SAMS and MIDAS

Reference: Letter from General Power to General White

1. General Power expressed concern over the lack of progress in the SAMS development program and lack of approval for any operational programs to date. In addition, the Under Secretary of the Air Force is withholding the approval for "Early Fix" facility at Quiet.

2. The proposed answer provides the current status of these programs and the further redirection of the operational plan.

RECOMMENDATION:

3. That the Chief of Staff sign the proposed reply.

JOHN L. MARTIN, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Assistant for Advanced Technology, DCS/Development
The President, General Power to General White

The projected funds in the United Development

The projected operational program in this: In addition to

This is standing for approval for "merry pic" facility.

The final letter provides the current status of these programs and the further

3. That Secretary of Staff signs the proposed reply.

John D. Moore, Jr.

Colonel, USAF

Deputy, Assistant for Advanced

Technology, PES/Development

AFWD  AFXPD  AFAIN

AFWD  AFXPD  AFAIN

SECUR
Sincerely,

SIGNED

THOMAS B. WHITE
Chief of Staff
In the fall of 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staffs approved the plan for the development of MIR. The Secretary of Defense also approved the plan for MIR development. The general acceptance of MIR development is due in part to the fact that it is the fastest missile system that is feasible. It is my belief that this represents an acceptable risk.

The operational phase, both as to range and timing, does not enjoy the same success. The operational plans were sent by the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff late in 1960. Since that time, the Chief of Naval Operations has recommended his proposal for a joint military aerospace program and I feel that it is most important that these two JCS actions be kept separate. It is necessary, therefore, in the view of the latter action since and we are pursuing this action with great care.

It has been and will be a continuing challenge to keep operational plans for the operational phase. The MIRAS phase has been given much attention because of lack of confidence by MIRAS in the probability of attacking the design of the system. We have considered adversely which led to the operational phase.

There are no operational funds actually in the 1961 budget, but we have asked the Secretary of Defense and the Congress to approve the fiscal year 1962 budget. As per 1959, the MIRAS and various nuclear warheads are part of the overall system. The operational plans for the JCS actions have been studied and will continue to be studied. The extreme no-nose studies has shown that the system may be viable.

The future seems to indicate that the general development of MIR will continue. I propose a general study to evaluate the basic feasibility of the system to handle in a responsible fashion any operational task from the JCS flights.