28 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, MOL

SUBJECT: Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts

Attached is a directive entitled "Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts", which is applicable to the selection, training, and operational use of Department of Defense MOL astronauts. This policy is designed to reduce risk to program security and negate the possibility of any international incident unfavorable to the United States Government.

I consider this directive to be an important interpretation of national policies related to the matter of overhead reconnaissance, as they pertain to the DOD MOL Program. It is requested that you effect an early and careful implementation of its provisions.

Alexander H. Flax

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Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts
POLICY RELATING TO
MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY (MOL) ASTRONAUTS

I. PURPOSE:

To prescribe policy applicable to the selection, training, and operational use of Department of Defense Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) astronauts, designed to reduce the risks of security compromise or embarrassment to the U.S. Government to an acceptable minimum without impairing mission objectives.

II. SITUATION:

The Department of Defense MOL is not a covert or clandestine overflight program, although the primary mission is covert. Under national policy applicable to the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program, the reconnaissance mission of MOL is controlled under policies and procedures consistent with all projects of the National Reconnaissance Program. Security protection is afforded the reconnaissance mission, within the BYEMAN system of security as project DORIAN. Compatible with the publicly acknowledged military development objectives of MOL, MOL astronauts will retain their status in the military service. In all probability, a modest public information release will be associated with at least the initial fully manned MOL launches.

Department of Defense MOL astronauts, selected to date, have been publicly identified. The extent of their exposure to the public, however, has been controlled in keeping with the strict security prescribed under this program. Those selected to date have undergone a careful selection process, which included evaluation against selected security criteria prescribed in Section III, A of this directive. These security criteria are well within the standards prescribed for access to BYEMAN, as well as specially compartmented intelligence products.
The nature of the primary mission of the Department of Defense MOL Program, which is the acquisition of high resolution reconnaissance photography, is such, that the on-board presence of man, as an integral part of the intelligence collection system, is intended to provide benefits to the effective accomplishment of this mission not technically possible through the use of an unmanned satellite. Initial studies suggest that the inclusion of man will enhance such benefits with respect to providing: (1) a manual backup for complex automated functions especially in the development phase; (2) manual repair or adjustment of sensor elements, controls and displays during on-orbit operations; (3) a greater percentage of cloud-free photography; (4) a possible quick reaction intelligence read-out capability; and (5) target selectivity.

The full realization of these benefits will require training of MOL astronauts to include a thorough familiarization with the operation of the space laboratory and associated camera equipment, in addition to intelligence target recognition and selected aspects of photographic intelligence interpretation. In addition, it is apparent that MOL astronauts will require access to target cue materials -- probably during mission -- which currently require security handling under special compartmented control systems prescribed for certain intelligence products. The denial of such training and access for MOL astronauts would severely limit the use of man as an integral part of the MOL intelligence collection system.

Certain calculated risks are assumed coincidental with receipt of this training and access by the MOL astronauts. These risks stem from the fact that they, as publicly identified figures, will be more easily targeted by individuals, groups of foreign intelligence organizations intending to acquire classified information; and from the possibility, however remote, of a system malfunction of such nature as to place them in peril of hostile interrogation. The probability of a system malfunction of such nature is extremely slight, with the greatest incidence of risk associated with launch activities, wherein through a partial booster failure the vehicle might fail to achieve orbit.
In addition, it is believed that under the MOL program, the best interests of the United States would be served by careful avoidance of circumstances which could result in the capture of MOL astronauts with incriminating intelligence mission products, with armament which might be construed as hostile and with devices designed to bring about their voluntary or directed self destruction.

III. POLICY:

The following stated policies are intended to preclude practices in conjunction with selection, training and operational use of MOL astronauts, which could result in unnecessary risk of security compromise or international embarrassment to the United States government as highlighted in the foregoing background discussion.

A. Selection

Security criteria to be applied to the selection process are those previously established by D/NRO which are restated below:

"Security criteria for selection of MOL astronauts will be applied as an integral part of the selection processes and are so designed as to cause an assessment of the individual in terms of the total security risk factor as related to the sensitive tasks the individual might be required to perform, rather than being restricted to evaluation in terms of suitability for access to classified and special access information.

