Intelligence Information for Dr. Foster's appearance before the Senate Subcommittee on Military Preparedness.

The following members and staff members have been briefed previously on intelligence programs:

Senator Stennis
Senator Symington
Senator Anderson
Senator Margaret Chase Smith
Staff member - Mr. Kendall

Mr. Chairman

I would like to discuss briefly some of the significance and usage of intelligence information within the Department of Defense.

The Department of Defense must take actions in force deployments and in the selection and initiation of research and development programs which counter identified and potential threats, by foreign powers, to the safety of the United States.

Today these vital decisions are made after deliberate and concentrated analysis of all sources of intelligence data which might influence our day to day decisions as well as our long term plans for improving the national defense.

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Satellite photography, SIGINT and ELINT have made major contributions to the quality and confidence in the intelligence data we collect.

Four principal functional categories of intelligence activities are exploited to get the maximum information on our potential and actual enemies.

First; Search --

Second; Baseline --

Third; Surveillance --

Fourth; Science and Technology --

I would like to give some current examples of each of these categories.

To conduct our photographic search missions we use the KH4 camera system in a low altitude orbiting satellite. In FY 68 the KH-4 system is producing photographs with 10 foot ground resolution. This past year the KH-4 system identified:

59 new Soviet ICBM silos

10 new Tallinn defensive missile sites

Significant Soviet missile build-up along the Chinese border

New airfields in Mongolia

5 extremely significant but unidentified advanced weapons related facilities in China. These are hardened facilities, apparently related to a Chinese advance weapons system.
Using the higher resolution of the KH-8 camera, satellites are used to provide engineering details which allow us to "Baseline" equipment and probable usage of thousands of specific national targets within the Soviet Union and China. For example:

- specific missile usage can be identified
- the specific weapons equipage of Soviet forces can be determined
- new classes of aircraft are identified
- new classes of ships and submarines are identified
- modifications to existing ships are identified
- a new unidentified aircraft or surface effects vehicle was detected in the Caspian sea

The time-phased continuity of coverage provided by the KH-4 and KH-8 has been used successfully for the "Surveillance" function. After a Tallinn site is suspected, for example, we have been able to confirm the identification within 45 days of the start of site construction. We have been able to positively confirm the disposition of the Soviet MR/IRBM force of 709 launch positions. This force remains about 90% deployed against the NATO area and has been relatively static for almost four years. This continuity of coverage allows us to update our Order of Battle for the USSR and China so we can plan our own deployments to counter their strengths or exploit any weaknesses we discover.

Other typical areas of surveillance are:
--silo starts and types
--nuclear storage sites and facility changes
--nuclear manufacturing plans changes
--Chinese nuclear test build-up
--underground nuclear test craters in USSR
--located USS Pueblo in North Korea about 19 miles south of Vladivostok. KH-8 photography showed

These have been a few samples which indicate the breadth and value of the coverage by satellites. In the case of China, satellite photography has been our most important source for intelligence data and in most cases the only source.

The in-depth analysis of the photographs plus electronic intercept on communications, radar activity and telemetry signals gives us information on which weapons are operational and what technology is either more advanced or less advanced than ours. For example, the following illustrate the "Science and Technology" usage of the intelligence information.

Installations. SIGINT satellites intercepted a signal which has been identified with high probability as emanating from the radar. The signal has further been associated with activities. Our intercepts ceased on last year but we now feel we know enough about
the frequency, modulation and mode of operation to make changes in some of our other intercept systems to improve our chances of positively specifying the purposes of the

Engine test facilities have been identified in the USSR which could be used for the development of high energy upper stages

Several new aircraft have been identified by satellite photography early enough to allow us to get the best coverage when that aircraft has been shown.

In the future better resolution and better detection capability for the ELINT and SIGINT satellites will bring us close to an intelligence data collection capability. There will always be much we could only learn through physical access to the equipment and/or defectors and agents. The quality of our data is improving steadily and this provides us with more confidence that our deployment and R&D decisions are the optimum balance for effectiveness and cost of national defense.