1. The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation has been and probably will continue to
be requested to give presentations on WS 117L, the Advanced Reconnaissance System,
to other governmental agencies. Typical of such presentations was the one recently
presented to Dr. Furnas, and that requested by the Air University.

2. Under SDD No. 117L, WDD is charged with maintaining special security pre-
cautions on a strict need-to-know interpretation concerned with the divulging of
information on the ARS. Furthermore, we are required to maintain a list of those
people who require need-to-know of all of the sensitive aspects of the program.
From a practical point of view, it is very difficult for an effective presentation
to be given by Lockheed which does not at least infer the nature of some of these
sensitive aspects of the program.

3. It is requested that Lockheed be advised that in the future, all requests
for presentations on WS 117L be referred to WDD for approval. In each case, the
proposed list of attendees must be completely specified in order that this office
can determine whether or not a need-to-know exists. It is further requested that
the instructions to Lockheed be phrased in such a way as to prevent them from volun-
tarily including discussions of their role in WS 117L on any presentation on over-all
company activities.

4. This DF is classified SECRET because it quotes portions of SDD No. 117L,
which are similarly classified.

SIGNED

FREDERICK C. O. ODER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant for WS 117L
Technical Operations

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
Presentations on NS 117L

APGM-A
Lt. Colonel Ahola

WDYR
OCT 17 1956
Lt. Colonel Odor/1313

1. At the request of HQ USAF, NDD, in the person of Lt. Colonel Odor, aided by Commander Truax, will give a presentation to the OSD Coordinating Committee on Guided Missiles (OASD)(M) on 26 October 1956. The presentation will be given a dry run in General Swafford's office on 25 October 1956.

2. It has come to the attention of NDD, that it would be fruitful to advise key personnel of the Directorate of Plans (AFORD) on NS 117L. It is requested that you contact Colonel James B. Tipton, Chief of Long Range Objectives and Programs Group in Room K967, with a view to inviting Colonel Tipton to attend one of the two presentations indicated above. Since this will be a TOP SECRET presentation, and accordingly, attendance at the OSD presentation will be quite limited, it is suggested that you determine whether or not Colonel Tipton could not attend the dry run in General Swafford's office on the 25 October 1956.

3. It is presently planned that the briefing team will arrive on the day time Statesman on 24 October 1956, they will be carrying material up to TOP SECRET. It is requested that arrangements be made for the securing of this material beginning with the night of 24 October 1956 and that Colonel Odor be advised as to what arrangements have been made in this regard.

HAROLD N. NORTON
Colonel, USAF
Ass't Deputy Commander

CHARLES H. TERRIHER, JR
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander
Technical Operations
Request for Security Investigation in Re Magazine Release  
OCT 15 1956  
F. C. E. Oder/la/1344

1. Your attention is invited to the article which appears on the lower right hand side of page 15 on the October 1956 issue of the magazine, "Missiles and Rockets", which is published monthly by American Aviation Publications, Inc., Washington, D.C., in which lists as the managing editor, Erik Bergaust.

2. The article referred to, has as its caption, "Navy's Truxx, Guides AF Satellite Work". The article deals with the fact that Commander Truxx is assigned to WDD. Discusses his career briefly and states that he is a nominee for the American Rocket Society's Presidency. The problem with the article lies both in the caption and in the last sentence, which states, "Informed sources believe Commander Truxx is guiding WDD's satellite work".

3. The fact that the AF (WDD) is engaged in development of a satellite is classified SECRET. Furthermore, WS 117L has special security measures directed by SDD No. 117L. The need for such measures is apparent, in that the premature compromise for a Reconnaissance effort such as this, could easily result in serious national embarrassment and a resulting loss of the investment in the project as well as a denial of the potential results thereof.

4. Accordingly, it is requested that an investigation be conducted to ascertain the circumstances surrounding this release and the determination of responsibility for the classified information concerned appearing in public print. It is further requested that this office be advised as to what steps can be taken to prevent future occurrences of this nature.

SIGNED

FREDERICO C. B. ODER  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Assistant for WS 117L  
Technical Operations

cc: WDGS

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DOD DIR 5200.10

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

WDTR-56-180  
WDTR-56-180

F C E ODER  
1344
1. WS 117L, being a satellite-borne reconnaissance system, leans heavily on the Ballistic Missile Programs for placing the vehicle on orbit. For instance, the ICBM provides almost 65% of the velocity required for a 300 mile satellite. The basic scheme is to replace the nose cone with a powered third stage. The USAF approved WS 117L Development Plan is based on the use of the SM 68 as a booster, although the SM 68 appears to offer the possibility of more payload on orbit, which may be required in the future.

2. Automation and MIT have been involved in parallel guidance and control studies for the satellite for the past seven years. How that WS 117L is an approved weapon system, with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation about to receive a contract for the System Development, the immediate selection of a guidance contractor is imperative.

3. In the most general case, the question of who the guidance contractor will be can be broken down into two categories, those who are and those who are not in the ballistic missile programs. The answer must be weighed in light of the following:

   a. Cost of putting a new contractor in the ballistic missile guidance business.

   b. Allowable degree of interference to the three other WDD programs.

   c. Degree of relative independence of ballistic missile programs desirable by WS 117L for its optimum development program.

   d. Overall economy to be affected by going to one of those contractors in the other programs which offers the best WS 117L solution.

   e. Relative degree of reliability of a guidance system which will have been flight tested for one of the other programs vs a new item developed for WS 117L alone, which must have allowance for separate flights for guidance tests.
4. None of the guidance schemes under development for the other programs will fulfill the satellite application without modifications, although some are more easily adapted than others. Based on technical promise and early availability to meet WS 117L launch dates, AGSP seems to be best suited of the WDD guidance contractors.

5. R-W has performed a short study and the results are included in enclosure 11. Since these results were presented, however, Mr. Scheman visited the WS 117L study group at MIT and seems to concur in the general idea of making use of as much as possible of AC production units, meanwhile, having MIT perform the necessary R&D to make the system compatible with the SN 65 and the WS 117L orbital vehicle, hence minimizing early engineering interference at AC.

6. Specifically, it is visualized that AG IRBM production platforms (IMU) and associated electronics will be used "as is" with modifications of the computer only being required for WS 117L use. These hardware modifications could be performed by AC with little or no interference.

7. WDTTR, in the best interest of the Air Force, feels that the possibility of using an MIT-AC spark plug combination for WS 117L guidance contractors should be fully investigated in detail, prior to selecting another contractor such as MAA.

