
One of the significant results of the NSC review of the national satellite reconnaissance program last August was the placing of the SAMOS project under a special streamlined management set-up. From my close observation of the results, it is clear that this was an important step in the right direction. However, personnel changes and policies which have been established in closely related areas since that time are seriously threatening undesirable expansion of this management structure with consequent dilution of authority and expansion of personnel who have knowledge of these highly sensitive matters. It is imperative that a new understanding be established immediately concerning the management of the entire national satellite reconnaissance effort.

In the NSC review of August 1960, both the overt SAMOS and the covert CORONA projects were considered, although access to information on CORONA was greatly restricted, of course. The resulting management change consisted in placing the SAMOS project under a streamlined management structure centered in the office of the Secretary of the Air Force. No outward change was made in the cover aspects of the CORONA project but the Air Force management responsibilities for the covert aspects (vehicles and launch schedules) were also centered in the office of the Secretary. The overt SAMOS project was removed completely from normal channels, with ARDC Hq (now AFSC), the Air Staff, and the OSD staff completely removed from reviews and approvals of this project. Management lines were established as direct to and from the Director of the SAMOS project in the field (Gen Greer), the office of the Secretary of the Air Force (Dr. Charyk), and the office of the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Douglas). Selected key personnel outside these channels were periodically informed of the program status; all elements outside these channels were required to support this project as and when required by this management structure. A description and functional illustration of the resulting SAMOS management structure is attached hereto, along with similar descriptions of several related satellite reconnaissance and mapping projects. As you can see, the management scheme is different in each case, and all are relatively complex when compared to the SAMOS structure.

D-11485Z-21-d Copy No. 1 of 2 cys. Page 1 of 3 pgs.



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Since that time, the following factors have made the establishment of a new understanding mandatory:

- 1. Key personnel have changed, and with the change, the full impact of the original intent has been obscured. Some of the SAMOS changes were originally established by verbal instruction, some by written, though purposely incomplete, vague or misleading directives; all were unequivocally understood by key personnel at the time the changes were made. The meaning of these changes is now sought in words which were written merely to confirm understandings while preserving security and outward appearances of this sensitive subject. A complete understanding must be reached with new key personnel as to the full intent behind these changes, and their full and complete support obtained for this management concept. In addition, some further actions must be taken to alleviate the situation described in the following paragraph.
- 2. Problems of mapping have complicated the subject of reconnaissance and presently threaten to expand greatly the number of people and agencies involved in management of these projects. This problem has arisen as follows: The covert mapping project ARGON uses the same overt cover as the CORONA project, and competes with it for vehicles and launch pads, although these projects are managed quite differently, as illustrated in the attachments hereto. In addition to complications due to this involved structure, two relatively recent mapping factors have considerable impact upon the recommaissance program:
- a. It has been generally agreed that the use of reconnaissance photography together with the mapping photography obtained from satellites will enable the production of higher quality maps with significant increase in accuracy. This means that the results of both SAMOS and CORONA will be used with ARGON and other proposed satellite mapping results to produce geodetic and mapping products. This will require a close coupling of these two types of projects, and may include some vehicles which carry both types of payloads simultaneously.
- b. Recent DOD policy has been established assigning the Department of the Army the responsibility for the processing of ARGON results, and for the establishment and overall management of a geodetic and manning management including

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D-11485Z-21-d Copy 1 of 2 cys. Page 2 of 3 pgs. STELLAL AMINULINA TOP SECRET

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satellite mapping and geodesy program, to include detailed supervision over payloads and associated program aspects except for delegation to the Air Force of responsibility for basic boosters and launch services. For reasons already mentioned, this step will inevitably inject the Army into the satellite reconnaissance management structure, with the obvious result of concurrently rejuvenating OSD staff action in reconnaissance satellite management matters.

It is clear that the previously established streamlined management, with the associated requirement to handle these large covert and special security projects with the smallest possible number of people and with overriding priority, is certain to be seriously diluted and weakened unless prompt action is taken. There appears to be no alternative to the rescinding of some recently published actions, and to considerably changing other actions now under consideration.

The following results must be obtained:

- l. The SAMOS management as originally established and as described briefly herein, must be re-defined to include all effort for the obtaining of photography by overflight of satellite vehicles, and to include all other projects carried out in or by these same vehicles (such as electronic intelligence payloads, for example).
- 2. All photographic data resulting from these projects will be chemically processed in the same manner as that established for the SAMOS project.
- 3. All results of any of these photographic efforts will be handled under the same security system and at the same security level as that established for the most sensitive of these products.
- 4. Results of all projects in this national program will be made available to authorized users in all services and agencies for their appropriate exploitation, including appropriate collection system characteristics where required for the production of maps.
 - 5. All conflicting memoranda and directives to be rescinded.
- 6. Every effort to be made to avoid publicity of this redirection, to the maximum extent practicable.

D-11485Z-21-d Copy 1 of 2 cys. Page 3 of 3 pgs.

