MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Security Handling of Satellite Reconnaissance Materials

REFERENCES:

a. USIB-D-41, 12/11, 22 September 1964
   Limited Distribution
b. USIB-D-41, 12/12 (COMOR-D-7/31)
   6 November 1964, Limited Distribution
c. USIB-M-359, 18 November 1964, Item 10

1. At its meeting on 5 November 1964 (reference b.), the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agreed to ask the Security Committee and the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) to collaborate in studying whether the present restraints on dissemination and handling of T/KH material were overly restrictive or still necessary within the US Government. Subsequently at its 18 November 1964 meeting (reference c.), the Board agreed to defer action on the Security Committee report (reference a. which reviewed the procedures and standards within the intelligence community for the control of sanitization and downgrading of sensitive intelligence), until such time as results of the Security Committee/COMOR study pursuant to reference b. could be considered in conjunction with the recommendations of the Security Committee report in reference a.

2. COMOR's response to the Board directive in reference b., prepared in consultation with the Security Committee, is attached at Tab A. COMOR (except the State and Army Members) recommends USIB approval of its recommendations in paragraph 2. thereto, including recommendations that the materials and information derived from the present satellite reconnaissance systems should continue to be subject to the special controls.
of the T/KH security control system, and that a revision of the 1962 TALENT Sanitization Manual be completed and published. The State and Army Members' dissenting view is that the original reasons for compartmentation have largely disappeared, and that the end product of KH-4 and KH-7 photography should be handled under normal security classifications and controls. A discussion of the majority COMOR view is contained in paragraphs 3. through 8. of Tab A, while the reasons for the State and Army dissent are contained in the footnote to paragraph 2. in Tab A.

3. As directed by the USIB, the Security Committee also considered the relaxation of T/KH controls. Its report is attached at Tab B. The Security Committee concurs in the findings and recommendations of COMOR, with the exception of the State and Army Members who dissent for the same reasons as expressed by State and Army in the footnote to paragraph 2. of the COMOR paper (Tab A). The Security Committee (except State and Army) considers that the sensitive intelligence information involved is vital to the national interest and that the T/KH System affords appropriate protection. The majority view therefore supports the position that removal from the System would greatly increase the possibility of compromise. The Security Committee also notes that the proposed revision of the TALENT Sanitization Manual by COMOR would be in accordance with its previous recommendation in paragraph 9. c. of reference a. (reproduced in the Attachment to Tab B hereto).

4. In addition to its comments on Tab A, the Security Committee requests that its previous recommendations on definitions and sanitization of COMINT set forth in paragraphs 9. a. and b. of reference a. (reproduced in the Attachment to Tab B hereto) be approved by the Board.

5. Accordingly, USIB will be asked to consider at an early meeting (probably 23 September) the following recommendations:

a. The recommendations on the subject by COMOR, concurred in by the Security Committee, set forth in paragraph 2. of Tab A hereto, together with the dissenting view of State and Army in the footnote to that paragraph.
b. The additional and separate recommendations by the Security Committee on definitions and sanitisation of COMINT set forth in paragraphs 9. a. and b. of USIB-D-41.12/11, as reproduced in the Attachment to Tab B hereto.

Attachments
As stated
MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Security Handling of Satellite Reconnaissance Materials

REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.12/12; COMOR-D-7/31

1. **Problem.** To determine in response to the Board's injunction whether the present products of satellite reconnaissance should be removed from the special security controls of the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System (see reference).

2. **Recommendation.** COMOR recommends that:

   a. The materials and information derived from the present satellite reconnaissance systems, which are now in the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System, continue to be subject to the special controls of the T-KH Security Control System.

   b. The COMOR complete the revision of the Sanitization Manual and on behalf of the Board publish it to replace the 1962 Manual (COMOR-D-7/1).

   c. In its revision a principal aim of COMOR be to facilitate and expand the use, within the intelligence...
community, of information drawn from these materials by making the controls more precise and better suited to the specific needs of the community.

d. The question of removing any of the products of satellite reconnaissance from the KH compartment be reconsidered by the Board one year hence.

e. As new satellite reconnaissance systems come into existence, COMOR be instructed to advise the Board in each instance prior to employment whether the Board should place such materials into the KH compartment.*

