

AGENDA

AIR FORCE MOL POLICY COMMITTEE

MEETING 65-3

Thursday, October 14th, 1965, 2:00 p.m.

Pentagon, Room 4E871

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Presenter</u>	<u>Time</u>
Approval of previous meeting minutes, review of old business.	Brig. Gen. Evans	5 minutes
MOL Program Status Report	Col. Lewis S. Norman Lt. Col. Richard C. Randall DE VARCHOVICH	30 minutes
MOL Astronaut Selection/Information Plan	Major Benjamin Loret Major Robert Hermann	20 minutes
MOL Management Structure	Lt. Col. Richard S. Randall DISCUSSION	1 hour 30 minutes :30 minutes
MOL Experiments Advisory Committee	Col. Lewis S. Norman	10 minutes
Executive Session	Chairman	30 minutes

AIR FORCE MOL POLICY COMMITTEE

Highlight Summary
of
Agenda Items for Meeting 65-3, October 14, 1965

1. Old Business: The previous meeting was devoted to a presentation on the recommended MOL program and MOL Laboratory Vehicle contractor source selection board results. These actions finally led to approval of the program by the President on August 25th, 1965 and to the announcement of selection of Douglas and General Electric as the Lab Vehicle and Payload Integrating contractors, respectively.

2. MOL Program Status Report: A summary status report will be presented to bring committee members up to date on key aspects of the program. Current MOL payload objectives will be reviewed and the status of the high resolution optical reconnaissance sensor will be discussed, with emphasis on the problems associated with utilization of the optical sensor in the unmanned mode. The current approach to SIGINT and Ocean Surveillance mission applications will be reviewed. Of greatest current concern is the possibility of slippage of the first manned launch with reconnaissance payload from late 1968, as announced by the President, to about March 1969. The possibility has arisen because of the long lead time for development of the reconnaissance payload and the delay from June to nearly September of this year before program approval was announced. Proposed solutions to the schedule problem will be presented for consideration.

Committee Action Requested: Approval of a recommended course of action to alleviate the potential schedule slippage problem.

3. MOL Astronaut Selection/Information Plan: The initial increment of eight crew members, out of a total program requirement of twenty, have been selected by USAF. The criteria used in the selection and brief background data on each of the six Air Force and two Navy selectees will be presented. The plan of action leading to their assignment will be discussed. Alternative plans for the amount of publicity to be accorded their assignment will be presented as a discussion item, as will the selection of a suitable title for MOL crewmembers.

Committee Action Requested: Approval of a recommended plan for implementing the assignment, and ~~selection of an appropriate title.~~

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4. MOL Management Structure: A thorough review of the approved management structure will be presented, including definition of the role and responsibility of each office/organization concerned as well as interface relationships, particularly those between the MOL System and Special Projects offices. The organizational arrangement for MOL within Aerospace Corporation and its meshing with the MOL System Office will be outlined.

} a.
} c.

add b.
Industrial
Structure

Committee Action Requested: None.

5. MOL Experiments Advisory Committee: A brief review will be made of those actions which led to the establishment of subject committee. Its present status, proposed membership, and projected future activity will be covered.

Committee Action Requested: Approval of proposed membership and planned course of action.

6. Executive Session: To be devoted to discussion of key items which arise during the open session, and such other matters which may be raised by the Chairman or other committee members.

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Item 1

THE MOL LAUNCH SCHEDULE

A. Background

1. The MOL launch schedule as presented by the MOL SPO in terms of months from acquisition phase go-ahead is presently as follows:

MOL 1	Titan III Development Flight	26 months
MOL 2	MOL Development Flight (Unmanned)	30 months
MOL 3	First Manned MOL Flight	34 months
MOL 4-7	All subsequent flights	4 months apart

2. Based on the original assumption of CDP start in July 1965 and an acquisition phase go-ahead in January 1966, the flight schedule is as follows:

MOL 1	Titan III Development Flight	March 1968
MOL 2	MOL Development Flight (Unmanned)	July 1968
MOL 3	First Manned MOL Flight	November 1968

3. The MOL Program Plan, as submitted to DOD, spoke of a first manned launch date late in 1968. In spite of the fact that there was an eight-week delay in program announcement, the President's statement of 25 August still quoted the late 1968 manned launch date.

