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Handle via BYEMAN Control System 7

This is the manned MOL configuration. Its major elements include the:

CHART 2

1. Gemini B, used as a personnel vehicle during launch, and a recovery vehicle for the astronauts and exposed film.

2. The Laboratory Module, consisting of a pressurized compartment, and an unpressurized service section housing propellants and propulsion system, oxygen, hydrogen, helium, fuel cells, and a tunnel which connects the GEMINI and the pressurized compartment;

3. And the Mission Module which contains the optical assembly. As you will recall, this is a four focal length frame camera. The earth image is reflected from this six-foot diameter mirror -- which tracks the target continuously during photography -- to another six-foot mirror, to these diagonal mirrors, and then through corrector lenses to the camera.

2

RORIAN Headle via BYEMAN Centrol System

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CHART Overla **DUKIAN** Handle via BYEMAN Control System

This spacecraft will weigh about 30,000 pounds and will carry enough expendables for at least 30 days. It will be launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base into polar orbits which will provide photographic access to the entire world.

This is the unmanned version of the MOL. Its major elements include:

A Support Module, in lieu of the
 GEMINI B in the manned version, which houses
 6-8 film recovery vehicles of the same kind used
 by present reconnaissance satellites;

2. A Modified Laboratory Module, with the life support and manual controls of the manned version removed;

3. And the same Mission Module -- or optical assembly -- used in the manned version.

The unmanned spacecraft will weigh about 26,000 pounds and is expected to function on-orbit for at least 30 days. Expendables for about 42 days on-orbit lifetime will be carried on initial flights.

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DORIAN L'andle via BYEMAN Control System

There are five major associate contractors involved in the MOL Program:

CHART 3

1. Douglas provides the Laboratory Module and the external structure of the Mission Module which houses the photographic system. Douglas also will physically integrate the major MOL system segments and perform the final launchreadiness tests and checkouts.

2. McDonnell builds the GEMINI B.

3. General Electric provides the control system and structure for the large tracking mirror in the Mission Module, most of the photographic mission-related control equipment in the Orbiting Laboratory, software for mission accomplishment, and data return capsules for the unmanned system.

4. Eastman Kodak is responsible for developing and manufacturing the optical and camera elements. Camera performance will be tested in Eastman Kodak facilities before shipment to the West Coast for final vehicle assembly.

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DUKIAN Handle via BYEMAN Control System

5. Martin and other Titan III associates are providing the Titan IIIM launch vehicle and booster launch services.

Chart 4

Here are a few of the program milestones prior to flight and the flight schedule. The MOL Program, as presently approved, includes seven launches: two unmanned launches to qualify the Titan IIIM booster, verify spacecraft structural integrity, and qualify the GEMINI B; three 30-day manned-automatic missions in all-up configuration photographic systems; and two 30-day -- or longer -unmanned-automatic missions with all-up photographic configuration systems.

5

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DORIAN Handle via BYEMAN Control System

You will recall that last summer, the first manned launch was projected for December 1969. During the project definition phase, it became obvious that there was insufficient time to accomplish all sequential ground testing prior to that date. Additionally, in view of the small number of flights, and to insure the very best resolution photography at the outset, we decided to fly a productiontype optical assembly rather than a development model. This required a nine-month program adjustment into 1970. Then, for higher assurance in meeting critical milestones, and in view of expected funding levels in FY 68 and FY 69, another three months was added. Thus, the first all-up manned flight now is planned for December 1970.

All associate contractors participated in the formulation of the present master schedule; all agree it is technically attainable, realistic, and can be accomplished within the funds estimated; and signed contracts to that effect.

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period y, and test

Note the more than two year period required for manufacture, assembly, and test of a complete system.

CHART 5

This is the manpower picture -- present and projected -- for the five major associate contractors.

The level-off this last spring reflects the transition period from the old schedule to the current one.

For comparison purposes, the APOLLO Program had between 65 and 70,000 contractor personnel on board at its peak about the first of this year.

<u>CHART 6</u> This is the estimated total cost of the MOL Program. The red bars on the chart indicate the amounts included in the current DoD Five Year Defense Plan.

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DORIAN Handle via BYEMAN Control System

Note the discrepancy in FY 68. The \$480 million NOA requirement was the MOL Program Office estimate at the start of the year. The current AF Financial Plan includes \$440 million. We are tracking forecast versus actual expenditures and commitments very closely for the first six months of Fy 68 and will have a more precise estimate about the first of the year.

