January 21, 1967

Dear Don:

This is in regard to our discussion several weeks ago in which you informed me of the forthcoming report of the PSAC panel on space research which included extensive material dealing with the relation of the MOL program to the APOLLO Applications program of NASA. Subsequently, several members of the MOL program office have informed me of conversations with NASA people regarding the contents of this report. The sum of this information leads me to believe that the forthcoming report may pose serious problems in maintaining MOL security.

Although there is no reason why possible NASA use of the MOL launch vehicle and laboratory module hardware should not be openly considered, I am concerned that the PSAC panel report may stimulate public and Congressional discussion of the MOL program as a whole. As you know, we have been referring, even in Secret level briefings, to the reconnaissance mission equipment of the MOL as "classified military experiments." Further, we have not provided a DOD cover program of military experiments unrelated to the primary reconnaissance mission. I believe it is essential that the PSAC panel report reflect this same approach to the "experiments" in the MOL program. As you will recall, we did brief a properly cleared subgroup of the panel on the primary mission of the MOL; Dr. Steininger and Dr. Golovin of your staff are also fully informed as to the details of the program.

An important point to be considered in any open comparisons of the NASA APOLLO Applications and MOL programs is that the NASA "earth sensing" experiments are essentially indistinguishable from reconnaissance activities. Thus, if great care is not taken in the wording of the report (which I understand is to be published in unclassified form),
it will be possible for the reader to infer that the panel report officially acknowledges that the MOL program is also an earth sensing (i.e. reconnaissance) program. Although such speculations have been made continuously in the press about MOL (and equally about other DOD space programs), the policies on overhead reconnaissance of denied territory which are implemented by BYEMAN security control have been successful in maintaining official Government silence on the existence of our reconnaissance programs, in addition to protecting technical and operational information relating to such programs. These policies were recently reaffirmed by the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee.

In light of the factors discussed above, I would urge that the panel report be carefully reviewed and edited to assure that the material relating to the MOL program, separately and in association with the APOLLO Applications program, is treated in a manner consistent with the spirit and intent as well as the letter of BYEMAN security requirements. I would be pleased to assist you in any way possible in carrying out such a review.

Sincerely,

Alexander H. Flax

Honorable Donald F. Hornig
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

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