

~~TOP SECRET~~

(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE NRO STAFF

June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS *Dr. McLucas has seen.*

Attached is Mr. Helms' memorandum of 16 June 1972 to USIB principals on the "Fact of" satellite reconnaissance. The memo emphasizes that there is to be no change in the disclosure policies, even though the President made an unclassified reference to satellites in his transmittal of the SALT agreement to Congress.

~~TOP SECRET~~

David D. Braddock
Colonel, USAF

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULES

CONTROL NO. _____
COPY _____ OF _____ COPIES
PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS


SUBJECT : Security Guidance Concerning National
Technical Means of Verification of
SALT Agreements

REFERENCE : USIB-M-621, 15 June 1972, item 3. a.

1. This memorandum is for your guidance and appropriate action concerning the continuing importance of maintaining security on satellite reconnaissance sources and methods, in view of the Congressional and other open discussion of the verification aspects of the SALT agreements.

2. The agreements and other official papers refer only to "national technical means of verification", unamplified, with one exception. The unclassified statement appearing in the Presidential transmittal of the SALT agreements to Congress is as follows:

"The second paragraph of this Article provides that each Party agrees not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other which are operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Article. This provision would, for example, prohibit interference with a satellite in orbit used for verification of this Treaty. [underlining added]



TOP SECRET

TCS# 022-72

WORKING COPY

TOP SECRET

HANDLE VIA TALENT-
KEYHOLE CONTROL

USIB-D-27.5/4
16 June 1972
Limited Distribution

3. As you know, there has been considerable speculation in the news media regarding the use of reconnaissance satellites as a means of monitoring the terms of a possible Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and related agreements. The future success of any verification action, however, will be dependent upon retaining the security and integrity of the resources and methods available for verification. Official U. S. disclosure policy regarding national means of verification has been carefully considered at the highest level of Government and it is essential that these verification means not be jeopardized by unauthorized disclosures which go beyond the limits which have been set.

4. In keeping with my statutory responsibilities for the protection of intelligence sources and methods, therefore, I am asking that you assure that all elements of the intelligence community under your cognizance be reminded that the concepts, provisions and restrictions of the TALENT-KEYHOLE [REDACTED] and other pertinent control systems remain completely appropriate and will continue to be enforced at all levels. It should be specifically and directly brought to the attention of all concerned that:

a. Official statements acknowledging "the fact of" satellite reconnaissance must not be further discussed outside of the established compartmented control systems.

b. Except for those specific officials who have been authorized to deal with Congress and the public on this question, no individual or official is authorized to expand, in any way, on formal Executive statements nor can any additional information be furnished or discussed in any manner.

c. All details bearing on the conduct of the U. S. reconnaissance satellite program, its assets, capabilities, modus operandi, results, products, and derived intelligence--past, present, or future--continue to fall within the protection of the established compartmented security regulations and any disclosure outside of these authorized channels calls for appropriate action.



Richard Helms
Chairman