4. With problems associated with the two contractor structure and scope of work disputes the Phase IB work did not really get underway

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until 1 October 1965 with DAC and is still not in progress at GE. It is hoped now that, if everything goes right, Phase II will start 1 May 1965. If there is no compression of schedules, the first manned launch cannot be expected until March 1969 which presents at least an awkward situation vis-a-vis the Presidential statement.

5. During the program planning activities Dr. McMillan insisted that the first manned MOL flight carry a prototype optical reconnaissance system which could be operated and employed to perform a useful reconnaissance function. His guidance was based on the conviction that there must be a very solid justification for any manned launches to take precedence over the first HRO flight. Such justification must be based on overall program risk, such as necessary crew safety measures, and not merely on the competing aspects of non-primary mission objectives.

B. Flight Mission Assignments

1. Based on system qualification requirements and program needs the configurations for the seven MOL flights are as follows:

MOL 1 - Titan IIC (7 Segment SRM)/Simulated Lab/Simulated or Used Gemini (Unmanned)

MOL 2 - Titan IIC/Lab Structure/Gemini B (Unmanned)

MOL 3 - Titan IIC/All-up Lab, Short Time/Manned Gemini B

MOL 4-7 - Titan IIC/Full Duration Manned Lab/Manned Gemini B

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2. The flight mission objectives have been tentatively identified without any detailed specification of flight parameters and specific mission assignments:

MOL 1: Qualify the uprated TIII system.

Qualify TIII/WTR compatibility.

MOL 2: Demonstrate Gemini B subsystem and polar re-entry.

Demonstrate polar test operations support system.

Demonstrate polar orbit recovery and retrieval.

Determine structural adequacy of lab vehicle.

Demonstrate lab/Titan III/WTR compatibility.

MOL 3: Demonstrate complete Gemini B and laboratory vehicle system.

Verify crew transfer.

Demonstrate polar manned mission control.

Conduct biomedical and human performance tests.

Test and operate prototype HRO equipment.

Back up to MOL 2.

MOL 4: Demonstrate 30-day adequacy of MOL system.

Evaluate crew performance for extended periods.

Evaluate low altitude orbit capability.

Operate HRO mission equipment.

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MOL 5, 6, 7: Operate HRO mission equipment.

No other specific objectives assigned.

3. At the present time none of the other MOL objectives like SIGINT, Ocean Surveillance, technological or scientific experiments, have been assigned to any of the MOL flights. The Presidential announcement, as well as other public statements, like that issued by the State Department, speak of an extensive experiment program. It may be necessary to make their statements true, not only because it may be technically and economically desirable to use the MOL as a bona fide laboratory, but it may be necessary to use the experimental program as a cover for the reconnaissance aspects of MOL.

C. Potential Schedule Problems

1. The HRO primary payload has so far been determined as the pacing item in the MOL program. An operable prototype model of the payload cannot be made available sooner than in about 32-33 months from Phase II go-ahead, i. e., not sooner than February or March 1969.

2. Another potential schedule problem lies in the development of the uprated THH booster. The March 1968 date for MOL 1 is paced by the 15:1 nozzle and improved injector development. Without early long lead item funding the MOL 1 date may be May or June 1968.

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3. Qualification testing of long life (30 days) subsystems to man rating standards is a very lengthy process. Although this is presently not recognized as a potential schedule hazard, it may very well become one.

D. The MOL Experiment Program

1. Although the MOL is publicly being treated as an experimental program, presently no work is going on in establishing firm experimental objectives in the technological and scientific areas, and only a limited amount of emphasis is being laid upon experimental objectives in the primary and secondary areas.

2. Regardless of the need for manned high resolution reconnaissance there still exists a need to perform experimentation in space. The MOL could serve as a useful laboratory or one could consider NASA's Extended Apollo to perform some of the military oriented experimentation. The experiments of interest can be classed in three categories:

a. Experiments which lead to the advancement and growth of primary mission capability (e. g., flexible mirrors, new alignment techniques).

b. Experiments which demonstrate and test concepts and components necessary for the promotion of new mission objectives to the primary category (e. g., SIGINT, Ocean Surveillance).

