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

Re-REVIEW ON

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07316

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE NATIONAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR MISSILE AND SPACE FLIGHT GROUND DATA EQUIPMENT

19 November 1959

Re [illegible] 19 Nov 59
GP-3

Lt. General B. A. Schriever, USAF

Colonel O. J. Glasser, USAF

Lt. Colonel A. R. Sult, USAF

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Briefings -

[redacted] Last Copy of [illegible] Briefing

SECRET

Remarks by Lt. General B. A. Schriever

Last week in my comments concerning Ground Data Equipment (GDE) supporting ballistic missile and space programs I emphasized three major points which the Air Force believes are of primary importance in this matter.

That the existing national organizational structure, with the addition of certain administrative actions and directives (which are within the present authority of DOD and NASA), is adequate to efficiently and economically carry out the nation's space programs.

That in the case of space systems being developed to perform a specific military (or civilian) mission, such as reconnaissance, warning, communications, navigation, etc., the GDE (except normal range support) is an integral part of the over-all system.

That such military systems will not be performing new military mission; they will simply perform existing missions better, and therefore must be integrated with existing systems and, for operational use, fall naturally within the scope and mission responsibilities of existing JCS Unified and Specified commands.

At that time you requested that we present these views, supported by charts which graphically portray the reasoning that leads to our conclusions. This I am prepared to do, and I have with me two members of my staff who will present this reasoning in detail.

SECRET

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POST *Sputnik* SPACE PROBLEMS

- LACK *of* CLEAR NATIONAL SPACE POLICY.
- CONFUSION RESULTING FROM DIVISION *of* R&D AND OPERATIONAL ROLES.
- COMPETITION RESULTING FROM CONFUSION.
- MAJOR BOOSTER ASSIGNMENTS *to* ABMA *and* BMD
- OVER ORGANIZATION :

NSC NASC NASA	CMLC	ASST SEC DEF R&D DIRECTOR G.M. ARPA	ARMY NAVY USAF	ABMA SPO AFBMD

- LACK *of* CLEAR PROCEDURES *and* FOCAL POINTS.
- HI-LEVEL *and* PUBLIC ATTITUDE THAT SPACE *is* UNIQUE. (SPACE PROVIDES NO NEW MISSIONS)

First, however, I should like to cover one aspect personally; namely, the problems which developed "post Sputnik" and created confusion in the space program, and recent actions which, if given a little time, should alleviate this confusion.

On this first chart (chart 1) I have listed some of the "Post Sputnik Space Problems," which contributed to the confusion of our space efforts.

The lack of a clear cut national space policy resulted in frantic, but somewhat uncoordinated efforts to make up lost time and meet the challenge of Sputnik.

With the creation of ARPA, programs for the development of military systems were taken away from the services and although R&D was conducted through a given service, there was no assignment of operational responsibility. The inevitable result was to destroy the systems approach and to make impossible the concept of concurrency.

As a result of this confusion, "space" was essentially "up for grabs" and each of the services as well as the other space agencies vied for new roles, or preeminence in the space field.

The competition was further heightened by the assignment to both the Army (ABMA) and the Air Force (AFBMD) of major space booster programs.

There arose a general tendency for over-organization. This was especially apparent in the OSD which at one time included not only the Assistant Secretary of Defense for R&D, but also the Director of Guided Missiles and the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Each of these offices had a role in the space program, but it was never clear to the field organizations just which part resided with which office.

The absence of clearly defined procedures and focal points within the various "space" agencies resulted in informal, out-of-channel contacts becoming standard practice.

Finally was the "catchword" status accorded to space not only by the public, but by high level officials as well. As I stated earlier, space is not unique, and it does not enable the conduct of new missions; it simply performs the old missions better.

Post Sputnik SPACE ORGANIZATIONS



The general confusion of this period can be visualized by examining the next chart (chart 2) which shows the principal "Post Sputnik Space Organizations" and some of the communications channels that existed between them. Add to this, the unofficial channels that were employed on a daily basis and the chart becomes nearly illegible. Had the ballistic missile program been conducted under such procedures we could not possibly have made the rapid advances which we did.

So much for the confusion of the past. In recent months I have been encouraged by a definite trend to overcome some of these deficiencies and actions which, given a little time, will alleviate many of our difficulties. There are additional actions required, which we will identify in detail later, but let me first review the progress to date.

*RECENT ACTIONS and TRENDS for Improvement

- DDR&E HAS EMERGED AS DOD FOCAL POINT
- ARPA VACATING SPACE SYSTEMS AREA (under DDR&E)
- TRANSFER of ABMA to NASA
- NASA ROLE CLARIFYING
- OSD TRANSFER of MILITARY SYSTEMS R&D and OPERATIONAL ROLE TO SERVICES.
- PRECEDENT ESTABLISHED by GEN YATES ASSIGNMENT as DOD MERCURY COORDINATOR.

On this chart (chart 3) I have tabulated some of the "Recent Actions and Trends for Improvement" which give use to the confidence I have evidenced.

In the reorganization of OSD, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering has clearly emerged as the DOD focal point for space matters.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency is currently transferring its responsibilities for military space systems to the several services and the trend seems to be that ARPA's future activities will concern solely with projects of an advanced research nature.

With the transfer of ABMA to NASA the Air Force has emerged as the OSD agency primarily responsible for space boosters.

As time has passed, and the above actions taken, the future role of NASA has become considerably clearer.

The transfer to the services of the responsibility for designated military space systems will do much to eliminate confusion and competition.

The precedent established by the assignment of General Yates as the OSD coordinator for the MERCURY project creates a pattern which will provide efficient future operations without the necessity for major reorganization or the creation of new agencies.

In summary, I am encouraged by recent progress and feel that with some further revisions to our policies and procedures, we will attain an effective organization for the timely and economical conduct of our national space effort.

Now Colonel Glasser will cover in greater detail the reasoning which leads the Air Force to the conclusions I have enumerated and will present some specific recommendations for further policy and procedure decisions which the Air Force feels are required. Lt Colonel Sult will supplement these remarks by developing for the case of SAMOS:

The technical interface between the satellite borne and the ground equipment.

The man-machine relationships of the over-all program.

The time phasing of the various elements of the program, with specific reference to the need for concurrent planning and action.