*The minority view of the State Department and the Army is:

a. The original reasons for compartmentation of the fact of the satellite program (listed on page 6 of COMOR-D-7/33) have largely disappeared. Studies indicate that the Soviets have sufficient data to predict the probable resolution capability of our photographic satellite systems. State understands that N8IC concurs with this assessment. There is no analogy to COMINT; opposition knowledge of the quality of the photo does not cut off the source.

b. The foregoing considerations are well known in the community and this over-classification endangers the security of other compartmented information.

c. Handling of the end product of KH-4 and KH-7 under normal security classifications and controls would permit much needed wider access on the part of Department officials and the timely dissemination of collateral products of the photography to certain of its missions abroad. It would also facilitate the use of such material as guidance for other collection efforts and benefit Government research and scientific efforts generally.

d. On-coming system product may well need compartmentation, but that time is far enough ahead and the circumstances which will prevail then so obscure that this consideration is not weighty on the present question.
3. Discussion. The decision to place the products of satellite reconnaissance in a special security compartment was made at the Presidential level in 1960. There are approximately 20 thousand individuals now cleared for T-KH, of which at least one thousand are located in the compartment to whom certain materials are provided as authorized. All intelligence products of photographic and SIGINT satellites are controlled by the TALENT Security Control System in a compartment called KEYHOLE. From the beginning a manual has existed for the guidance of the agencies in sanitising to the SECRET level information obtained by satellite reconnaissance in order to meet the needs of the Government.

4. That the United States is engaged in satellite reconnaissance has been assumed by the press in the U.S. and by the USSR. By Presidential direction chiefs of state of allied and neutral countries have been made aware that such reconnaissance is going on. There has, however, been no official U.S. confirmation that it is acquiring overhead photography of the USSR or in some instances the territories of our allies.

5. There is no evidence that the USSR knows either the extent or the quality of reconnaissance achieved. It is surmised that they would suspect that from their knowledge of the state-of-the-art, we are achieving...
a resolution at least as good as the KH-4. SNIE 11-6-65, now in draft form, deals with the Soviet Capabilities for Concealing Strategic Weapons Program. It emphasizes the Soviet passion for secrecy and rationalizes between pursuing this and a counteracting desire to flaunt strength for its deterrent value. The SNIE notes many examples of Soviet efforts at concealment and points out that these are directed more at protecting details of systems rather than the existence of active weapons programs. The draft estimate also indicates that Soviet concealment efforts are unlikely to diminish and may increase. Detailed knowledge of U.S. capabilities might considerably further these efforts.

6. If the materials now subject to KH compartmentation were removed from that compartment and were classified TOP SECRET, a wider dissemination could take place but the problems involved in handling any volume of T-KH materials at a TOP SECRET classification only would be so great that it would prove to be impracticable and unmanageable from an administrative point of view. If they were classified SECRET, the handling would have to be NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION.

else we would be confronted with difficult situations with these countries who have already been the beneficiaries of some of these materials. It would not be feasible to require them to maintain the system
of compartmentation when it is not so handled in the U.S. If the decision were to remove the materials from KH control, it should be classified SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM.

7. Under this last classification there will be a greatly increased number of individuals with access to the material which will increase the possibility of materials or information falling into the hands of the USSR. In that event there are at least two possibilities:

   a. The certainty of the quality and scope of our achievement in reconnaissance might prompt the USSR or other countries to take actions inimical to our interests, including protests in the UN.

   b. The USSR may also take political reprisals or direct physical ones designed to deny us intelligence, such as shoot down, fogging of film, camouflage, etc.

8. There are varying judgments of the likelihood of the possible effects indicated above, but there is no certainty. COMOR believes that these risks of embarrassment to the U.S. and denial of intelligence cannot be ignored. In its view they need not be taken inasmuch as ways and means
exist through clearances and revised sanitization procedures to meet the needs of the U.S. Government. Therefore, it concludes that it is not desirable to remove the materials from the KH compartment at this time.

William A. Tidwell
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Security Handling of Satellite Reconnaissance Materials

1. The Security Committee has considered the problem presented by the Board as to whether the products of satellite reconnaissance should be removed from the Special Security Controls of the Talent-Keyhole Security Control System. The Security Committee has also reviewed the findings and recommendations of the COMOR Committee in this matter.

2. The Security Committee accepts the fact that a large portion of hard intelligence on denied areas available to the United States today is obtained from the product resulting from

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satellite reconnaissance. The Security Committee further accepts the fact that this information is vital to the intelligence collection effort and loss would adversely affect the national security.