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c. Experiments which explore future potentials leading to the formulation of new military space objectives (e. g., communications, lasers, long life subsystems).

3. In general, engineering planning and development work can proceed most effectively only if specific flight dates and mission assignments are established. Therefore, it appears highly desirable to select one or several of the five proposed manned MOL flights as potential experimental flights. The first manned flight (MOL 3) should have an alternate flight mission assignment in addition to its present primary payload prototype assignment.

4. To provide flexibility in achieving the alternate mission capability, an additional standard mission module could be procured and outfitted with experiments. If there are schedule difficulties with the primary payload, the alternate mission module equipped with experiments could be substituted at the launch site, and the flight could go on schedule. To achieve this backup capability, however, the experimental payload will have to be planned for the first manned flight.

E. Recommendations

1. There are no schedule problems as severe as that posed by the payload. There are two solutions for this, either one of which will require high-level policy guidance:

a. Recognize now a MOL schedule slip and target for the first manned launch (MOL 3) for March 1969; or,

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b. Define an alternate payload for the first manned MOL flight, and attempt to compress the MOL development schedule to about 30 months before first manned launch.

2. Alternative (a) retains all presently formulated MOL flight objectives, but compromises the Presidential announcement of the flight date. Alternative (b) provides for flexibility to plan for a definite manned launch regardless of payload schedule constraints. In case the HRO payload would come through on time, it would fly; but if it experienced a slip, an alternate experimental payload would be available. As a cover, this would also have the advantage of not revealing any reasons for program slippage.

3. It is also recommended that the following actions be taken to establish a firmer schedule control and develop the alternate mission capability:

a. Establish launch schedule and require change approval by Director, MOL.

b. Establish flight mission assignments and require change approval by Director, MOL.

c. Define total experiments program that encompasses primary, secondary, and tertiary program objectives.

d. Designate an alternate mission module flight objective.

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- e. Make plans to procure an additional mission module, preferably of the same design as the standard module.

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Items 3

AGENDA ITEM 3

MOL Astronaut Selection/Information Plan

MOL POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING

14 October 1965

Tentative Outline of Presentation

1. Introduction: First eight of twenty crew members have been selected. We are currently recruiting for second selection. This presentation to cover some brief information on the selection criteria and background of the eight selectees; action being taken preparatory to assignment; ^{AND} discussion of alternatives as to extent of publicity to accompany assignment, ~~and selection of an appropriate title for the selectees.~~ The committee will be requested to decide the extent of publicity to be accorded the assignment, ~~and to select a title.~~
2. Criteria for Selection: All of the selection criteria will be briefly covered.
3. Background on Each Selectee: Pictures of each selectee, brief comment on age, education, experience, etc.
4. Preparations for Assignment: Quiet meeting of selectees to be held at SSD on Saturday, 16 October. Conducted by General Berg with assistance from this end. Purpose is to cover events leading to assignment. Subjects covered will be plans for reassignment, PIO,

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introduction of their Flight Surgeon, legal matters, etc. In addition photographs and film clips will be made; biographical data will be obtained. This latter activity will insure that all necessary information will be available should it be decided that a press conference will be held to announce their assignment. We will be prepared for any eventuality with the earliest date for possible announcement tentatively established for Wednesday, 20 October.

5. Public Information Implications: Several alternatives are possible:

a. The item has been submitted to OSD/White House because it is a potentially national news item. If either OSD or the White House elect to make an announcement the matter is taken out of USAF hands. We will be prepared to provide the material to support such a press conference or news release. Because of the USAF policy to low-key the MOL Program, this eventuality is considered undesirable but USAF is essentially powerless to prevent it. If OSD/White House elect not to make an announcement, USAF has essentially two alternatives.

b. A minimum release can be made at SSD on 20 October 1965, or after. This approach takes recognition that in one way or another, the assignment is news and will eventually leak out anyway. Hopefully, the release would be temporary news, dropping out of the public eye in a short time. Under this option USAF could follow-up by releasing no further information but responding to questions. Alternately the follow-up would be to release no further information and not respond to questions.

c. Quiet assignment of the selectees to the program with no release. This option would be most in keeping with the intent to low-key the program. It would probably be unrealistic, however, to assume that news would not leak out eventually, resulting in a flood of questions from news media. Follow-up to this option would be either to respond to questions or to refuse to respond to them.

d. Summarizing the three options:

Option I - Release by OSD/White House. This takes the matter out of USAF hands. We have no choice but to cooperate.