CHART 7

The major extensions of current technology occurs in the Eastman Kodak and General Electric efforts associated with the camera system. Since they will talk about areas such as these listed on this chart, I will not.

I would like to mention, however, that back-up work is underway in several areas, for example:

 Alternate mirror polishing techniques at two different manufacturers and one university;

2. An alternate mirror material called Cer-Vit which has greatly superior thermal qualities to the present fuzed silica.

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DORIAN Mandle via BYEMAN Control System

Chart 8 Not only must the optical assembly and camera be manufactured with great precision, but several technically-difficult functions must also be precisely accomplished on orbit resolution photography is to be if achieved. This is where man becomes an important asset in diagnosing troubles, adding vernier adjustments, or manually operating failed or malfunctioning automatic subsystems. Simulations indicate that man can provide at least as fine a control as the automatic systems for these four functions . . . and you will hear more about these during the course of the evening.

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DORIAN Handle via BYEMAN Control System

Also, once the automatic devices are working reasonably well and do not require repeated adjustment or extended manual operation, we expect the astronauts to increase both the quantity and quality of photography acquired through weather avoidance techniques and/or the selection of targets having a momentary increased value -- for example, a missile on a pad versus a nearby but empty pad.

CHART 9

Last, a word about Government management. The MOL Program has both an open and covert management channel under SecAF and the DNRO.

General Ferguson, the MOL Program Director reports directly to Dr. Brown and Dr. Flax and is responsible in the Air Force solely to them for the program. He has a small **P**rogram Office in the Pentagon, to assist him in Washington matters, which I head up as a full-time duty.

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DORIAN Handle via BYEMAN Control System

The Systems Office in Los Angeles, headed up by General Bleymaier, is responsible for overall management of the contractors. The Aerospace Corporation assists him in the general systems engineering and technical direction functions which are Government responsibilities in the MOL Program.

This evening, you will hear from the two major associate contractors concerned with the most critical elements of the MOL system . . . This is the agenda we propose to follow . . . Let me note on behalf of GE that they are not on their homegrounds and some improvising has been necessary in terms of items on display.

With that, let me introduce Mr._____ from the Eastman Kodak Company.

* * *

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TECHNICAL & TACTICAL INTELLIGENGE PURPSES ... PHOTOGRAPHY OF SIGNIFICANT TARGETS FOR SECRET-5/6 OPTICAL TECHNOLOGY AND SYSTEMS FOR EITHER MANNED OR UNMANNED USE ... DEVELOP NECESSARY HIGH RESOLUTION OR BETTER RESOLUTION MOL OBJECTIVES: ECURE NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1 JULY 2015



Second years e l トヨメ MARTIN PNO M MOL CONTRACTOR KESPONSIBILITIES CE: NIREOR DRIVE & MOUNT EK: OPTICS & OPT ASSEMBLY DAC: LABORATORY VEHICLE INTEGRATION DAC: FLIGHT VEHICLE INTEGRATION DAC: ORBITING VEHICLE INTEGRATION MARTIN : LAUNCH SERVICES DAC: STRUCTURE MODULE Noiselw FEI CAMERA CONTROLL TRACKING SCOPES DAC : STRUCTURE SUB-SYSTEMS EK: CAMERA/FILM LABORA*tory* MODULE My Dannel - MAC Durglas- BAC SEMINI B NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 NAC egen

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MOL PROGRAM SCHEDULE:

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MILESTONES	FY 68	FY 69	FV70	FY 71	FY 72
PRE-FUGHT ITEMS					
DVNAMIC TEST OPTICS ASS'Y		4			
STATIC FIRE 7-SECMENT		•			
Test RUN CAMJOPT ASS'Y			tereter en in serie serie en		
START ACEPT IST PROD CAM			•		
ASSEMBLE/TEST FV-3					
FLIGHT SCHEDULE					
T-IIIM/GEM/STRUC QUAL			VV		
MANNED ALL-UP					
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508-5/575N_ RECCE PRODUCT. CONTROL : PBACK-UP FAILED OR MALFUNCTHANING 10 & VERIFY, ADUUST, OR MANUALLY * EXPOSURE CONTROL. P I NCREASE VALUE/QUANTITY * TRACKING ... * ALIGNMENT. MAN IN MOLS * POINTING ... * Focusooo NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1 JULY 2015





