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117L
22 JAN 1959

WDZW

SUBJECT: GOR No. 80

TO: Commander
Air Research and Development Command
ATTN: RDZB
Andrews Air Force Base
Washington 25, D. C.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 00 HR
INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 510

1. Reference is made to letter, subject as above, dated 23 October 1958, and two messages of clarification from your headquarters, RDZGW 10-44-E and RDZGW 10-48-E. In accordance with your instructions, GOR 80 dated 15 March 1955, revised 26 September 1958, with four addendums, No's 1 through 4, dated 26 September 1958, has been reviewed and compared with the 15 September 1958 Weapon System Development Plan. Due to reprogramming action the comparison is no longer valid.

2. The reprogramming action was the result of Memorandum Report for Director, Deputy Director, and Chief Scientist, ARPA, subject: Reorientation of 117L Program, Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated 1 December 1958. As a result of the ARPA memorandum the program structure of WS 117L as described in the 15 September 1958 Development Plan has undergone radical change. The new structure will call for four or more separately identified and documented programs. At the present time these new development plans are being prepared and they will be available to your headquarters in early February. The requirements of GOR 80 will be included in appropriate development plans with the following exceptions:

a. The Basic GOR 80

(1) Paragraph VII, E, Self Destruction

No provisions for satellite on orbit self destruction are contemplated as vehicle could not survive re-entry. If this requirement of the GOR intends that the satellite contain a ground command actuated destruct system, it is requested that we be so instructed.

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(2) Paragraph VII, K, 1, a

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This paragraph of the GOR states a requirement to return the intercepted information from the electronic reconnaissance subsystem in a secure manner to an appropriate location. It has been our interpretation that the digitally coded data transmitted from the satellite to ground readout stations on the North American Continent and within territorial waters of Hawaii is considered as secure. If this interpretation is incorrect and the requirement implies a cryptographic capability for satellite space to ground transmissions, then the development plan will be amended to incorporate this added feature upon your instructions. The work will be undertaken within the limitations imposed by program funding.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SIGNED

J. E. HAMILTON
Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

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