8. Because of the long lead time involved on guidance development, it is requested that this question of feasibility of utilizing AC for WS 117L guidance system production be answered as soon as is practical.

9. The MIT contract for WS 117L study terminates 1 Nov 56, hence, it is desired that the question be resolved in time to extend their contract without a work stoppage, if they are to continue. If this scheme is not satisfactory, this group at MIT will contract with the Navy for a development of a shipborne inertial reference system for Jupiter launchings.

10. WDTTR would like to have a discussion between AC-MIT-WDTTR representatives to perform this detailed analysis of exactly what is required of AC and the degree of interference with WS 115A.

1 Incl
Memo from F.A. Ford to J.C. Fletcher
5 Sep 56, subj: Inertial Guidance for
WS 117-L

SIGNED

FREDERICK A. ODEN
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant for WS 117L
Technical Operations

WDTTR 56-178

Lt Herther
1344
Subject: Request for Proposal, PR 57-MD-196
Lockheed Aircraft Company

OCT 15 1956

TO: MCPZS
FROM: MTR

OCCURRENCE NO. 2

Ocair Truss/dr/13bb

Attn: Major Rowland

1. Lockheed's Proposal of 26 September 1956 (NSD/20302) to the Ballistic Missiles Office suggested a number of changes to the USAF Development Plan of 2 April 1956 for WS 117L. It is not considered necessary that these changes be accepted or rejected prior to issuance of a letter contract, however, the approach should be determined in some detail for the purpose of the definitive contract to follow.

2. The Development Plan of 2 April 1956 was based on that submitted by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in March 1956. The latter document contained much material to substantiate the program presented. No supporting information has been presented regarding the proposed changes. It is requested that such information be supplied either as special reports or as part of the regular reporting system. This information should be supplied prior to any significant expenditures along the lines of the changes mentioned. In particular, the following data should be included: (Numbers refer to Disclosure (a) of NSD/20302)

A-1

1a. Characteristics of the X-17 as an environmental test vehicle including:

- Cost
- State of development
- Payload
- Launch facilities and location
- Altitude
- Availability (interference)
- Accelerations
- Crew training status
- Stability

These characteristics should be compared with the Aerobee-HR.

b. The same information is required for the ATV, with comparable data for Redstone. If it is desired that the number 13 be included in the development plan, a test annex should also be provided showing a test schedule and the general payload and test objectives of each flight.

c. It is assumed that the number of vehicles mentioned was determined by the estimated availability of SN 65's. The time period needs to be fixed more accurately and the test payload and objectives outlined as described for the ATV. In addition, further explanation of the idea of proceeding from simple to complex payloads is desired. In view of the cost of each launching, it would appear that the complexity of the payload should be limited only by the availability or reasonably well-ground-tested components or by the reduced success probability for the flight. Whether this last factor actually enters or not would depend on how a given test item interacts with other items.
2. It is not expected that a firm weight limitation for the SM 65 can be established prior to about 1 November 1956. The Western Development Division agrees with the general principle of increasing the orbiting vehicle weight so long as worthwhile gains in payload accrue from such increases.

3. The Western Development Division is particularly interested in a detailed comparison of the Hustler and second stage Vanguard engines. Rough calculations indicate that an inessential gain in payload will result from using the more costly and complicated Hustler System. The comparison should include appraisal of the following:

(a) Relative reliability
(b) Relative cost
(c) Payload differences for a realistic gross weight and trajectory due to:

(1) Specific impulse including propellant consumed by turbo-pump.
(2) Propulsion system weight
(3) Different mixture ratio, control tolerances (different propellant utilization).

(d) Difference in weight of thrust carry-through structures because of different thrusts of the two engines.

(e) Summary of problems in Hustler engine because of different attitude.
(f) Relative difficulty of varying propulsion program.
(g) Differences in countdown time launch crew requirements, checkout equipment, etc.

(h) Guidance and control problem engendered by turbine during coast-down.

(i) Adequacy of residual gas pressure for post-cut off control for both Systems. (if used)

(j) Effect of difference in thrust on guidance accuracy and trajectory.

A-4. No special requirement other than a complete evaluation of competing systems.

A-5. Availability of Minitrack system should be considered.

A-6. No additional data required

A-7. No additional data required.
3. The request for Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for 2.6 million of government financing for the Captive Systems Test facility is at variance with their cost estimate of March 1956. Since Lockheed stated willingness to provide all brick and mortar at or near their plant had a considerable influence in their selection as contractor, it is felt that further pressure should be brought to bear to encourage them to provide all non-recoverables for this System Test Facility.

4. WDTR has no comment at this time on the selection of subcontractors. It is believed that the Air Force should not signify approval or disapproval of the proposed team until it is reasonably complete.

SIGNED

1 Incl:
Contractor's Proposal
subject as above.

FREDERIC C. E. ODER
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Assistant for WS 117L
Technical Operations

WDTR     dh
Cdr Truex    1344

SAR: 1022.5

WD 56-01027
SUBJECT: Request for Study of Optimum Method for Acquisition and Tracking of the W3 1171 Orbital Vehicle

TO: Boeing-Vertol Corporation
   Attn: Dr. James C. Fletcher

1. It is requested that Boeing-Vertol perform an immediate short study to determine the optimum technique for acquisition and tracking of an orbital vehicle. This study should assume an orbital altitude of 300 miles, and that radar "skin-tracking" will not be used.

2. It is desired that the various systems, i.e., radar interferometer, etc., would be compared with respect to the following general specifications:
   a. Estimated cost.
   b. Ground and support facility requirements.
   c. Vehicle weight and power requirements.
   d. Growth capability, i.e., ability to handle increasing number of vehicle passes.
   e. Settling time, i.e., a measure of the tracking system accuracy vs the number of vehicle passes.
   f. System complexity and/or reliability.
   g. Susceptibility to jamming.
   h. Lead time for obtaining recommended system.
   i. Any other comparison deemed pertinent.

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MDIR 56-170
3. It is desired that the results of this study be transmitted to WDTR by 25 October 1956. The system comparisons should be furnished in tabular form with the assumptions and recommendations presented in letter form in sufficient quantity (5 copies) to WDTR. Not more than 2 months shall be devoted for this study.