GAMBIT/ DORIAN Handle via BYEMAN Control System

GAMBIT/DORIAN COMPARATIVE INFORMATION

INDEX

1. Summary Cost Comparison MOL & G-3

2. Costs/Data re G, G-3, C, and Hex

3. MOL Miscl Costs/Data

4. G Flight Performance

5. G-3 Flight Performance

BORIAN/gambit Handle via Byeman Control System



NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1 JULY 2015	SEGNE		Handle via BY Control System	EMAN
	COST COMPARISON	N TABLE		
	<u>M</u>)L	G ³	-
	Manned	Unmanned		
1965 Program Cost Estimate	\$ 1.5 billion	\$ 1.2 billion	н Алариян Алариян	
Current Program Cost Estimate	\$ 2.35 billion	\$ 1.93 billion		
Cost per Launch	\$ 85 million	\$ 66 million		
Cost per day/30 day mission	\$ 2.83 million	\$ 2.2 million		
Cost per day/8-16 day mission	an an 10			(average)
Cost per Photograph	\$5600	\$3300	Strip Camera	
Cost per Cloud Free Target	\$23,600*	\$22,000*		

* The MOL target deck will contain approximately 14000 targets. The target geometry is such that a single aiming point usually covers more than a single target. On a single mission, we estimate photographic coverage of approximately 3000 targets in the unmanned configuration and approximately 3600 in the manned configuration.

** Based on actual take from 6 flights, and an estimate of the 7th flight. For G³ calculation, any photograph which contains a target which can be positively identified as such, is included in the count, irrespective of its resolution. On this basis, the average is 850 targets per flight.

1/ Includes about for increased reliability, double RV's, and other improvements. There are no recurring or production hardware systems (not even first six) included in this total.

Bye 21383-67

2/ Cost of first six = approximately _____each Cost of double RV (#23 on) = approximately _____each

3/ Cost per day from 8 days to 16 days

DORIAN/GAMBIT Handle via BYEMAN Control System



Handle via BYEMAN Control System

System	Launched <u>Cost (x10⁶)</u>	Weight <u>On Orbit</u>	Days on Orbit	\$/Day on Orbit (x10 ⁶)
GAMBIT	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
G #1→G #25 G #26→G #29 G #30→		4200# 4400# 4500#	4-5 6 8	average
GAMBIT-3				
G-3 $\#1 \rightarrow$ G-3 $\#8$ G-3 $\#8 \rightarrow$ G-3 $\#23$ (1 RV) G-3 $\#24 \rightarrow$ (2 RV)		7200# 7200# 8216#	8+ 8-10 14-16	average average average
<u>KH-4</u>			,	····· ,
C #1→ C #25 (1 RV) C #26→C #56 (1 RV) C #57→C #91 (2 RV) *C #92→C #102 (2 RV) C #102→(2 RV)		2300# 2800# 3600# 4000# 4000#	4-5 5-6 8-11 13-14 13-14	
<u>KH-9</u>				
KH-9 #1		20,200# (T-IIIC)	30	

* First THORAD/14-day AGENA Aug 1966

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Handle via BYEMAN Control System

TAB A

Manned vs Unmanned

Recurring Launch Cost Comparison

		Manned	Mode*	Unmanne	d Mode*
Lab Vehicle		\$25.3	million	\$22.0	million
Mission Module		24.0		22.1	en an
Gemini B		16.5			
Support Module				4.0	
Titan IIIM		17.0		17.0	
Crew & Equipmen	t	•5			•
Test Operations	•••	1.0		-5	•
GSE/TD		•5		5	·
	TOTAL	\$84.8	million	\$66.1	million

On a 4 launch per year basis

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<u>TAB B</u> Manned vs Unmanned MOL

Cost Comparisons

From September 1966 (Million Dollars)

	MOL	Unmanned DORIAN Program	
	(7 flights)	(10 flights)	Remarks
Experiments	338	378	Includes 10 payloads at \$8M
Mission Module	306	275	
Laboratory Vehicles	836	150	Costs to 1 July plus Termination @\$43M
New OCV		450	\$250M plus 10 Vehicles @ \$20M
Gemini B	235	50	Cost to 1 July plus Termination @ \$15M
Titan III-M	332	390	Includes 10 Launch Vehicles at \$20M
Crew	12		
Test Operations	30	25	
Pre-MOL	3		
Aerospace	70	60	
Other	42	40	
TOTAL	2204	1818	
DORIAN			
Handle via BYEMAN Control System	SEGN		WORKING PAPER SAFSL INTERNAL





Handle via BYEMAN Control System

o What is the cost per launch for the manned system?

