MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WORTHMAN

SUBJECT: Review of NRP Directive No. GMS-1 (Draft), dated 20 October 1965

I have reviewed the NRP Directive No. GMS-1. In my opinion, this document fulfills the intent implied in the "Summary:" to describe a program and management concept for the National Reconnaissance Program. Even so, the following comments are submitted in critique of the document.

In general, I do not believe the directive offers a workable system. The document is not consistent within itself nor is it consistent with the 11 August 1965 DOD/CIA "Agreement for Reorganization of the NRP." Those sections which describe aircraft and drone programs are particularly argumentative and will lead to complex command and control situations, if followed. Further, I do not believe the NRP/NRO or any organization can long endure without a specified Table of Organization. Good management practice dictates periodic reviews of the organizational structure for appropriateness, but a basic, workable organizational system is required.

For ease of comparison, the following specific comments are numbered to correspond to the numbering in GMS-1:

1. There are not sufficient parameters defined. As a minimum, this section should be expanded to include: NRP, denied territory, overflight, cold war, general hostilities, and peacetime.

2. An introductory sentence should preface the listed documents.

3.a. "Overflights" is not sufficiently descriptive. Friendly territories must be excluded.

3.b. The word "normally" is not consistent with the wording of the 11 August 1965 agreement. I know of no documents which transfer the NRP assets to the Sec Def upon a declaration of a state of general hostilities.
3.c. This paragraph is unduly restrictive in the four categories of projects.

4.a. The NRP is not necessarily so restrictive as to satisfy only U.S. goals. Many U-2 flights are presently conducted out of forbidden territory. The word 'so-called' should be deleted as a limitation on denied territory.

4.b. Compliance with this paragraph could cause fluxuations in command and control. The 147 drone in S.E. Asia is an example. This program could be under the control of JCS for operations over Vietnam and the NRO for operations over South China. The local commander would have to serve two organizations and mission priorities would change as often as the local weather.

6.a.(1) I believe the NRO to be larger than the DNRO, DDNRO, NRO Staff, and NRO Comptroller. The entire organization responsible for the NRP should be a part of the NRO.

6.a.(4),(5),(6) These three paragraphs split aircraft programs three ways giving each office operational responsibilities. If the aircraft programs are to be efficiently managed in the NRP, they should be under one program office.

6.b. The NRP organization—should be changed to NRO.

6.e. I do not believe an organization can be run properly without a table of organization and manpower billet structure. Such an organization would be subject to constant personnel changes depending on "parent" organization needs.

6.f. Since 6.e., does not give management structure and 6.c. has each Program Office as an entity, I do not understand what joint reviews would take place or who would arbitrate differences of opinion.

7.c. Provision should be made to include NSA, NPIC, and/or NASA representatives, as required, on the NRO Staff.
7.c.(2) This paragraph places the NRO Staff in the command and control channel of the NRO/NRP. I believe that such functions rightly belong with the system operator and Project Directors.

7.c.(6) The Air Staff, Navy Staff, and/or Army Staff, as appropriate, should be included.

7.c.(7) No previous mention has been made of the relationship between the NRO and NPIC. Such a determination is required. This paragraph also makes a portion of the staff operators rather than staff members.

7.e.(4) Too specific for this paper. This item is included in 7.e.(3) above.

7.f., 7.g., 7.h. Splits the aircraft responsibilities into three programs. In addition, 7.f.(3) does not allow for any command other than SAC to conduct NRP programs. I believe this is unduly restrictive for undefined programs.

7.g.(1) This paragraph conflicts with the 11 August 1965 agreement. Paragraph D.1.d. of the agreement assigns only "engineering development of sensor subsystems" to CIA. All other development is the responsibility of DOD.

9.d. I do not believe such a restrictive communications channel possible or desirable. Even on NRP matters, the JRC must have direct communication with the JCS and the Sec Def.

In summary, I do not believe the NRP Directive No. GUS-1 to be sufficiently consistent within itself or with previous agreements to provide the foundation for NRP/NRO organizational structure and management. The aircraft programs should be consolidated under a single Program Director. The NRO Staff should function as a staff or as operators, not split according to programs. A table of organization and billeting structure is required for continuous management planning. Finally, the NRO should encompass the entire structure for accomplishing the NRP, not an office of limited staff functions.

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