SIGNED

FREDERICK O. OBER
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Assistant for WS 117L
Technical Operations
Subject: Project RAND Recommendation to the Air Staff  

TO: WDTL  
FROM: WDT (In Turn)  
CAPT. COOLBAUGH/sh/13 unh  

1. The enclosed RAND Recommendation has been reviewed by WDTL, and WDT has discussed it with WDTL.

2. As far as WS 1172 is concerned, the subject of infrared is not new since the application of infrared techniques to WS 1172 is being given serious consideration by both WDTL and Lockheed Missile Systems Division. In fact, Lockheed Missile Systems Division has issued a report, "Preliminary Study of WS 1172 Warning System Against ICBM Attack", NSD 1929, dated 6 September 1956, which deals entirely with using infrared detection techniques. This volume should be examined by the people who are concerned with acting on RAND's Recommendation, because the information contained in it is closely related and in some cases is applicable to the RAND defensive system. One copy of the report is inclosed for such use.

3. The attached report, NSD 1929, does not present a firm program which is being incorporated as a part of WS 1172. Rather, the report should be read with Lockheed's introductory qualification in mind, "This system is admittedly not the optimum one, and it is offered here solely for the purposes of discussion".

4. The discussion with Colonel Ely (MDTL) brought out the fact that there are no provisions in the existing programs at WDT to conduct experiments such as RAND suggests. He did state that, possibly, such experiments could be incorporated in the various test programs, and they might even serve a useful function, e.g., tracking of missiles by infrared equipment. The results of these experiments could also be used by WS 1172 to better define an infrared reconnaissance system capable of warning of an impending ICBM attack by enemies of this country.

5. No discussions have been held with WDO on this matter.

SIGNED  
FREDERICO O. E. CORDER  
Lt. Colonel, USAF  
Assistant for WS 1172  
Technical Operations  

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INTERVALS, NBD AUTOMATICALLY  
DECLASSIFIED, DOD DIR 5200.1Q  

3 Incls:  
1. RAND Recom. to the Air Staff.  
WD 56-02919 (SECRET)  
2. Lockheed NSD 1929, Preliminary Study of WS 1172 Warning System Against ICBM Attack.  
WS 56-1539 (SECRET)  
3. Memo fr Gen. Stranathan above subject, dtd 12 Sep 56  
WDTR  
CAPT. COOLBAUGH/sh/13 unh  
WD 56-02919
MEMORANDUM FOR GEN SCHRIEVER
THRU: Col Terhune

SUBJECT: Report on "Ballistic Missiles, Satellites, and Space Vehicles - 1956 to 1976"

1. Attached is a revised copy of the subject report for your information.

2. With the exception of the recommendations, nearly all of the material has been used in one place or another in the preparation of the draft of the final report of the Ballistic Missile and Space Vehicle Committee.

3. It is interesting to note that, although, many people from R-W, R&D, and WDT have contributed to the material and have discussed technical details at length, there has been little or no controversial discussion about the estimated development program and time schedule. This obviously does not make it correct, but it would indicate that it might not be too far out of line.

4. I plan to distribute copies to the R&D and R-W personnel who contributed, if you have no objection.

LAWRENCE D. ELY
Colonel, USAF
Asst for Technical Groups
Deputy for Technical Operations


When inclusions are withdrawn the classification of this correspondence will be downgraded to Secret in accordance with APR 206-1.

WDTL
Col Ely

WDTL 56-42
SUBJECT: Semi-Annual TOP SECRET Inventory

TO: Chief, WDTX  
FROM: WDTX (Maj Urban)  
DATE: OCT 5 1956  
COMMENT NO. 3  
Major Urban/mug/439

1. In accordance with instructions contained in Paragraph 1, Comment No. 1, the following is a tabulation, by office, of Top Secret documents in WDT as of 30 September 1956:

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<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>WDT, WDTA, WDTX</th>
<th>Control No.</th>
<th>Unclassified Title (Long or Short)</th>
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<td>b. WDTA</td>
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<td>WS 117L Dev. Plan (cy 21)</td>
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<td>OOR ICBM Weapons System</td>
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<td>WDD-55-15-85 (cy 3)</td>
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<td>c. WDTT</td>
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<td>WS 117L Rev. Plan, Supplement</td>
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<td>d. WDTG</td>
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<td>e. WDTB</td>
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<td>f. WDTX</td>
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<td>Systems Dev. Plan AUS</td>
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SUBJECT: Semi-Annual TOP SECRET Inventory

1. WDLA  WDL-56-13-721  2 oys numbers 1 and 2 of 3
        WDL-56-13-57  Memo dated 16 May 56
        WDL-56-13-65 (qy 36)  AFS/AAMTPass 100,000 A

j. WDLG  None

k. WDLIP  None

l. WDTM (AFMTO)  WDT-56-13-08 (or 27)  Supplement ARS, 2 April 1956
    Project Off  * Confirmed by telecon w/J. Zinn

m. WDTK (Edwards  WDT-56-13-28  Supplement ARS, 2 April 1956
    Rocket Base)  * In possession of Edwards Base

2. I certify that the above-listed material constitutes a complete and accurate
   inventory of Top Secret in WDT as of 30 September 1956.

   [Signature]
   JOHN A. URBAN, Major, USAF
   Inventory Officer
SUBJECT: Use of SM-65A Missiles in the WS 117L Flight Test Program

TO: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
    Missile Systems Division
    Attn: Mr. J. H. Carter
    P.O. Box 504
    Sunnyvale, California

1. Reference is made to the paragraph at the bottom of page 7 in Pied Piper Progress Report for August, NMD 1956, in which it is stated that a study is being made of the performance of SM-65A to determine its capabilities as a booster for an orbiting Pioneer Vehicle, "on the assumption that the SM-65A may be available in quantities sufficient to provide a wealth of valuable test data early in the WS 117L program even if only a meager payload can be placed on orbit".

2. Because the Weapon System Project Office lacks assurance that the above assumption is correct and, in fact, there is reason to believe that the number of SM-65A's available to the WS 117L Program will be small, the Missile Systems Division is requested to limit the quantity of SM-65A's to be used in the flight test program to a very small number.

3. In the event a few SM-65A missiles are made available to the WS 117L Program, they will be considered as "bonus" test vehicles to be incorporated in the established flight test program. In all probability, their use should be limited to non-orbiting flights and, certainly, because of the lack of assurance of getting them, the Pioneer Vehicle's design must not be biased in order that orbiting flights can be made by using the SM-65A as a booster.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

F. C. TRUAX
Commander, USN

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

FREDERIC G. B. CODER
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Assistant for WS 117L Technical Operations
Nomination of Camp Cooke Representative

WDTR

OCT 3 1956
Lt Hether/eb/1344

1. WDTR appoints Lt. John C. Hether as a WS 117L representative planning the phased activation of Camp Cooke.

2. His appointment is primarily to insure the technical integration of WS 117L requirements with current plans for Camp Cooke.