A study completed in May 1967 estimated the cost of 4 launches per year for a 4 year period at \$85 million per launch. This estimate included costs of the Gemini B, lab vehicle, mission payload, 7-segment booster and O&M costs (Tab A).

o What is the cost per launch for the unmanned system?

The same study estimated costs of \$66 million per launch. The difference is due primarily to substitution of the Support Module for the Gemini B, and changes to the lab vehicle and mission module (Tab A).

o What would be the program cost had we proceeded with an unmanned system program originally?

The program cost, corrected for price escalations, and using the 1965 estimate of \$1.2 billion as a base, is estimated at \$1.93 billion.

o What would be the program cost if we now proceed with only an unmanned system program?

Approximately \$2.05 billion. This cost provides for the development of a new Operational capability Vehicle (OCV).

o What are the costs per day of on-orbit operation?

Based on the launch cost estimates of \$85 and \$66 million:

Orbital Life	Manned	Unmanned
30 Days	\$2.83 million	\$2.2 million
42 Days		1.57 million*
60 Days		1.1 million**

For long duration missions utilizing rendezvous techniques, non-recurring costs are estimated at \$300 million; recurring annual costs for the initial vehi le, and 5 resupply missions at 60 day intervals are estimated at \$350 million.

At \$350 million, 365 days on orbit would cost approximately \$950 thousand per aay.

* Baseline MOL includes a growth capability to 42 days.

** Provisions in design allow option of increasing operation time to 60 days.

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o What is the cost per I	hotograph for the Orbiti	ing Lab as compar	ed to G ³ ; (1)
	(2) <u>Manned</u> <u>Unma</u>	(3) 3 anned <u>G</u>	
10 day mission 30 day mission	, \$5600 \$330	strip 00	camera.
o What is the comparativ Orbiting Laboratory as	re cost per cloud free ta	arget covered for	the
•	Manned ⁽⁴⁾ Unm	anned ⁽⁵⁾ <u>G³</u> ⁽	6)
10 days (5-8 day actual)	· . · · · · · ·		
30 days	\$23600 \$220	000	
·			
 None of the cost est the photographic "ta selectivity of targe 30 day mission, 1315 30 day mission, 1740 3600 targets covered 3000 targets covered 	imates consider a value ke" which the manned sys t choice, and coverage o 0' of film, 15000 frames 0' of film, 20000 frames (3000 + 20% manned syst	factor for enhancement)	cement of ugh ortunity, etc.
(6) Based on average lau DORIAN/GAMBIT	nch cost -		
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4002 15 Aug 63 6 Sep 63 16 5 . 75 101. 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	4001 4001 4002 440 4002 13Jul63 15Aug63 15Aug63 12Jul63 6Sep633 2 94.46 94.36 94.36 94.36 94.36 94.36 94.36 94.36 94.36 94.36 115.65 165.75 165.75 115.65 101.9 9 101.9 9 101.5 11 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	003 4004	lOct63 6Dec63 5Oct63 18Dec63	9.96 97.7 9.19 97.88	84.0 145.0 83.0 155.0 ·	9.0 85.0 1.0 77.0	2	.0	1	
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	and the second sec	TALL IN	Life A rresta				and a subscript	Statisti Statistis Statistis
	4015	16Dec64 23Jan65	102.5 102.53	169 . 9 174.42	83.2		688 883 2161	a breana ystem
	4014	10Nov64 4Dec64	97.0 97.02	172.5 192.57	8 8 8 4 8 4 8	- -	37 2.61	
	4013	230ct64	95.5 95.5	169.8 175.07	84.0 81.69	ک کر	•	
	4012	30Sep64 8Oct64	 	151.0 	0.1	vn 1	o 1	
	<mark>4011</mark>	26Aug64 25Sep64	93.0 92.9	147.0 157.0	85. 0 85	w. 4	246 81	
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APPROVÉD FOR EASE 1 JULY 2015.		Launch Plan Actu	Incl An Plan Actu	Apogee Plan	Perige. Plan Actu	Days or Plan Actu Total C	Targeti By NPI Best Re Achieve	
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NRO APPROVEI RELEASE 1 JUL	AFOR Y 2015 *Reasons for Difference	Mission		
M5N #	Planned vs Actual Launch Date	Anomalies	Remarks	
4001	Favorable checkout progress	n de geografie Geografie	Hitched-up mode	
4002	Exchange second stage		та 2 п. н. н. н. н. н.	
4003	Tech. Problems during checkout		n (1997) An Araba (1997) An Ar	
4004	Command system anomaly	Control gas depleted rev 5	lst OCV solo msr	
4005	Electrical Problems in OCV	Extreme YAW error no usable		
4006	Tracking station communication	photography	lst successful use	e of
4007	Problem (Thule)		roll capability	
1001	rajival power, command decoder			
4008		Vehicle unstable rev 16		•
4009	AGENA electronics	Vehicle stabi- lization & film wrap up difficult	ties	
4010	OCV replaced	Only 2 days oper due to command	ration mal-	
		function		
4011	ATLAS booster changed command decoder malfunction			
4012	NRO Direction to avoid conflict	AGENA failure/	no orbit	
4013			No recovery	
4014	Tech. difficulties during checkout	Early recovery	due	
	OX K/V	to stabilization a battery	ING	
4015	Anomalies in OCV checkout			