Candidates will meet the personnel security criteria prescribed in USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver, and of AFR 205-34 relating to Ultra Sensitive Positions.

A current security background investigation consistent with USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, and AFR 205-34, will be initiated and a careful
psychological and psychiatric examination made in the case of all candidates. Both the investigation and the psychological and psychiatric examination will be of such detail as to provide a basis to assess the candidates' ability and compunction to perform a wide variety of sensitive tasks as might be assigned to the MOL program under unusual military security restrictions. All facets of the candidates' behavior, conscience, motivation and personal affairs that might have a bearing upon his ability to so perform should be carefully explored."

The final decision with respect to the selection of MOL astronauts rests with the Director, MOL Program. As has been prior practice, he may be assisted in this regard by a MOL astronaut selection board upon whose recommendations he acts. However, any such selection will be consistent with the security criteria stated above.

Each candidate will be reviewed by competent authorities against the requirements of USAFTEI 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver and AFR 205-34, and the certifications of these authorities made a matter of record. Inasmuch as the criteria stated above go beyond that included in the cited AF regulations, the final review of the investigative files, security certifications, and the psychiatric assessments must be made at no less level of authority than the MOL astronaut selection board constituted by the Director, MOL Program. A project DORIAN cleared professional security officer and psychiatrist will be present to assist the board in the interpretation of these materials.

B. Training and Operational Use

Whereas the identities and general background of MOL astronauts may be released publicly, their exposure to the public will otherwise be limited and controlled in keeping with the security requirements of this program. Personal appearances before public groups and interviews with representatives of the news media or writings for publication, therefore, are not to be authorized.
Access on the part of MOL astronauts to classified and specially compartmented information will be controlled on a strict "must-know" basis as required to training and the successful and full accomplishment of their mission.

MOL astronauts will be required at all times to maintain a high standard of moral, ethical and military conduct.

MOL astronauts will receive periodic briefings on the subject of their responsibilities to the program and to program security (to include its basis in national policy) in addition to defensive security briefings similar to that prescribed under AFR 205-21. Periodic debriefings of all MOL astronauts will be conducted by program security and psychiatric personnel with particular emphasis upon events transpiring in the personal life of the astronaut and his family which might have a bearing on security of the program.

Special security arrangements will be invoked at such time as the astronaut's training program requires his presence at facilities indicative of the program's intelligence mission (e.g.: camera contractors and the National Photographic Interpretation Center) in order that such mission may not be compromised to unauthorized personnel or the public by virtue of the astronaut's presence at the facility. In general, such facility visits will be avoided if at all possible, and will in each instance require the approval of the D/NRO.

MOL astronauts will be provided with no instructions, devices or equipments for purposes of bringing about their personal destruction in the event of incident.

Any equipments provided to astronauts for purposes of survival, will undergo careful screening against a standard of practical application, to insure that the purpose of such equipments can logically be defended as not intended to bring about the death or injury of other individuals, or to induce such individuals to act in a manner contrary to their allegiance.

It is planned that MOL astronauts will return to earth in the GEMINI vehicle with a substantial portion of the mission photographic product on-board. However, the
operational plan will provide for an exception to the procedure related to the return of film; in the event it would appear, due to some emergency circumstance, that the impact of the GEMINI will occur in an area where U.S. forces cannot exercise prompt control.

MOL astronauts, in the absence of other U.S. personnel, will attempt in a non-violent manner to exercise U.S. sovereignty over all MOL equipments both while in space and on the earth's surface.

All MOL astronauts will be instructed that in the event of incarceration or interrogation by a foreign government, they will provide no information other than name, rank, serial number, date and place of birth, places of residence and the fact of their occupation as MOL astronauts. Under such conditions the astronauts should request to be placed in contact with representatives of the U.S. Embassy or Legation, or in the absence of any U.S. representation, the International Red Cross. Astronauts will be advised that the U.S. Government in such event will make every effort to secure their prompt release through regular diplomatic channels.

The instructions contained in this directive, to be applicable to MOL astronauts, are intended to supplement rather than substitute for Department of Defense directives and military service regulations related to the personal and official conduct of military personnel.