3. In the near future it is expected that additional personnel uniquely qualified in the generation of operations orders will supplement the WDTR staff and assist in preparing the detailed document with Lt Colonel Lyster's group.

R. C. TRUAX
Commander, USN

FREDERICO G. O. GODD, Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant for WS 117L
SUBJECT: Security Consideration Regarding WS 117L in Relation to Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation

TO: Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation

1. ARDC System Development Directive No. 117L, "Advanced Reconnaissance System", 17 August 1956, directs that special security restrictions be maintained on information relating to the development progress, system status, and planned operational capabilities of WS 117L. It further directs that a roster be maintained of individuals whose position, as known to Western Development Division, requires overall knowledge of the "sensitive aspects" of the WS 117L development program.

2. The "sensitive aspects" referred to above are defined as those items of information shown as classified TOP SECRET in Section XIV, page 31, of the Master Security Classification Guide 117L, 27 August 1956. Six copies of this guide have been attached for your use and retention.

3. Inasmuch as the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation will have certain access to WS 117L information, the following administrative procedures will be followed by the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation in the conduct of work relative to WS 117L:

   a. R-W will furnish to Western Development Division, Attention: WDTR, a list of individuals whose position requires overall knowledge of the sensitive aspects of the WS 117L program together with justification for such listing. The R-W Corporation will maintain this listing on a current basis to WDTR.

   b. R-W will furnish to WDTR, on a monthly basis, a listing of those personnel of R-W who have been involved in WS 117L during the month together with the degree of involvement in the programs and the reason therefore.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS. NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10
MDD (HQ ARDC) Subject: Security Consideration Regarding WS 117L in Relation to Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation

0. R-W will obtain written approval from Western Development Division prior to the distribution of all R-W documents relevant to WS 117L. R-W requests for approval of distribution will be routed through WDSIT to WDTI.

1. Because of these security considerations, R-W should, insofar as possible, stabilize the personnel that are to be involved with WS 117L.

SIGNED

1 Incl:
6 Copies of
Master Security Guide

Charles H. Terrill, Jr.
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander
Technical Operations

CC: WDTI
WDSIS

WDTI
Lt. Col. Riepe
13th
SECRET FROM WDTN 10-1.

FOR DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

THE RAND CORPORATION GM IN ATTEMPT TO SIMULATE THE ARS SYSTEM'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AS REALISTICALLY AS POSSIBLE GM Requires PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF THE FOLLOWING DOMESTIC AREAS GM MISSILE TEST INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES AT PATRICK AND GM EDWARDS AFB GM CONVAIR'S INSTALLATION AT STROMOAR CANYON NEAR SAN DIEGO AND AERO-JET'S INSTALLATION AT SACRAMENTO NEAR MATHER AFB PD. ANY EXISTING PHOTOGRAPHS YOU HAVE GM CAN BE USED GM AND IF GM IN THE FUTURE GM PHOTOGRAPHS CAN BE TAKEN OF THESE AREAS BY YOUR ORGANIZATION ON A REGULAR SCHEDULE GM PREFERABLY EVERY TWO MONTHS GM THEY WILL BE EXTREMELY USEFUL IN DETERMINING HOW TARGETS CHANGE WITH TIME RD RAND SUGGESTED THAT GM IF POSSIBLE GM FUTURE PHOTOGRAPHS BE MADE AT 30,000 TO 40,000 FEET ALTITUDE BY CAMERAS USING LENSES WITH

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

R. C. TRUAX
Commander, USN

FREDERIG C. E. GEBER
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Assistant for WS 1171
Technical Operations

WDTN 56-161
COMDR WID, INGLE, CALIF

FOCAL LENGTHS OF 1 CM, 2 CM, 6, AND 12 INCHES PD. THESE PHOTOGRAPHS WILL PERMIT THEM TO SIMULATE A SCALE OF 250,000 CM WHICH IS APPLICABLE TO THE ABS CM 117L PD. YOUR HELP IN GATHERING THIS MATERIAL WILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED PD. BOTH RAND AND WID ARE READY TO COOPERATE WITH YOU IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE PD. MR. AMRON KATZ IS THE CONTACT AT RAND PD.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

23 December 1957

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Colonel Nunziato to General Rittland

Colonel Nunziato stated that Mr. Douglas made the following statement before the Johnson Committee — this was the unclassified portion of the hearings:

Secretary Douglas stated that both we and the Russians had an engine with sufficient thrust to launch a 1,000 lb satellite and an engine and guidance sufficient to cast a 1,000 lb satellite in orbit.

The Committee Counsel requested that Secretary Douglas check on his testimony in this regard. In his testimony, Secretary Douglas had stated that he was speaking of a single engine supplemented by a single stage engine.

BMD was requested to supply Colonel Nunziato with an answer to the above by this afternoon. In addition, we are to let him know what we can do now, including the NAVARO.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL KITLAND

18 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL KITLAND

SUBJECT: 117L Presentation at Ballistic Missile Orientation Course

1. Lt Colonel Walter of the A. U. Liaison Office has requested permission to have someone from Colonel Oder's shop give a briefing on the 117L Program to the attendees in the next local Ballistic Missile Orientation Course (approximately 30 January).

2. It would seem proper to release this type briefing to our own people since the Department of Defense has approved the Air University adding a briefing on the 117L to both the command and staff and the Air War College courses in January.

3. Your concurrence is required since a request to include this briefing in the orientation course approximately six months ago was not approved.

mjp

BRUCE FOX, II
Major, USAF
Assistant Executive Officer
December 2, 1957

Dear Sir:

The Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee is presently engaged in an intensive inquiry into the missile and satellite programs of the Department of Defense. The principal purpose of the inquiry is to determine the present status of those programs, the reasons why those programs have not proceeded at a faster rate, and what actions can be taken to accelerate such programs.

In connection with this investigation we are now writing to each of the principal manufacturing companies which have been engaged in research and development or production, or both, of missiles covered by the program, in order to ascertain certain information which is necessary to shed light on the past and present status of the programs and the future development thereof. While the information we seek must, of course, be answered with reference to particular missiles, it is not our purpose to identify particular manufacturers but rather to get an overall picture of our past, present and future missile situation.

