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JUL 31 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

Reference your note to General Berg (Atch 1) on the resolution-value study for MOL.

For the past several months, we have again been studying the need for and value of [redacted] resolution photography. AFNIN has given us a briefing of their views; FTD has compiled a new and rather detailed break-out of resolutions required to analyze various weapon and support system components; we have had discussions with DIA and NPIC representatives; we plan to discuss this subject with the Navy and Army, etc.

This is a frustrating exercise. None of the approaches seem to add up to mathematically precise and overwhelming proof that [redacted]

[redacted] A cost-effectiveness approach seems hopeless -- it is easy to compute the cost, but the worth (in dollars) is a highly subjective opinion . . . . Perhaps, I am seeking some yardstick that doesn't exist, since it occurs to me that a KH-8 replacement for KH-7 or a KH-9 replacement for KH-4 might never have been started had such demands been imposed.

In any event, we recently started preparing a fairly comprehensive paper on this subject. We will document the story with as many "official" (COMOR, DIA, etc.) papers and as few MOL-prejudiced opinions as possible. We will attempt to clearly indicate the need for and value of [redacted] resolution photography in terms of: (1) technical intelligence; (2) operational information (order of battle, and equipage of weapons of known characteristics, arms control, etc.); and (3) the increased value of lesser resolution photography (KH-9, etc.) when higher resolution material is available (i.e., the "signature" technique). We will also attempt to "translate" the what-can-be-seens into what actions can or might be taken as a result of acquiring the information. Actual events (Cuba, [redacted] photography, etc.) will be used as examples where applicable, etc.

A first rough draft will be available just prior to Mr. McNamara's forthcoming visit to GE and EK and you will have the opportunity to peruse it for possible discussion ideas as soon as available. (We will also use some of the non-controversial material from the study to give Dr. Miller and Mr. Simmons some background in this area prior to the



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SecDef's visit). The next step will be to produce a refined and revised draft by early September. At that point, we can decide whether to turn out a final and formal study, but, in any event, at that stage of development, the study should provide a worthwhile reference document for briefings, discussions, inputs to various papers, etc.

SIGNED

JAMES F. STEWART  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director, MOL Program

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