Alexander H. Flax
POLICY RELATING TO MOL ASTRONAUTS

NO. 67-1

JANUARY 1967

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MOL PROGRAM OFFICE
MOL PROGRAM OFFICE

DIRECTIVE NO. 67-1

POLICY RELATING TO MOL ASTRONAUTS

JANUARY 1967

PROGRAM REQUIREMENT DOCUMENT

THIS DOCUMENT IS AN OFFICIAL RELEASE OF THE MOL PROGRAM OFFICE AND ITS REQUIREMENTS ARE DIRECTIVE ON ALL COGNIZANT ELEMENTS OF THE MOL PROGRAM

APPROVED

signed

JAMES FERGUSON
General, USAF
Director, MOL Program

Handle via BVEMAN
Control System

TOP SECRET
This directive sets forth policy relating to MOL astronauts. Its purpose is to enhance the achievement of MOL Program objectives by avoiding a security compromise or unfavorable international incident as a result of astronaut activity.

This directive contains two parts:

Part I is the policy relating to MOL astronauts as established by the D/NRO.

Part II contains the implementing instructions. The channel for actions which require the review or approval of the D/NRO or the MOL Program Director will be through the MOL Program Office, SAF-SL.
MOL PROGRAM OFFICE
DIRECTIVE NO. 66-2

PART I -- POLICY RELATING TO MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY (MOL) ASTRONAUTS

A. PURPOSE

B. SITUATION

C. POLICY
   1. Selection
   2. Training and Operational Use

PART II -- IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS

A. ATTENDANCE AT OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES

B. BRIEFINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS

C. VISITS TO FACILITIES

D. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

E. CONTINGENCY OPTION(S) FOR EMERGENCY FILM RETURN

F. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN EVENT OF INCARCERATION OR INTERROGATION BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

G. PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL CONDUCT
PART I

POLICY RELATING TO

MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY (MOL) ASTRONAUTS

A. PURPOSE

To prescribe policy applicable to the selection, training, and operational use of Department of Defense Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) astronauts, designed to reduce the risks of security compromise or embarrassment to the U. S. Government to an acceptable minimum without impairing mission objectives.

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Department of Defense MOL astronauts, selected to date, have been publicly identified. The extent of their exposure to the public, however, has been controlled in keeping with the strict security prescribed under this program. Those selected to date have undergone a careful selection process, which included evaluation against selected security criteria prescribed in Section C, 1, of this directive. These security criteria are well within the standards prescribed for access to BYEMAN, as well as specially compartmented intelligence products.

The nature of the primary mission of the Department of Defense MOL Program, which is the acquisition of high resolution reconnaissance photography, is such that the on-board presence of man, as an integral part of the intelligence collection system, is intended to provide benefits to the effective accomplishment of this mission not technically possible through the use of an unmanned satellite. Initial studies suggest that the inclusion of man will enhance such benefits with respect to providing: (1) a manual backup for complex automated functions especially in the development phase; (2) manual repair or adjustment of sensor elements, controls, and displays during on-orbit operations; (3) a greater percentage of cloud-free photography; (4) a possible quick reaction intelligence read-out capability; and (5) target selectivity.
The full realization of these benefits will require training of
MOL astronauts to include a thorough familiarization with the opera-
tion of the space laboratory and associated camera equipment, in
addition to intelligence target recognition and selected aspects of
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that MOL astronauts will require access to target cue materials--
probably during mission--which currently require security handling
under special compartmented control systems prescribed for certain
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part of the MOL intelligence collection system.

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possibility, however remote, of a system malfunction of such nature as to
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In addition, it is believed that under the MOL Program, the best interests of the United States would be served by careful avoidance of circumstances which could result in the capture of MOL astronauts with incriminating intelligence mission products, with armament which might be construed as hostile and with devices designed to bring about their voluntary or directed self destruction.

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"Candidates will meet the personnel security criteria prescribed in USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver, and of AFR 205-34 relating to Ultra-Sensitive Positions.

"A current security background investigation consistent with USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, and AFR 205-34, will be initiated and a careful psychological and psychiatric examination made in the case of all candidates. Both the investigation and the psychological and psychiatric examination will be of such detail as to provide a basis to assess the candidates' ability and compunction to perform a wide variety of sensitive tasks as might be assigned to the MOL Program under unusual military security restrictions. All facets of the candidates' behavior, conscience, motivation and personal affairs that might have a bearing upon his ability to so perform should be carefully explored."