We would, therefore, greatly appreciate it if you would answer the following questions with respect to your participation in the missile program. These questions should be answered separately with respect to each missile project in which your company is engaged. Wherever directives are involved, please indicate the dates, numbers and pertinent provisions.
I. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

A. With respect to each missile on which you are working, when did you start research and development work?

B. What is the present status of research and development with respect to each missile on which you are working?

C. Has there been any limitation imposed at any time on your use of overtime? If so, has there been any change with respect thereto?

D. Have you been hampered directly or indirectly in your research and development work by lack of funds? If so, please explain.

E. Have you at any time been hampered in your research and development work by lack of sufficient manpower? If so, please explain.

F. Has your research and development work been delayed by change orders? If so, please explain.

G. What other principal bottlenecks, if any, have you encountered in your research and development work on each missile?

II. PRODUCTION

A. With respect to the production of each missile, please specify when a letter of intent was issued, when the contract was executed and when production was started.
B. Please furnish the original production schedule on each missile. Indicate what changes, if any, have been made in such schedule. Indicate what production has been obtained to date.

C. What have been the principal factors limiting or deterring production of each missile?

D. Has there been any limitation imposed at any time on your use of overtime? If so, has there been any change with respect thereto?

E. Has production been hampered directly or indirectly by lack of funds? If so, please explain.

F. Have you at any time been hampered in production by lack of sufficient manpower? If so, please explain.

G. Has production been delayed by change orders? If so, please explain.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

Please outline your recommendations for accelerating the development and production of the missiles which you are developing or producing.

As you know, the Subcommittee has set for itself a very rigid schedule so that its investigation can be completed at the earliest possible date consonant with a thorough investigation. It is the hope of the Subcommittee that it will be able to make its conclusions and recommendations to the Senate shortly after Congress reconvenes.

The next set of hearings for the presentation of testimony and data to the Subcommittee has been fixed for Friday, December 13, 1957. We should like very much to have the requested information ready for presentation to the Subcommittee at the opening
of these hearings. We should, therefore, appreciate it very much if you would give this your prompt consideration and attention.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Edwin L. Weisl, Special Counsel
Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee

Mr. Eugene Root, Division Manager
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Palo Alto, California
December 5, 1957

Dear Sir:

Supplementing my letter to you of December 2, 1957, I would appreciate very much if in connection with the information requested, you furnish the Subcommittee with copies of any directives issued by the Department of Defense or the military service from and after October 4, 1957, having as their purpose the acceleration of the production programs or the research and development programs being conducted by your company or which provide for increased funds for such programs.

Thank you for giving this request your prompt attention.

Sincerely,

Edwin L. Weiss
Special Counsel
Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee

Mr. Eugene Root, Division Manager
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Palo Alto, California
December 13, 1957

Mr. Edwin L. Weisl, Special Counsel
Senate Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Weisl:

Attached is the information which you requested in your letter of December 2, 1957 and your supplementing letter of December 5, 1957.

You will note that data is provided only under your Research and Development category. This is due to the fact that the missiles on which the Lockheed Missile Systems Division has contracts are all under development at this time and have not yet entered the production phase. Answers to your alphabetical items are submitted under each missile program. To supply the information requested in your supplementing letter we have added Item "H" under the Research and Development category. As you will note, answers to Items B, C, D, E and G are identical for they apply to each missile program. The information for Lockheed Missile Systems Division missile programs is contained in enclosures as listed below.

Enclosure 1 Test Ballistic Missile, Polaris
Enclosure 2 XB-117L, New Horizon
Enclosure 3 X-7A, Subjet Test Vehicle
Enclosure 4 XQ-3, Supersonic Drone
Enclosure 5 Recommendations

I trust that the enclosed information provided will be of value to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

L. Eugene Root
Vice President and General Manager

Attachments:
Enclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5
I. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

A. Research and Development work started in October, 1956.

B. Research and Development work is generally on constant schedule.

C. All cost reimbursement type contracts such as those held by the Secretary, Missile Systems Division contain certain restrictions covering the use of overtime. Until mid-1957, it had been the preference of the local administrative contracting agencies of the government to approve, prior to the being worked, such overtime as was reasonable and necessary. At that time, however, certain instructions and directives from the Department of Defense to the various agencies eliminated the use of all overtime except on ballistic missile production lines or restricting other vital research and development work to a routine 40-hour week. The implementation of these directives caused some confusion and re-arranging with respect to many important projects. Approvals for overtime were difficult to secure but were not limited where important action on the part of the Department of Defense has indicated vast improvements necessitating this overtime situation.

Pertinent overtime directives are:

Memorandum addressed to Material Management from Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics) dated 15 May 1957 subject, "Overtime Policy," excluded overtime except for very special purposes. Overtime policy was emphasized in DOD-1209-45, 19 June 1957 and DOD-1209-45 revised October 1, 1957 entitled, "Overtime Policy for Governmental Contractors."

D. The contractor has operated at the minimum rates permitted by the funds available. But there been additional money available the schedules for development and testing would have been met at a faster pace.

E. There is a nation-wide heavy demand for highly qualified managerial and scientific personnel and it is difficult to acquire such personnel on a timely basis, although in general we are able to meet our personnel requirements.

F. Change orders have delayed the Polaris development. The complexity of governmental procedures for processing changes are costly in time and effort.

G. Research and Development effort in our-missile work progresses more effectively when it is carried out under a well-planned long-range program.
The support of our program by annual funds makes difficult the orderly programming of long-term effort because of uncertainties and variations in the funding support levels available from year-to-year.

A governmental security system which would provide for more expeditious processing of security clearances would be of material assistance.

It. The contractor has received classified technical instructions from the Department of the Navy which in effect serve to accelerate the POLARIS Program. Due to the Security classification of these instructions the contractor is not at liberty to provide copies.
I. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

A. Research and development work started in July, 1955.

B. Research and Development work is generally on contract schedules.

C. All cost reimbursement type contracts such as those held by the Lockheed Missile Systems Division contain certain restrictions covering the use of overtime. Until mid-1957, it had been the practice of the local administrative contracting agencies of the government to approve, prior to the being worked, such overtimes as were reasonable and necessary. At that time, however, certain instructions and directives from the Department of Defense to the various agencies eliminated the use of all overtime except on ballistic missile production projects restricting other vital research and development work to a routine 40-hour week. The implementation of these directives caused some confusion and replanning with respect to many important projects. Approvals for overtime were difficult to secure and were for limited amounts. Recent action on the part of the Department of Defense has indicated vast improvements concerning this overtime situation.