3. Experience has shown that the wider the dissemination of any classified information the greater the possibility of compromise due to the loss of control. Large volumes of sensitive intelligence information critically affecting the national security, in order to be afforded adequate protection, must be maintained within a system of compartmentation. This is necessary for the following reasons:

a. The need-to-know is clearly defined and access controlled.

b. Higher standards of personnel and physical security are maintained.

c. There is uniform security protection throughout the community.

4. The recent revelations of espionage within the U. S. Government critically affecting the intelligence collection effort, have illustrated that rigid systems of compartmentation, as the T-KH system, do afford greater protection. Because of compartmentation and the attending denial of access to T-KH material, the product of satellite intelligence was not available to the principals of these cases. It must be presumed, therefore, that the removal of classified information from a system of compartmentation subjects it to a greater chance of compromise.
5. Although selected chiefs of state of allied and neutral countries have been made aware of a U.S. reconnaissance program, there has been no official declaration to the Communist Bloc. There has been no evidence on the basis of extensive damage estimates conducted subsequently to the discovery of espionage cases that the Soviets have been provided the products of the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program. The fact that the Soviets can surmise that a particular intelligence collection effort exists, such as overhead satellite reconnaissance, should not justify any lessening of security safeguards of the information involved. If the intelligence collection method is highly productive, then it warrants maximum security protection from possible compromise to protect against possible loss. The test, therefore, as to the degree of security protection to be afforded is the measure of how vital the intelligence effort is to the national interest and the damage resulting if the particular intelligence effort is made ineffective by opposition counteraction. The test should not be whether the opposition may be aware of the existence of the effort.

6. The Security Committee supports the findings of the COMOR Committee that if the materials now subject to KH compartmentation were removed this would increase the possibility of compromise of materials and might prompt the USSR or other countries to take actions inimical to our interests, including protests in the UN and direct reprisals.

7. The Security Committee recognizes that the product of overhead reconnaissance must be made readily available to all necessary users. It is the opinion of the Committee (except State and Army) that the proposed revision of the Sanitization Manual will provide adequate security protection and will make the information available to those who require access. It is
noted that the proposed COMOR revision of this Manual would be in accordance with the previous Security Committee recommendation contained in paragraph 9.c. of USIB-D-41.12/11 (reproduced in the Attachment hereto). Accordingly, the Security Committee (except State and Army) concurs in the recommendations in paragraph 2 of the COMOR report. The State Department and Army Security Committee Members dissent from this recommendation for the same reasons as expressed by the State Department and Army COMOR Committee Members in the footnote to that paragraph.

8. In addition to the above, the Security Committee requests USIB approval of its recommendations on definitions and sanitization of COMINT contained in paragraphs 9.a. and b. of USIB-D-41.12/11, which are reproduced in full in the attachment hereto.
SECURITY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN USIB-D-41.12/11, DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1964

SUBJECT: "Review of the Procedures and Standards Within the Intelligence Community for the Control of Sanitization and Downgrading of Sensitive Intelligence."

RECOMMENDATIONS

"9. It is recommended that the Board approve:

"a. The following definitions:

"(1) Sanitization - The effective concealment in classified material of intelligence sources and methods. A pre-requisite for sanitization is the existence or reasonable presumption of the existence of a separate and logical, less sensitive source. Information may not be reported in the sanitization with a precision or exactness that exceeds the capability of the less sensitive source.

"(2) Decontrol - The removal of material from a system of compartmentation for sensitive intelligence, provided it remains classified.

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"(3) Downgrading - The change of existing classification to a lower level of classification.

"(4) Declassification - The complete removal of classification. (This includes removal from a system of control.)

"b. The following statement of principles pertaining to the sanitization of COMINT:

"(1) Extensive and/or precise facts and figures leading back to COMINT source should not be included in the sanitized material.

"(2) If sanitization is for a specific use and not intended for broad dissemination, then an appropriate caveat or control (as provided for in DCID 1/7) should be placed upon the sanitized material to ensure that it is disseminated and used only for that intended purpose.

"(3) Material which is sanitized for broad dissemination and use based upon classification and need-to-know should be closely reviewed to ensure that sanitization procedures followed absolutely ensure source protection.

"(4) Focal points should be established within each department and agency to authorize and record the sanitization and downgrading of COMINT. Information recorded would include the name of the requester, the purpose of the sanitization or downgrading, the document in which the sanitized material is to be included, and a copy of the sanitization.