

TOP SECRET

13 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: MOL "Posture" Paper

Today I was called by Dr. Albert Hall, DDR&E who wanted to discuss actions resulting from a Space Council Meeting of 9 July. At that meeting, Mr. McNamara had presented the MOL program for the consideration of Dr. Seaborg (AEC), Mr. Webb (NASA), Mr. Rusk (State), and Admiral Raborn (CIA). State raised questions about the international "image." NASA requested a firm policy position prior to announcing MOL as an approved program. Mr. McNamara agreed and suggested that the DOD prepare a "Posture" Paper, saying he believed it could be ready in about 30 days! When State suggested the "Thompson Committee" as a mechanism for producing the paper, Mr. McNamara quietly rejected the offer.

Dr. Hall received this action item from Dr. Brown. He asked if I would serve on a small committee to prepare the paper. I advised him that he was operating deeply in ASD/ISA territory and suggested he be sure to contact Colonel Marshall Sanders on this matter. I would, of course, be glad to assist, as necessary.

Dr. Hall spoke to Colonel Sanders late this afternoon and enlisted his "support." I reminded Sanders that everything in the 2454 area is assigned by the Secretary of Defense to ASD/ISA.

By the end of the day, Lt Colonel Quiggins had prepared the attached preliminary notes for a "Posture" Paper.

PAULE. WORTHMAN Colonel, USAF

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13 July 65 -


NATIONAL POLICY -- MOL

- 1. The United States should continue to maintain the security of the National Reconnaissance Program by controlling knowledge that certain satellite reconnaissance derived technology (sensor equipment, etc.) is to be utilized by the MOL.
- 2. The United States should not attempt to develop/launch the MOL as a completely covert endeavor. Its mission includes unclassified functions, which may be discussed publicly -- as well as classified functions which cannot be described:
 - a. Acknowledge and describe unclassified functions/missions.
- b. Acknowledge inclusion of classified functions/mission -- but do not describe.
- 3. It may well be desirable to acknowledge, low key, inclusion of a reconnaissance/observation function aboard MOL as an obvious -- but secondary -- mission:
- a. To reduce impact of subsequent intentional or inadvertent disclosure that MOL is conducting intelligence quality photography of the territory of other nations.

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- b. To serve as an initial sampling of public (world) opinion/reaction concerning advisability of future public release of MOL photography.
- 4. The United States should not acquiesce to any prohibition against free and unrestricted passage of its MOL satellites about the globe or against the performance of any mission or function, including reconnaissance, which does not pose any threat or harmful effect to any other nation.
- 5. The United States should, at an appropriate time, reaffirm its intention of refraining from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit by publicly announcing that MOL does not include such plans.
- 6. Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 1721, all MOL launchings should be included on the U.S. portion of the U.N. registry of satellite launchings (identified as "scientific").
- 7. Considering the unpredictable world reaction to public disclosure of MOL sensor products, all such products should be rigidly controlled after exposure and during processing, and subjected to careful review, prior to any consideration of unclassified disclosure, in order to assess impact of such disclosure in light of current world events.



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- 8. Considering the unusually complex security arrangements affecting the NRP/MOL interface -- in addition to other agencies involved, the Department of Defense will be a point of mandatory coordination on all press or other public releases concerning the MOL.
- 9. It shall be the policy of the United States to promote, within the bounds of security, the free exchange of scientific data resulting from MOL experiments.
- 10. Since MOL is a multi-manned endeavor, consideration should be given to soliciting from other nations both personnel and/or experiments which might contribute to further exploration and knowledge of outer space.
- ll. The United States shall take action to exclude from MOL functions any experiments which might directly contaminate or indirectly bring about a radical or undesirable change in the existing environment of outer space.
- 12. Mission oriented communications design and operation will respect existing international agreements on allocation of communications frequencies.

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