Pertinent overtime directives were

Memoranda addressed to Material Executives from Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics), April 16, May 1957 subject, "Curtailment of Overtime", eliminated overtime except for very special purposes. Overtime policy was announced in DOD-4023, 18, 19 June 1957 and DOD-4025-129, 19 October 1, 1957 entitled, "Overtime Policy for Procurement Contracts."

D. The contractor has operated at the maximum rate permitted by the funds available. Had there been additional funds available, the schedules for development and testing could have been set at a faster pace.

E. There is a nation-wide heavy demand for highly qualified managerial and scientific personnel and it is difficult to employ such personnel on a timely basis, although in general we are able to meet our personnel requirements.

F. Change orders per se have not delayed the MS-1170 Program but changing objectives have had a delaying effect.

G. Research and Development effort in our missile work appears most effectively when it is carried out under a well planned long-term program.
The support of our programs by annual funds makes difficult the orderly programming of long-term effort because of uncertainties and variations in the funding support level available from year-to-year.

A governmental security system which would provide for more expeditious processing of security clearances would be of material assistance.

II. No accelerating directives or increased funds for the purpose of accelerating this contract have been received.

The Air Force has requested the contractor to prepare a proposal for acceleration of the program. The contractor's initial proposal will be submitted to the Air Force prior to the end of the year.
I. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

A. Research and development work started in February, 1943.

B. Research and Development work is generally on contract schedule.

C. All cost reimbursement type contracts such as those held by the Lockheed Missile Systems Division contain certain restrictions covering the use of overtime. Until mid 1957, it had been the prerogative of the local administrative contracting agencies of the government to approve, prior to its being worked, such overtime as was reasonable and necessary. At that time, however, certain instructions and directives from the Department of Defense to the various agencies eliminated the use of all overtime except on ballistic-missile production thereby restricting other vital research and development work to a routine 40-hour week. The implementation of these directives caused some confusion and replanning with respect to many important projects. Approvals for overtime were difficult to secure and were for limited amounts. Recent action on the part of the Department of Defense has indicated vast improvements concerning this overtime situation.

Particular overtime directives are:

Memorandum addressed to Material Secretaries from Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics) dated 16 May 1957 subject, “Curtailment of Overtime,” eliminated overtime except for very special purposes. Overtime policy was enunciated in DOD-4105.43, 19 June 1957 and DOD-4105.48 repeated October 1, 1957 entitled, “Overtime Policy for Procurement Contracts.”

D. The contractor has operated at the maximum rate permitted by the funds available. Had there been additional monies available the schedules for development and testing could have been set at a faster pace.

E. There is a nationwide heavy demand for highly qualified managerial and scientific personnel and it is difficult to acquire such personnel on a timely basis, although in general we are able to meet our personnel requirements.

F. Change orders have not hampered research and development work.

G. Research and Development effort in our missile work proceeds most effectively when it is carried out under a well planned long-term program.
The support of our programs by annual funds makes difficult the orderly programming of long-term effort because of uncertainties and variations in the funding support level available from year-to-year.

A governmental security system which would provide for more expeditious processing of security clearances would be of material assistance.

ii. No accelerating directives or increased funds for the purposes of accelerating this contract have been received.
I. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

A. Research and development started in May, 1958.

B. Research and development work is generally on contract schedule.

C. All cost reimbursement type contracts such as those held by the Iotived Missile Systems Division contain certain restrictions covering the use of overtime. Until mid 1957, it had been the prerogative of the local administrative contracting agencies of the government to approve, prior to its being worked, such overtime as was reasonable and necessary. At that time, however, certain instructions and directives from the Department of Defense to the various agencies eliminated the use of all overtime except on ballistic missile production thereby restricting other vital research and development work to a routine 40-hour week. The implementation of these directives caused some confusion and replanning with respect to many important projects. Approvals for overtime were difficult to secure and were for limited amounts. Recent action on the part of the Department of Defense has indicated vast improvements concerning this overtime situation.

Pertinent overtime directives are:

Memorandum addressed to Material Secretaries from Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics) dated 16 May 1957 subject, "Curtailment of Overtime," eliminated overtime except for very special purposes. Overtime policy was amended in DOD-4105.43 17 June 1957 and DOD-4105.43 repeated October 1, 1957 entitled, "Overtime Policy for Procurement Contracts."

D. The contractor has operated at the maximum rate permitted by the funds available. Had there been additional monies available the schedules for development and testing could have been set at a faster pace.

E. There is a nation-wide heavy demand for highly qualified managerial and scientific personnel and it is difficult to acquire such personnel on a timely basis, although in general we are able to meet our personnel requirements.

F. Change orders have not delayed our research and development work.

G. Research and Development effort in our missile work proceeds most effectively when it is carried out under a well planned long-term program.
The support of our program by annual funds makes difficult the orderly programming of long-term effort because of uncertainties and variations in the funding support level available from year-to-year.

A governmental security system which would provide for more expeditious processing of security clearances would be of material assistance.

H. No accelerating directives or increased funds for the purpose of accelerating this contract have been received.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS

Streamlined procedures which will allow timely consummation of contractual authorizations.

Adequate and stable long-term funding so that contract objectives may be established and planning and implementation may proceed on an effective basis.

Eliminate overtime restrictions so that management may utilize this important tool when warranted.

Accelerate the process of granting security clearances.

Adequate basic research is fundamental to the expeditious development of new weapons. The contractor firmly believes that company sponsored research constitutes one of the outstanding opportunities for long-term "profit" to the government's defense effort. To encourage this privately sponsored research the government should adopt a much more liberalized view regarding this activity in its contractual requirements. At the present time general research must be negotiated separately on each contract. As a consequence different interpretations are applied to each contract and the contractor is never certain of the government's position with respect to this vital support of its defense program.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
15 December 1957

General, Munniano, via General Eisenhower to General Dwight.

Subject: Memorandum for Record,

December 15, 1957

General, Munniano, via General Eisenhower to General Dwight.

The Committee would like information on the following:

- Method of analysis
- Conclusions
- Reporting
- Reporting
- Data presented
- Basis of funding data
- Definitions
- Order of magnitude -- people, consultancy, etc. involved in handling data.

Munniano has been ordered to file requested for the above -- it is planned to rely completely on contractors protocol in this effort.

On the 'quick' side -- they want to know what can be done with the HEDO. General Eisenhower noted that it wouldn't be possible to tell the groups specifically what can be done because approval has not been received yet. However, they are working towards a preliminary solution.

The Committee would like some discussion on the June 1958, date for the P-722 regarding combat capability we will have at that time.

