MEMORANDUM FOR DR. EDWARD W. PROCTOR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, CIA
MR. [REDACTED], CHAIRMAN, USIB SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Secrecy and Compartmentation Meeting, 24 March 1976

REFERENCE: A. DDI Memo, Same Subject, 16 March 1976
B. Draft Memo, Subject: Principles and Guidelines for the Classification and Control of Intelligence, 19 February 1976

I was unable to attend the scheduled 24 March meeting due to the unexpected absence of the DNRO. I have, however, enclosed comments for your consideration.

Charles W. Cook

1 Attachment
Comments on 19 Feb Draft Memo
I. The NRO supports the principle of insuring appropriate access to intelligence information by those who need that information. We recognize that many aspects of our current security system now need intensive review in order that the security system not serve as an impediment to getting the necessary information to the appropriate people. On the other hand, we believe that access to sensitive sources and methods information should be on a strict need-to-know basis. We feel that need-to-know security concerning the details of our systems is necessary to insure effective collection in the future.

The proposed principles and guidelines in the first paragraph of the referenced paper are indeed new. The current principle for dissemination of intelligence information is need-to-know. The proposed principles, with emphasis on trying to assign the lowest classification, will allow intelligence information to flow to more people through broader access and fewer dissemination controls.

As indicated in the paper, the principle of extra protection of sources and methods should apply only to those aspects that significantly affect their viability. We agree and think such information requires strict application of the need-to-know principle. In this regard, we can review information currently held in other channels for some possible selective downgrading.
We do believe there are sensitive mission revealing facts at risk in some intelligence product decompartmentation proposals presently being staffed in the community. This aspect should be carefully reviewed and actions taken to retain the sensitive material through channels.

II. We believe that the [redacted] Control System could well be used as a model system for other collection code word systems. Furthermore, we believe that the security policy we espouse largely contains what is being sought by the remedial procedures advocated in the memo. The security policy that has made the system work is the strict adherence to security procedures and guidelines, and insuring that all personnel authorized access to information understand the applicable security principles, policy and procedures. Most of the failings of the present security system, as indicated in the memo, appear to result from poor security indoctrination and education. We believe that the aggressive education suggested in the memo will help. We believe that rather than initiating a completely new set of security principles and guidelines, that old ones can and should be made to work.

We question whether many of the suggested remedial measures mentioned in the paper will help this situation. For example, the signing of secrecy agreements without procedures for insuring distribution of information only to personnel who signed the agreement makes such agreements ineffective. More detailed investigations of some SECRET cleared people will only add to DIS workload. Establishment of a universal code word on some intelligence information would appear only to complicate the present
III. We strongly support providing intelligence data to appropriate users but also strongly adhere to a belief for the need for protection of sources and methods and certain capabilities associated thereto. We believe that certain products and information can be decompartmented. We support this particular effort and will provide whatever assistance is desired to explain the effectiveness of the security control system, and our security policies and philosophies.