1. General Schriever directed a letter, subject as above, dated 19 September 1960 to General White (MAGF) with attached recommendations for:

   a. Establishing a Science Advisory Committee for the SAMOS.
   b. Avoiding any delay in the SAMOS launching schedule.
   c. Strengthening and revising the informational plan for SAMOS to avoid Press speculative accounts, emphasizing "Sky In the Sky" theme.

2. The proposed reply (Tab A) outlines the actions taken by the Air Force regarding General Schriever's recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION:

3. That the attached reply be signed and dispatched.

   2 Attachments:
   1) Tab A - Ltr from Gen Schriever to Gen White
   2) Tab B - Proposed Ltr from Gen White to Gen Schriever
SECRET

I am sure you will be pleased to know also that the Under Secretary has been in close contact with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and other officials in the Department of Defense and the Executive Department and has presented a position for the Air Force which I think generally is compatible with your views on the subject.

Sincerely
AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

SUBJECT: SAMOS Program

To: General Thomas D. White
Chief of Staff
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General,

I appreciate your prompt action in designating General Greer as "Mr. SAMOS" and in establishing top priority for the assignment of his needed assistants as summarized in your CONFIDENTIAL - EYES-ONLY memorandum of 4 August 1960. General Greer is now operating as Vice Commander, ANSD, for Space Security Satellites; requests for proposals have gone out and we have briefed the contractors relative to the requirements of the E-6 Program; and the recent successes in returning orbiting payloads to earth, all add to our confidence in the success of the over-all program.

However, for your consideration, I want to give you a few more thoughts on the proposal to establish a Science Advisory Committee to serve in a role for SAMOS similar to the Van Neumann Committee on Ballistic Missiles. My idea is to create a buffer from the criticism which we expect from civilian committees such as the ones headed by Dr. Killian and Dr. Baker, because it is so difficult and time consuming for key Air Force personnel to counter the criticisms of such committees. In this connection we can expect the unfortunate defection of NASA personnel to give impetus to investigations and reviews of intelligence and intelligence systems. This lends further weight to the idea of establishing the proposed committee. I believe a Science Advisory Committee composed of men and women compatible to the several interested agencies would function as a buffer, would facilitate solution of some of the technical and vested interest problems with which we are confronted and, perhaps most important, would demonstrate Air Force initiative in developing SAMOS to serve the variety of national purposes of which it is capable. This could help to counter, in the incipient stages, any charges that the Air Force is attempting to hold SAMOS to serve its own parochial purposes. This latter consideration could be very important and could negate the requirement to reaffirm ANDC's charter for the conduct of the program.

We should also concern ourselves with the world-wide impact of the forthcoming launching of the first RED SAMOS satellite now scheduled for
4 October. This fall will mark the beginning of the next United Nations
Assembly meeting which convenes approximately 20 September. We can expect
the Soviets to launch another reconnaissance attack during this meeting,
which will be designed to further limit U.S. intelligence efforts,
especially communications activities. This attack, together with pressures
which we believe will be exerted by the framework of our own Government or from
public opinion must not be permitted to delay or interfere with the
scheduled launching for the following reasons:

1. The loss of the Geminus, the U-2 and the recent B-47 incident have re-
emphasized the urgency of a successful and timely achievement of photo-
graphic and electronic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union and other denied
areas.

2. A successful SALOM launch shortly after convening of the U. N. General
Assembly (20 September 1960), would provide the U.S. and other Western
powers with a propaganda victory and strengthen the position of the West
at this meeting.

3. The Communist position, on the other hand, might be weakened by such a
development and could result in a more conciliatory Soviet attitude. This
could conceivably serve to lessen the existing East-West tensions.

4. A successful SALOM launching could be portrayed as a scientific develop-
ment which could serve the purposes of furthering disarmament by demonstrating
an inspection and monitoring capability for certain specific arms control
proposals.

5. In like manner, the SALOM could be portrayed as an effective contribution
toward an open world and thereby further serve to reduce existing tensions.

6. One of the Soviet types of attack at the U. N. probably will be to con-
tinue to play the U-2 games. A successful launch of SALOM could confirm
that such flights (U-2) would be unnecessary in the future and could deflate
the Soviet bombast.

7. The SALOM launching should be considered as a normal, routine develop-
ment in our research and development program. Any decision to delay the
launching would require a subsequent positive decision as to when the
appropriate time might exist to establish a launch date. Such a sub-
sequent decision might be hard to obtain inasmuch as a judgment would be
required as to the "right" time. Conceivably, a continuing slippage could
occur in arriving at such a positive decision and we could find ourselves
in a situation similar to that existing in the test cessation negotiations
where we have for a prolonged period of time been unable to test nuclear
weapons.

8. There is a good possibility that the Soviets may not choose to react
immediately to a U. S. reconnaissance satellite. This has been evidenced
in the past by the fact that the Soviets have made no formal protest about
TIMOS (NIX 100-6-60). The Soviets might deliberately adopt such a position
in order not to give further recognition to such a U. S. achievement.
In the absence of a clear line of guidance or concrete threats, the Western press is very likely to respond to a successful spy launch in a somewhat sensational way, emphasizing the 'Spy in the Sky' theme. A public event of this type could provoke a strong Soviet reaction, which might have repercussions in the U.S. Congress. The potential for public pressure to increase public pressure on the U.S. government, especially in light of current political considerations, should include the following:

The U.S. still faces the continuation of a series of S-260 launches which could advance the state-of-the-art in the field of observation capabilities. This situation was demonstrated to the world by TIMOS, the first successful launch of an S-260 on April 19th. The demonstration opened the possibility that future launches might result from the initial success. The United States' activities in the Western Hemisphere, coupled with its advanced technological tools, could put the United States at the forefront of international technology development.

Hence, the U.S. should continue to monitor and respond to the Soviet Union's S-260 launches, understanding the potential for increased Soviet activity and the need for continued investment in technology and infrastructure.
SECRET

1. The President has directed that the U.S. government fully support the British effort to develop appropriate signals intelligence equipment. The President has also directed that the U.S. government provide the British with all available signals intelligence equipment and personnel as necessary to support the British effort.

2. The President has directed that the U.S. government provide the British with all available signals intelligence equipment and personnel as necessary to support the British effort.

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7. The President has directed that the U.S. government provide the British with all available signals intelligence equipment and personnel as necessary to support the British effort.

It is recommended that you urge the Secretary to obtain assurances from the Department of Defense and the respective Department of Defense officials of views as expressed in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 above.

Sincerely,

[Signature]