They will probably ask the question: 'What are you going to do with the overseas forces that are available?' Although General Munniano informed the group that the resources were allocated to the Aerospace Department, they are under the impression that the Air Force is looking into this. General Munniano suggested the following reply to
one question is: "The prospect for utilizing these, because some of them really are going back to something almost industrial."

Also, that we may even consider toward the THCR because of its growth potential.

Colonel Nash stated a summarizing note: very briefly stated in the summary, perhaps without stating that a very good project at

Let's now start with another meeting headed up by Colonel Nash on another project within.
NOTE FOR COLONEL TERRUNE

The following must be solved:

a. Program for super RTV.

b. Immediate satellite effort using THOR and the third stage VANGUARD. Conflict between this and the super RTV.

c. What is Colonel Donszato doing?

d. What is our recommended program which we will present ARDC during the week of the 2nd in regard to the Air Force satellite effort.

e. Do we or do we not wish to establish a solid weapon system office?

The above are rather curtly stated but nonetheless you and General Ritland must take time out to make decisions. In addition to the above, we must pin down this presentation for Anderson which is now scheduled for 10 December. More specifically, shall we proceed in the awarding of contracts for studies, etc., based upon our follow-on effort?

H. W. HORTON
Colonel, USAF

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOQ DIR 5200.10
CONFIDENTIAL FROM WDTR 11-14-E FOR COLONEL NUNZIATO, AFDDC-SP
INFO FOR LT COLONEL PAUL WORTHMAN, RDZGW

THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS BEEN ASKED TO ASSIST IN PREPARING A BRIEFING ON
WS 117L TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH FORMAL PERIODS OF INSTRUCTION
ON BALLISTIC MISSILES FOR THE STUDENTS OF THE SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES
OF THE AIR UNIVERSITY PD. PRESENTATION TO COMMAND AND STAFF SCHOOL IS
SCHEDULED FOR 9 AND 10 JANUARY 1958. AIR WAR COLLEGE SCHEDULE IS
APRIL 1958 PD AUTHORITY TO INCLUDE WS 117L IN THESE INSTRUCTION
PERIODS HAS BEEN DENIED BY YOUR HEADQUARTERS IN THE PAST ON THE BASIS
THAT AIR UNIVERSITY STUDENTS HAVE INSUFFICIENT NEED TO KNOW PD WE
RECOMMEND THAT THIS POLICY BE MODIFIED AND REQUEST AUTHORITY TO
INCLUDE WS 117L IN THE COURSE OF INSTRUCTION AS REQUESTED BY AIR
UNIVERSITY PD

WDTR
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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.1Q

Captain David D. Bradburn
2594 1 1

SIGNED

J. L. HAMILTON
Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

20 November 1957

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Colonel Kesseling to General Sidland

Astronautics and Space Technology Briefing. Colonel Kesseling called regarding the ARDC wire which placed a requirement on BMD for someone to visit Baltimore on 25-26 November to assist in replying to General Putti’s wire to General Anderson. Colonel Kesseling emphasized that it was extremely important that someone be present during this meeting for two reasons: (1) to give the L17L portion, and (2) to sit in on the RDT technical development presentation to General Anderson on the 26th.

General Sidland felt that this wouldn’t give us sufficient time to prepare a reply and suggested having the ARDC meeting delayed until around the 2nd of December. He will call Colonel Nunziato to find out whether it is possible to delay the 1 December briefing in Washington.

Note: In a later telephone conversation with Colonel Nunziato, the briefing in Hq USAF was postponed until the 16th of December.

Anti-ICBM. At least initially, AFBMD is to assume complete responsibility for anti-ICBM developments, including the source selection which is due in by 1 January. This means that BMD must have a management philosophy, document procedures, and organization. General Sidland advised Colonel Nichols that BMD must rely heavily on ARDC for the people to work on this project. Arrangements will be made to send ARDC representatives out to BMD to start work on this Monday.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

14 November 1987

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Mr. Root, Lockheed, Sunnyvale

Lockheed people (Dr. Ridgway, Menard, Root, Johnson, Carter, and Hawkins) are scheduled to see Celestino Schecker and Sidland from 1000-1200 on Wednesday, 20 November.

They want to discuss what Lockheed should be doing in order to accomplish the most optimum program on "New Horizons." They have a lot of ideas and can go in a number of different directions. This will be a preliminary meeting to determine in what areas they should concentrate their efforts. They want to know what they should be doing in accordance with BMS desires and their own ideas reclarification, wise, etc., in view of the developments which have taken place. The Lockheed people have a great feeling of urgency in this respect since they don't want a competitor to get these things done first.

Mr. Root advised that they will be in around 0930 on the 20th for this meeting.
MEMORANDUM TO COL ELY

13 November 1957

SUBJECT: Space Flight Program

1. At the present time we are busily pulling together for bon-

consumption by HQ ARDC and the AF Scientific Advisory Committe during
the month of December, a program to identify the follow-on areas of
R&D associated with ballistic weapon programs.

2. As of this date Gen Schriever has directed that a central
point of contact be established for identification of a program of
approximately ten to fifteen years leading to development of man-
carrying systems for space use. In this respect you are designated
as the office of contact for AFMD and you will be responsible for
completing on as accelerated a schedule as possible, such a program.

3. Please contact Dr. Dunn of STL to determine their part of
the contract for this work.

SIGNED

Cy to Dr. Dunn-STL

CHARLES H. TERNHURST, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander
Weapon Systems
ADVANCED RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM EVOLUTION

BASIC ROCKETRY RESEARCH PHASE

SATellite FEASIBILITY DETERMINED

RAND ISSUES SATELLITE UTILITY REPORT

GOR PUBLISHED (MAR '55)

RAND RECOMMENDS SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

LETTER CONTRACT AWARDED TO LOCKHEED (OCT '56)

DEVELOPMENT DIRECTIVE PUBLISHED (AUG '56)
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ODER 5 November 1957

SUBJECT: Analysis of Complex 65-1 at Cooke AFB

Request that you develop a complete analysis of Complex 65-1 at Cooke AFB for launchings of WS 117L missiles. This analysis should be complete with regard to costs, numbers of stands to be modified, instrumentation required, time schedule of launchings, and capability of SM 65's vs satellite vehicles.

It is important that this be accomplished as soon as possible so that final cost estimates and course of action can be pursued. Please advise as soon as possible.

SIGNED

O. J. RITLAND
Brigadier General, USAF
Vice Commander

1 Incl
Memo for Record,
29 Oct 57 (WGI-57-78)

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD Dir 5200.10

WDGV vb
Gen Ritland 2221
29 OCT 1957

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Reports

TO: Chief of Staff
    Headquarters, United States Air Force
    Directorate of Development Planning
    ATTN: AFDAP-A
    Washington 25, D. C.