*Normally epresents operational problems - not contractual delivery

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G-1 951	"HITCH UP". Heat loss had depleted 4400 lb-sec of the 6300 lb-sec of stabilization thrust available at separation from AGENA on Vehicle 18. All gas lost on Rev 34 when valves went to high thrust mode. Command. decoder inadventently turned off due to noise or "switch bounce."	
G-2 952	"HITCH UP." While "hitched up" to AGENA it was noted that OCV control gas temperature was decreasing to point where solo OCV operation would be marginal. Re- covery executed on Rev 34 and OCV "solo-ed." At pressurization of the pneumatic system all control gas was expended. Probable causecover left off a fuel valve in the OCV pneumatic system. Spurious real time command accepted by vehicle on Rev 14. Attitude control power supply lost on Rev 35.	
G-3 953	"HITCH UP." Recovered on Rev 33. Solo after recovery. Some problems in proper roll rates due to switching anomalies "Prohibited modes" resulted in excess gas usage.	
G-4 954	Successful recovery Rev 18 on lifeboat. No useful photographs. Vehicle unstable Rev 4 due to gyro heater malfunction over heating rate gyro which exploded. No L.B. telemetry due to problem during countdown.	
G-5 955	Successful recovery Rev 34. No pictures. Error in commanding sequence on Rev 2 caused vehicle to drift in yaw. After slewing film forward cause of error found and corrected. Lifeboat failed on post-recovery test. Rev 65clock recycle and delay time erase (Command System problem).	
G-6 956	Successful recovery Rev 51. Roll maneuvers o.k. but impingement of gas on bulkhead gave vehicle thrust effect (high thrust only). Lifeboat failed on post- recovery test. Orbit Adjust engines show erosion effects.	
G-7 957	Successful recovery on Rev 64, fourth day. 4°-6° negative pitch error after Rev 41. Attributed by GE to short in the H.S. mixer box. Flew low o.k. 	
G⊷ Š 938	Successful recovery Rev 34, after bad injection from AGENA.	
	1. Vehicle unstable Rev 15 due to IR Scanners losing horizon reference. Attributed by GE to bad	

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	initial orbital environment.
2.	Also thermal blanket tore, bound the TARS platform and perhaps reflected into H.S.
3.	No useful photographs after Rev 15.
• • •	lopps time signal failed on Rav 16.
5.	Command readout failurecertain stored program commands were not executed after Rev 16.
• 6.	On Rev 37 the telemetry did not turn on as programmed. By BUSS command telemetry revealed store program commands were not being executed. Attributed to programmer power supply failure due to high temperature.
G-9 OCV	
959	Recovered on Rev 34. No useful photography.
2.	Vehicle lost lock from the beginning in the vicinity of the South Pole. Did not re-stabilize away from the pole.
	a. Causes of the instability:
	(1) Horizon Sensor "spooked" by cold environment at S.P.
	(2) Re-located "Roll Nozzles" reflected into H.S.
	(3) Thermal blanket at rear of OCV reflected into H.S. (if it expanded in vacuum due to trapped air).
	b. Fixes:
	(1) Operational procedureturn off H.S. in vicinity of South Pole.
•	(2) Re-locate "Roll Nozzle."
	(3) Restrain thermal blanket and reduce its reflectivity
3.	A pressure leak on secondary propulsion system between Rev 32 and 34.
4.	Wrench handle left in the R.V.
G-10 OCV.	
1.	Recovered on Lifeboat on Rev 66. (Attempted on 50 but failed due to Kodi problem).