Option II, a - Simple release at SSD, followed up by responding to questions.

Option II, b - Simple release at SSD, no response to any questions generated.

Option III, a - No release, but respond to questions which are bound to arise.

Option III, b - No release, no response to questions.

6. Discussion of Options: Assuming the choice is left to USAF, i.e., OSD/White House do not exercise options, the option selected must be made in the light of overall MOL information policy. At present, the de facto policy is low-key, i.e., no releases but answer questions. This policy is objectionable in that it results in "exclusives" by any

writer who takes the trouble to ask questions. Granting of exclusives is against USAF information policy. Thus, in general, it appears that the overall policy must be one in which no releases are made, and no questions are answered or one in which a limited amount of information is voluntarily released, followed either by responding or not responding to questions generated.

From a program viewpoint, the policy should undoubtedly be no-release, no-response, assuring maximum security. The same policy would apply in this case, i.e., USAF should elect Option III, b, above. It must be realized that the crew members will be highly knowledgeable of the most sensitive program information. If they are well known, easily recognizable to the press and public, their travel to and training at various contractor plants will certainly jeopardize program security. If not known, such activity can be conducted relatively more freely, with less jeopardy to program security.

Although election of Option III, b is obviously best from a program security viewpoint, can it realistically be expected that its intent will be accomplished? Not fully. Their identity will no doubt leak out and questions will be generated. Non-response by USAF will probably result in a hostile press, irresponsible members of which, free to conjecture, will generate adverse publicity, perhaps painting USAF in a ludicrous light. Further, those publications and writers specializing in space

program articles can be expected to continue to dig out information concerning MOL crew members' activities. These contemplated results would appear to make it desirable to make a simple release, Option II, a or II, b, or to exercise Option III, a, no release but respond to questions.

Option III, a can be dismissed as a possibility, although it adheres to the present de facto policy, because it is equivalent to Option II, a -- the only difference being that the press must first dig out the crew members' identity, or simply ask who they are. Thus, the result would be exclusivity, with no compensating benefits to the Air Force.

Option II, a, simple release, response to selective questions, derives some benefit to USAF in terms of publicity and is to some extent consistent with the de facto policy for the program. It avoids exclusivity. It makes realistic recognition that the news will get out anyway but entails some penalty in giving notoriety to the selectees. Hopefully, the notoriety will taper off, particularly if subsequent questions are selectively and carefully made.

Option II, b, simple release, no response, has the benefit of meeting a minimum requirement to release information in response to intense national interest, and avoids exclusivity, while cutting off subsequent flow of information. However, this option is not compatible with the present de facto policy.

7. Recommended Policy: The decision cannot be made without considering the information policy to be followed for the entire program. Without question, program security would best be served by a no-release, no-response policy. However, it is questionable whether such a policy can realistically be pursued, primarily because the policy cannot be unilaterally achieved by the Air Force. In addition to the option OSD/White House will always have to make announcements pertaining to the program due to public/political pressure, the public news media cannot be expected to cooperate but will continue to dig for program information. The result of the latter will be adverse publicity at best, possible compromise or jeopardy to program security anyway, at worst.

Thus, unless the President himself directs that a no-release, no-response policy be adhered to, and this eventuality is highly unlikely, the objective of that policy will never be completely achievable.

Nevertheless, program security being the paramount consideration, and despite the obvious difficulties and disadvantages involved, the overall policy which must be recommended by the MOL office is one of no-release, no-response. In keeping with this overall policy, Option III, b must be recommended for adoption. An obvious corollary to this decision is to terminate the present practice of responding to press inquiry.

8. Selection of a Title for MOL Crew Members: There are several considerations which have been voiced in connection with selection of a title:

6.

