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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 6 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES E. GOODBY

FROM: DONALD G. OGILVIE

SUBJECT: Study of U. S. National Space Policy

Attached are restated issues which OMB believes should be considered by the Space Policy Working Group. In preparing these issues, we have taken into consideration DOD, NASA, and CIA comments on the study's outline. If these issues are agreeable to you and the participating agencies, they can form the basis for a major section on issues in the Working Group's Report.

We also have some general comments on the group's work as follows:

1. The outlines for Sections I and II represent a reasonable framework for getting drafting efforts initiated. We agree with your general approach of trying to get working papers circulating as soon as possible.

2. While we understand the point of view expressed by you and by several agencies that it is difficult at this time to identify crisply what alternatives should be considered in the study, we believe that development of alternatives is an integral part of the task assigned the working group and that alternatives should be addressed as soon as possible. In particular, an alternative for a future "single system" (or even a single "space service" as suggested by NASA) should be considered. This relates directly to the President's question about the potential for converging civilian and military technologies and programs.

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The substantive information and technical capabilities needed to address the issues reside in the operating agencies rather than in OMB. OMB can play a useful role in formulating the issues (as in the attachment), in critiquing the drafts prepared by the agencies, and in evaluating the information and alternatives addressed by the working group, and we are prepared to do so. We are not, however, in a position in terms of manpower, experience, or information to prepare draft papers that address these issues.

Enclosure

Current Issues for Space Policy Working Group

Although there is inevitably some overlap between the issues identified below, we believe stating them as broad questions with sub-sets may be helpful in providing perspective on the many facets of the complex problems to be addressed and the various interests at stake.

I. Definition of U. S. Objectives Pertaining to Earth Sensing from Space

- What are and should be the objectives of the U. S. with respect to earth sensing from space? Military? Civilian?
  - Are the current objectives of civilian and military earth sensing space programs consistent and compatible?
  - If not, how should objectives be restated?

II. Issues Related to National Security Objectives

- Is current U. S. policy which encourages operation of an aggressive civilian earth sensing space program on an unclassified basis for the benefit of all nations compatible with national security interests?
  - Does open release of technical and operational information pertaining to civilian systems compromise U. S. classified technology?
  - Does open release of data and products acquired by the civilian systems provide unacceptable amounts and quality of military intelligence (particularly targeting data) to other nations?
  - Does the policy of open release jeopardize continuing use of classified systems?
  - If there are risks inherent in the present policy, to what extent are they offset by present or potential political/economic benefits provided by the civil earth sensing program?

- If there are risks, do they stem from current programs or are they only potential risks related to planned upgrading of civilian systems?

- Have the thresholds set forth in NSAM-156 allowed civilian programs to do too much? If so, how can the U. S. retreat now? What would be the political, international, legislative or other consequences of a decision to retreat?

- In what areas do civilian satellite systems produce information of military or intelligence value?

  - Are the "reconnaissance-like" characteristics of certain civilian activities (e.g., the LACIE project to estimate foreign and U. S. wheat production) likely to increase international sensitivities to remote-sensing activities and thereby increase the risk of international objections to classified reconnaissance activities?

- Does current U. S. policy of not explicitly admitting the fact of reconnaissance remain valid in face of widespread awareness?

  - What would be the national security consequences of less stringent release policies and practices? Of declassifying the fact of U. S. operation of reconnaissance satellites and making data from such programs (but not technology, products or details of operations) available to the public domain without attempting to conceal their source? Of also releasing products but not technology or details of operations? Of total release?

  - If reconnaissance systems were to be declassified, which are candidates? Old, current, new?

III. Issues Related to Civilian Objectives

- What are the consequences of current policy restrictions on the use of advanced technologies in terms of meeting civilian program objectives?

- Are there unique characteristics in the technologies being pursued in the civilian program which would warrant their independent development in the absence of policy constraints on the free availability of technology and/or data from the military sector?

- If yes, what are these characteristics?

- In what applications, and for what purposes are they important?

- In the absence of constraints on the use of advanced technology, would the technology used in the civilian sector converge with that available in the military program?

- What are the implications for the civilian program of the expanding role of the Intelligence Community in making earth resources assessments of foreign areas? Is it necessary that satellite systems and derived data supporting such intelligence analysis be classified? If so, which systems and what data?

  - What would be the consequences (especially international) of classifying data from existing and planned civil programs?

IV. Issues Related to Efficiency from National Perspective

- To what extent is there now duplication of technology development effort between the civilian and military programs because of restrictions on the availability of technology from the latter?

  - Have the constraints on the development of civilian technology (i.e., limits on spatial resolution and quality of altimeter data) and the different nature of the technologies being developed for civil applications (i.e., the emphasis on multispectral sensors) been effective in limiting duplication?

- What cost savings would result from declassification of the fact of classified capabilities and data?

  - To what degree could civilian requirements be satisfied by unclassified military systems (impact on representative applications such as agriculture, land use, water resources, etc.)?

  - What civilian information requirements could not be met if only unclassified military reconnaissance systems were in use? How valuable are they (marginal analyses)?

- In the absence of a decision to declassify the fact of classified capabilities, is it feasible to make unclassified data from classified sources more widely available for civilian purposes? If yes, how? For what specific applications?

- Can and should there be only one national earth sensing space satellite program to meet both civilian and military objectives?

  - If yes, how can convergence be accomplished?

  - If no, what steps can and should be taken to eliminate unnecessary duplication of research and hardware?