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•		2. No useful photos after Rev 23 due to command problems (started Rev 10).
		3. SIdid not work after Rev 2.
•		4. Command Problem. Could not load stored program commands. Isolated to decoder and associated circuitry. Most probable causecoaxil cable problems.
G- 98	11	Successful recovery on Rev 67. Orbit adjust system malfunction during mission. Only 1 engine apparently burned. Also pressurizing gas leaked. SI worked fine. Soft photos.
G 98	12	No orbit. Agena burned less than one second. Agena engine received a shut down command. No SI on board.
G 96	13 3	Recovery capsule did not deorbit. Retro rocket did not fire. Destruct system worked.
G 96	14 4	Lost stability on Rev 9 due to power trouble.
G- 96	-15	Recovery on Rev 84. Mirror stuck in forward position on Rev 59 attributed to micro switch failure.
G- Se	-16 56	Recovery on Rev 81. Mirror stuck in vertical position on Rev 16. TM anomalies on Rev 63 and 64. Transmitter on but no data when first seen. Erroneous readings on secure word counter, environmental power turned off and pneumatic control system was in high thrust. Attributed to EMI from tape recorder.

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³ -<u>SECRET</u> Handle via BYEMAN Control System

Primary door actuator failed Rev 4. One 100 second focus test not executed due to G minute timer. Focus control malfunctioned by rev 31. Excellent photos. Two incidents: (1) mirror servo mechanical interforence. (2) Buss test not successful due to ground system problem.

C-18 968

G-19

GATEIT

6-17

937

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One delay line failed. Slightly reduced programming flexibility.

Short in 28 volt power system during Agena burn. Unstable. No payload functions

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Sections & 16

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MSN #	Reasons for Diffe Planned vs Actual	rence Launch Date	Mission Anomalies	Remarks	
4301	Ground guidance malfunction	equipment			
4302	Ground guidance	station			
4303	•				
4304	Hardware deliver contractor	y from			
4305	Delay in delivery payload section	of Photo	Failed to orb TIII B 2nd St	it Ago	
4306	Photo payload rel	ley		lst 10 day m	n
4307	Titan 2nd stage s (Present planne date - 16 Aug 6	kirt updet ed launch updet 7)	5		
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G³ Anomalies

4301

Slit change mechanism disabled before launch. Time track not recorded due to known small misalignment of film prior to launch.

Much of the stellar camera degraded by flare. Flare from camera looking toward earth great enough to degrade adjacent frame. Minor pressure and static marks.

4302

4303

Variable image quality due to out-of-focus condition and error in IMC. Stellar camera disabled prior to launch.

Memory malfunctions caused loss of ll pictures. The stereo mirror did not respond to commands to move from the forward to the vertical position - 8 frames were lost. Average film velocity .38% below the commanded velocity. CORN targets read from 38".

375 unprogrammed terrain camera exposures were taken due to command malfunctions. Terrain camera time block malfunctioned. Right stellar camera shutter stuck open intermittently.

4304 Focus setting in error by approximately 5 mils. CORN targets varied from 27" to 84"; focus sensor performance erratic.

> Right and left stellar camera shutters experienced sticking. Flare degraded stellar photography. Time blocks for terrain and stellar malfunctioned.

4305 Failed to orbit, T III B 2nd stage.

4306 Best CORN targets - 2 feet. Stop film coast distance gradually increased to 6 inches due to failure of the dynamic brake. 'As a result, 212 more feet of film were used than programmed.

An error in roll joint position began on Rev 65, corrected by softwear compensation on Rev 74.

Terrain camera time word intermittently exposed. 35 programmed terrain camera exposures did not occur.





UUKIAN Handle via BYEMAN Control System

Mr. Secretary:

During the next ten minutes, let me refresh your memory on the MOL Program so that the Eastman Kodak and General Electric discussions which follow may be considered in their proper context.

CHART 1

These are the objectives of the MOL Program.

We are developing the manned system and plan to fly it first because: 1. This gives much higher assurance of achieving the primary objective; and 2. It is almost essential to its early accomplishment.

The unmanned system is being developed to insure the continued availability of this reconnaissance capability should international objections or a foreign threat preclude manned operations, or should man be unable to function effectively in space for prolonged periods -although we do not expect difficulties in this latter regard.

WORKING PAPERS

Bye 21383-67

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