- a. Desire to follow NASA precedent versus desire not to follow that precedent, i.e., glamorized title versus non-glamorous title.
 - b. Desire to include a military connotation, i.e., Military Astronaut, versus desire not to emphasize militarism.
 - c. Desire to select a title with growth, which could be used for crew members other than pilots, and applicable to crew members of future manned space programs other than MOL.
 - d. Desire to conform with present AF Regulations which pertain to astronaut status and astronaut wing's etc.
 - e. Et Cetera: A list of proposed titles will be provided in assisting the Committee to select an appropriate one.
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~~To be used on basis
of a no release,
no response info policy~~

MOL PROGRAM OFFICE

DIRECTIVE 165

PROGRAM REQUIREMENT DOCUMENT

THIS DOCUMENT IS AN OFFICIAL RELEASE OF THE
MOL PROGRAM OFFICE AND ITS REQUIREMENTS ARE
DIRECTIVE ON ALL COGNIZANT ELEMENTS OF THE MOL PROGRAM

APPROVED _____

B. A. SCHRIEVER
General, USAF
Director, MOL

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MANAGEMENT OF MOL CREW MEMBER ACTIVITIES

I. PURPOSE

Of all the personnel resources to be assigned to the MOL program none are more critical to program success than the individuals assigned as crew members. The purpose of this directive is to prescribe policy for regulation of crew member activity so as to insure that the crew members will be able to make maximum contribution to success of the MOL program. The intent is to normalize rather than to glamorize crew member status and activity.

II. SCOPE

This directive is applicable to the management of the activities of all personnel assigned to the program as crew members.

III. SUPERVISION OF CREW MEMBERS

All crew members will be assigned to the MOL Systems Office. All of their activities will be under the direct control of the Deputy Director for MOL, or as delegated by him.

The crew members will be treated as are all other officer personnel assigned to the program. They will not be accorded any special treatment merely by virtue of the key positions they hold in the program as crew members. However, special arrangements for the crew members may be made when they can be justified on the basis that such arrangements make a direct contribution to program success. For example, the flight surgeon assigned to monitor the crew members' health may be allowed to monitor

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and provide for the health of their immediate families on the basis that the crew members' busy schedule, requiring frequent absences, will not enable them to devote as much time to their families as can other personnel assigned to the program, and so that they may be relieved of worry about their families which would adversely affect their performance of duty.

IV. PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY

The crew members will be subject to the same constraints applicable to all personnel as prescribed in the MOL Information Plan.

In addition, because of the unique positions they hold, and in order to insure protection of classified information related to the program, the following restrictions will apply.

A. The crew members and members of their immediate family will not be permitted to publish articles or make public appearances or speeches while assigned to the MOL program. Requests for exceptions to this restriction are discouraged, and can be approved only by the Director, MOL.

B. The crew members and members of their immediate family will not respond to questions from representatives of news media or from the public, but will refer such inquiries to the Information Office at Headquarters USAF or at SSD. To facilitate implementation of this restriction, the crew members will be adequately briefed before assignment to the program on how they and their immediate families are to handle

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requests, invasions of their privacy, etc., and of their civil rights to privacy.

C. No information concerning crew members' schedules, training program, itineraries, or whereabouts will be provided to individuals outside the program.

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TALKING PAPER

on

MOL PILOT SELECTION ANNOUNCEMENT

*Alternate
Approach to
PIO pros and
cons.*

The current public interest in the human aspects of space flight and the public affairs precedent set by NASA require that careful consideration be given the alternatives of MOL pilot selection announcements. These are:

(1) Announcement by higher authority (White House or DOD). This could require exposure of the selectees to newsmen at the time of announcement. We have no control over this choice due to current policy on handling news of national interest.

(2) No official public announcement. News of the assignments would "leak" out, and we would be asked for confirmation and additional information.

(3) Official Air Force releases briefly describing selection process and naming individuals. Short biographies and pictures of selectees would be available on request. We would also be prepared to answer press queries for additional information.

Since we must be prepared for the first possibility, we plan to gather the group at SSD, 16 Oct, to produce information materials and brief the individuals.

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If the choice is ours, selection of the second possibility (no release) offers several advantages:

- (1) Makes it easier to eventually close the entire program if desired;
- (2) May limit the amount of public exposure the pilots received, thereby helping maintain a semblance of normality for them;
- (3) Reduces risk of program security compromise;
- (4) Helps establish policy of no public affairs activities for the pilots - if this is desired.