1. Attached are seven (7) copies of the Rough Draft of Part I of the Phase I report of the Advanced Weapon Systems Study. This report is entitled "A Pilot Study of Advanced Ballistic Missiles" and is comprised of a summary and eight tabs. Part II of the Phase I report entitled "A Pilot Study of Lunar Rockets", is expected to be available in the near future. Part III, the final part of the Phase I report, will be entitled "Satellites" and should be available in November 1957. *(c)*

2. Your attention is invited to the fact that the attached documents are Rough Drafts and it is emphasized that they have not received final internal AFDAP/E-W review. For example, contrary to the recommendation made in the report, highly accurate enemy ICBM's may not require a re-evaluation of survival alternatives. The alternatives between hardness, dispersal, force size, reaction time and force expenditure time have been widely studied and are known for various enemy capabilities (including perfect accuracy). The agencies primarily active in this regard are Hq USAF (Committee established by the Chief of Staff), RAND, SAG, AFSWC and AFDAP. *(b)*

3. These documents are forwarded solely for your review and coordination as a participant in the study. Consequently, it is expected that they will be circulated only to those individuals which you consider as having contributed material for the report. In addition to AFDAP, it is understood that this is specifically limited to certain personnel within Operations Analysis, Long Range War Plans and Intelligence. Copies will be available for other elements of the Air Staff when the report is completed in final form. *(HB)*

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.1Q

WD-57-122
Cy 3 of 4
4. Arrangements will be made for the final coordination sessions planned for the week of 28 November at AVIEMO. A list of the personnel who will attend these sessions is requested. (U)

9 Incls
1. Summary (7 cys)
2. Tab 1 (7 cys)
3. Tab 2 (7 cys)
4. Tab 3 (7 cys)
5. Tab 4 (7 cys)
6. Tab 5 (7 cys)
7. Tab 6 (7 cys)
8. Tab 7 (7 cys)
9. Tab 8 (7 cys)

SIGNED

O. J. RITLAND
Brig. Gen., USAF
Vice Commander
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:


1. Col. Seay explained our plans for definitization namely:
   a. Submission of LAC Proposal 28 October 57
   b. Agreement on Terms and Work Effort November 57

   The importance of proceeding on this schedule was emphasized by Col. Seay, and Col. Nunziato agreed we should proceed as outlined.

2. The requirements for funds to cover this program to Final Definitization were submitted as follows:

   $ 15.0 Million  P-100  LAC
   $ 5.5 Million  P-100  Convair
   $ 15.5 Million  P-100

3. It was agreed to allow LAC to proceed without P-200 funds until such time as the issues were resolved at USAF Hq.

4. Col. Nunziato also approved proceeding with commitments in the P-600 area to the total of 4.5 million on a tentative allocation as follows:

   RADC  3.5  P-600
   AFCRC  3   P-600
   WADC  1   P-600
   MIT   0.6  P-600

   Total  4.5

5. Hq USAF does not require a TWX confirming this go ahead, however, they will send us authority to proceed on the above basis.

6. USAF will not withdraw the PA for $35.1 Million P-100 money, but will place an administrative freeze on $19.6 Million of the total pending resolution of program issues.

/s/ Raymond Zelenka

Raymond Zelenka
Major, USAF
AF ITEM 1 X-SECRET/
FOLLOWING IS TVX DISPATCHED TODAY--
REQUEST ADVISE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AS TO
ANY RECOMMENDED ACTIONS AND THE ESTIMATED
RESOURCES REQUIRED THEREFOR THAT COULD
BE INITIATED TO FURTHER ACCELERATE THE
ICBM/IRBM PROGRAMS. CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD
INCLUDE ADVICABILITY OF INCREASING SIZE
OF 1C3 FORCES ADVANCING SCHEDULED BY SIX
PLUS MONTHS EMPLOYING ALTERNATIVE BASE
CONSTRUCTION CONCEPTS I.E. SOFT VS HARD
FOR TITAN UNITSIC ETC ESTIMATED RESOURCES
MAY NOT BE LIMITED TO FY 59 BUDGET CYCLE
AND MAY INCLUDE INCREASES IN CURRENT FISCAL
YEAR. INFO IS DESIRED BY CHIEF OF STAFF
SOONEST DATE REPLY CAN BE FURNISHED.
ANTICIPATED SIMILAR INFO WILL BE REQUESTED
REGARDING HS-117L PROGRAMS SUGGEST PREPARATORY
ACTION ACCORDINGLY.
END USAY ITEM 1 X-SECRET/

Stand By.

REL.
USAY ITEM 2/X-SECRET/
IF AT ALL POSSIBLE DESIRE YOU PROVIDE
ROUGH ESTIMATES IMMEDIATELY FOR PRELIMINARY
DISCUSSION BY 9/8 AT NSC MEETING
AM 10 OCT. SUBJECT OF MEETING PRIMARILY
SATELLITE BUT HAS OBVIOUS ICBM/IRBM
IMPLICATIONS. DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS
END USAY ITEM 2/X-SECRET/

AFMD. ITEM 1/X-SECRET/
WILL TAKE A QUICK LOOK--
HAVE ANTICIPATED SOME OF YOUR QUESTIONS
BUT ANSWER NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE.
ESTIMATE PRELIMINARY ANSWER CAN BE
AVAILABLE EBD PH VIA TVX.
THIS ALSO ANSWERS US ITEM 2.

"A—PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR
to CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY RE-
MOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME
GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION."
ITEM 3 \SECRET/

FIND UNDERSTAND BACKGROUND OF
SITUATION AND WILL EXERT MAXIMUM
EFFORT FOR PRELIMINARY ANSWER.

ITEM 4 \SECRET/

WHAT ARE THINKING IN TERMS
OF HOW MUCH IMPACT THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
MIGHT HAVE TOWARD BREAKING FUNDING RESTRICTIONS.
IT COULD BE POSSIBLE TO GAIN AS MUCH AS
300-200 MILLION FY 1985 AND 200-900
MILLION FY 1988 IF SUFFICIENT NATIONAL
IMPELLE WE PLACED ON THESE PROGRAMS
INCLUDING 1STL, WE WANT TO BE PREPARED TO STATE
THAT WE COULD DO WITH THE FORKING
10A OR LESS AMOUNT 10A SHOULD THEY BE MADE AVAILABLE.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10