining horizon cameras with the KH-4 program. In attendance at the meeting were:

Mr. Hares and myself presented to General Greer the case for retaining horizon cameras with the KH-4 system and how we employ them for immediate readout of vehicle attitude. We also brought out that the stellar camera cannot be used at this time as a replacement for the horizon cameras due to its history of unreliable operation. We further explained to him our need for vehicle attitude to determine accurate measurement data. We pointed out that a measurement with 3% or 5% error was considered a poor measurement. General Greer said President Kennedy will never know the difference if a 5% error is in the measurement or not. We pointed out to General Greer that a 5% error may not be noticeable to the President but is highly significant to the people who feed him intelligence information. There followed some discussion on the unsatisfactory operation of the horizon cameras and the potential danger to the primary take if the horizon camera should fail with the shutter open. In conclusion, General Greer said he would relay our information back to the project director at NRO that the decision to retain or remove the horizon cameras was not his to make. It was indicated that
horizon cameras would be retained for the next M or J shot as the case may be. Following this the existence of the horizon camera seems to be doubtful. The following day (22 October 1963), John and myself had a discussion with Mr. Kiefer, and discussed this problem with General Greer. He understands the problem and if asked by General Greer will relay our needs to the General.

2. The following days (23, 24 October 1963), we attended SE meetings at LMSC. Throughout this meeting and subsequent discussions I picked up a feeling that the program (KH-4) is becoming schedule dominated and that some of the operations people are losing sight of the prime objective of the program; the user. It seems as if adequate testing schedules are not or have been adequately maintained due to the attempt to meet launch schedules.

3. Col. Worthington stated in the SE meeting that he was going to recommend to General Greer that the J program be grounded until adequate testing procedures can be established and scheduled prior to launch.

(Seen in Draft)

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