This choice has these disadvantages:

- (1) Forces newsmen to "dig" for information - could result in badgering of families.
- (2) Could be used by communist propagandists as proof that our program is offensive since we are hiding it;
- (4) Prolongs coverage by stringing it out in our answer-to-query routine;
- (5) Could be accused of trying to dodge fact that a certain colored pilot was not chosen;
- (6) Could be accused of creating a group of "second class" astronauts - this could cause morale problem;

If we choose to make a release, these are the potential advantages:

- (1) Provides potential material for use in USIA efforts, by directing attention to normal human aspects of the program;

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- (2) Helps shorten coverage by getting most in one blast;
- (3) Helps promote positive public attitude about program and the Air Force;
- (4) Could enhance morale of pilots and their families.

Release has these potential disadvantages:

- (1) Creates renewed press interest in the program making it more difficult to close;
- (2) Helps make "celebrities" of the pilots which could produce undesirable psychological effects;
- (3) Encourages requests for public affairs participation by the pilots;
- (4) Could be construed as beginning of information program that will continue reporting pilot activities.

If any degree of public information activity is chosen we must decide:

- (1) Official title of pilots;
- (2) Policy on press interviews with pilots;
- (3) Policy on public appearances of pilots.

Request decision on "release" or "no release" plan.

Request decision on official title, policy on press interviews and public appearances, if "release" or "open" general policy is chosen.

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Item 5

TALKING PAPER

for

GENERAL SCHRIEVER

SUBJECT: MOL Experiments Advisory Committee

BACKGROUND:

The original MOL Program directed by OSD placed major emphasis on the experimental nature of the program and its mission objectives. Although subsequent redirection by OSD now places the major emphasis on exploiting operational mission capabilities, emphasis continues on research and engineering experiments both military and civilian. During July 1964, in anticipation of the need for assistance and support from the scientific and engineering community, General Schriever met with key individuals of the community to explore the feasibility of establishing a MOL Scientific Advisory Committee. All discussions reached general agreement that an organization generally patterned on the model of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board would be desirable to support the MOL Program.

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Page 1 of 3 pages
Copy 2 of 2 copies

The current environment reaffirms the requirement for such a committee. In fact, the interest demonstrated by the PSAC and DDR&E, and the increasing activity of the Space Council and NASA, makes the advisory support of recognized leaders in the scientific community very desirable.

The assistance of Dr. Seitz and the National Academy of Sciences was requested to set up this committee. On 2 June 1965, Mr. John Coleman of NAS requested the following individuals attend the first meeting of the committee, pro tem, scheduled for 28 June. Those indicated by an asterisk did attend the meeting;

*Dr. James G. Baker

*Dr. William O. Baker

*Dr. Herbert Friedman

*Dr. Harry H. Hess

Dr. Edwin H. Land

*Dr. Gerald M. McDonnell

Professor Edward M. Purcell

*Professor Edward Teller

*Dr. Brian O'Brien

*Dr. Frederick Seitz

*Honorable Brockway McMillan

*Honorable Alexander H. Flax

*General Bernard Schriever

*Brigadier General H. L. Evans

Page 2 of 3 pages
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The meeting which was held on the 28th of June contained no DORIAN information. In the afternoon, following the meeting, Dr. Brian O'Brien, the nominee for chairman of the committee, was briefed DORIAN and given an hour's presentation on the work accomplished up to that time by EK.

PRESENT STATUS

Mr. Coleman of NAS has indicated to the MOL Program Office that Dr. Seitz had queried Dr. Brown, in his new capacity as Secretary of the Air Force, if he wished to continue the MOL Experiments Advisory Committee.

Dr. Flax has discussed this subject with Dr. Brown, and a letter is being prepared by Dr. Flax for Dr. Brown's signature. Dr. Brown indicated to Dr. Flax that he wanted to see Dr. Land, Professor Purcell or someone of equivalent stature as a member of the Committee. On 8 October, Mr. Coleman was advised that such a letter was being prepared.

It has been proposed that the name of the committee be changed from MOL Experiments Advisory Committee to the MOL Advisory Committee. Subsequent to the full committee being briefed DORIAN, consideration could then be given to broader issues relating to the program such as the manned vs unmanned issue.

The enabling document which contains the committee's charter requires the signature of the Secretary of the Air Force.

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Page 3 of 3 pages
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