The final decision with respect to the selection of MOL astronauts rests with the Director, MOL Program. As has been prior practice, he may be assisted in this regard by a MOL astronaut selection board upon whose recommendations he acts. However, any such selection will be consistent with the security criteria stated above.

Each candidate will be reviewed by competent authorities against the requirements of USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver.
and AFR 205-34, and the certifications of these authorities made a matter of record. Inasmuch as the criteria stated above go beyond that included in the cited AF regulations, the final review of the investigative files, security certifications, and the psychiatric assessments must be made at no less level of authority than the MOL astronaut selection board constituted by the Director, MOL Program. A project DORIAN cleared professional security officer and psychiatrist will be present to assist the board in the interpretation of these materials.

2. Training and Operational Use
   a. Whereas the identities and general background of MOL astronauts may be released publicly, their exposure to the public will otherwise be limited and controlled in keeping with the security requirements of this program. Personal appearances before public groups and interviews with representatives of the news media or writings for publication, therefore, are not to be authorized.

   b. Access on the part of MOL astronauts to classified and specially compartmented information will be controlled on a strict "must-know" basis as required to training and the successful and full accomplishment of their mission.

   c. MOL astronauts will be required at all times to maintain a high standard of moral, ethical and military conduct.
d. MOL astronauts will receive periodic briefings on the subject of their responsibilities to the program and to program security (to include its basis in national policy) in addition to defensive security briefings similar to that prescribed under AFR 205-2L. Periodic debriefings of all MOL astronauts will be conducted by program security and psychiatric personnel with particular emphasis upon events transpiring in the personal life of the astronaut and his family which might have a bearing on security of the program.

e. Special security arrangements will be invoked at such time as the astronaut's training program requires his presence at facilities indicative of the program's intelligence mission (e.g., camera contractors and the National Photographic Interpretation Center) in order that such mission may not be compromised to unauthorized personnel or the public by virtue of the astronaut's presence at the facility. In general, such facility visits will be avoided if at all possible, and will in each instance require the approval of the D/NRO.

f. MOL astronauts will be provided with no instructions, devices or equipments for purposes of bringing about their personal destruction in the event of incident.

g. Any equipments provided to astronauts for purposes of survival will undergo careful screening against a standard of practical application to insure that the purpose of such equipments can logically
be defended as not intended to bring about the death or injury of other individuals, or to induce such individuals to act in a manner contrary to their allegiance.

h. It is planned that MOL astronauts will return to earth in the Gemini vehicle with a substantial portion of the mission photographic product on-board. However, the operational plan will provide for an exception to the procedure related to the return of film, in the event it would appear, due to some emergency circumstance, that the impact of the Gemini will occur in an area where U. S. forces cannot exercise prompt control.

i. MOL astronauts, in the absence of other U. S. personnel, will attempt in a non-violent manner to exercise U. S. sovereignty over all MOL equipments both while in space and on the earth's surface.

j. All MOL astronauts will be instructed that in the event of incarceration or interrogation by a foreign government, they will provide no information other than name, rank, serial number, date and place of birth, places of residence and the fact of their occupation as MOL astronauts. Under such conditions the astronauts should request to be placed in contact with representatives of the U. S. Embassy or Legation, or in the absence of any U. S. representation, the International Red Cross. Astronauts will be advised that the U. S. Government, in such event, will make every effort to secure their prompt release through regular diplomatic channels.
k. The instructions contained in this directive, to be applicable to MOL astronauts, are intended to supplement rather than substitute for Department of Defense directives and military service regulations related to the personal and official conduct of military personnel.
PART II
IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS

This part consists of extracts of Part I with appended implementing instructions.

A. ATTENDANCE AT OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES

"Whereas the identities and general background of MOL astronauts may be released publicly, their exposure to the public will otherwise be limited and controlled in keeping with the security requirements of this program. Personal appearances before public groups and interviews with representatives of the news media or writings for publication, therefore, are not to be authorized."

Attendance of MOL astronauts at official activities where they may be subject to pressure for interviews by news media representatives is subject to prior approval by the Director of the MOL Program.

B. BRIEFINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS

"MOL astronauts will receive periodic briefings on the subject of their responsibilities to the program and to program security (to include its basis in national policy) in addition to defensive security briefings similar to that prescribed under AFR 205-21. Periodic debriefings of all MOL astronauts will be conducted by program security
and psychiatric personnel with particular emphasis upon events transpiring in the personal life of the astronaut and his family which might have a bearing on security of the program.

1. The briefings and debriefings required by this paragraph will be administered or arranged by the MOL Program Office (SAF-SL) as follows:

   a. An astronaut's first defensive security briefing will be given at the time he receives his SI/TKH clearances. Follow-up defensive security briefings will be given each six months thereafter and prior to any foreign travel.

   b. Psychological interviews and security debriefings will be conducted at least once each year. The psychological and security meetings will be conducted separately.

2. Records of psychological debriefing interviews will remain in the confidential files of the Program Psychiatrist. Records of security debriefings will remain in the confidential files of the Program Security Officer. The records of all such debriefings will be permanently retained in their respective offices and made available for program use as approved by the Director of the MOL Program.

3. The security officer and psychiatrist are authorized to compare findings after each debriefing. Any information detrimental to the objectives or security of the program will be reported to the Program Director.
C. VISITS TO FACILITIES

"Special security arrangements will be invoked at such time as the astronaut's training program requires his presence at facilities indicative of the program's intelligence mission (e.g., camera contractors and the National Photographic Interpretation Center) in order that such mission may not be compromised to unauthorized personnel or the public by virtue of the astronaut's presence at the facility. In general, such facility visits will be avoided if at all possible, and will in each instance require the approval of the D/NRO."

Requests for approval of visits to the type of locations referenced in this subparagraph will be submitted to arrive at SAF-SL at least seven (7) working days prior to the intended visit(s). The request will include names of astronaut(s), location(s) to be visited, date(s) of visit, reason for visit and proposed security arrangements.

D. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

"Any equipments provided to astronauts for purposes of survival will undergo careful screening against a standard of practical application to insure that the purpose of such equipments can logically be defended as not intended to bring about the death or injury of other individuals, or to induce such individuals to act in a manner contrary to their allegiance."
The list of the proposed contents of the astronaut's survival package will be forwarded to SAF-SL for approval.

E. CONTINGENCY OPTION(S) FOR EMERGENCY FILM RETURN

"It is planned that MOL astronauts will return to earth in the Gemini vehicle with a substantial portion of the mission photographic product on-board. However, the operational plan will provide for an exception to the procedure related to the return of film, in the event it would appear, due to some emergency circumstance, that the impact of the Gemini will occur in an area where U. S. forces cannot exercise prompt control."

The MOL mission planning document will set forth contingency option(s) to cope with the emergency circumstance described in this subparagraph. If necessary, the Gemini B Spacecraft will be engineered to accommodate any special requirements to accomplish such contingency action.

F. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN EVENT OF INCARCERATION OR INTERROGATION BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

"All MOL astronauts will be instructed that in the event of incarceration or interrogation by a foreign government, they will provide no information other than name, rank, serial number, date and place of birth, places of residence and the fact of their occupation as MOL astronauts. Under such conditions the astronauts should request
to be placed in contact with representatives of the U. S. Embassy or Legation, or in the absence of any U. S. representation, the International Red Cross. Astronauts will be advised that the U. S. Government, in such event, will make every effort to secure their prompt release through regular diplomatic channels."

Instruction required by this subparagraph will be covered as part of the defensive security briefings. In addition, the pre-flight training schedule will provide a block of time to be devoted to full review of this topic and to satisfy any related briefing requirements of other Government agencies. Provision for these briefings will be made by SAF-SL.

G. PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL CONDUCT

"The instructions contained in this directive, to be applicable to MOL astronauts, are intended to supplement rather than substitute for Department of Defense directives and military service regulations related to the personal and official conduct of military personnel."

Review of pertinent military service regulations and directives related to the personal and official conduct of military personnel will be included in the defensive security briefing program. (See Section B.1.a.; above).