MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: The Rivers Committee and MOL

At Attachment 1 is a copy of testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on May 8, 1969, showing Mr. Hansen and Mr. Blanford in a scene which would be best forgotten. Shortly after this date, as one would predict, Mr. Rivers’ committee members demanded a full-blown briefing on MOL.

On May 22, Colonel Allen was discussing this matter with Dr. McLucas and volunteered my services to suggest possible courses of action. On May 23, I briefed Dr. McLucas along the lines outlined in Attachment 2.

Actually, the situation is impossible and we cannot "solve" this problem. There is some hope that the request may "go away," if we drag our OSD feet, but I consider that a slender reed on which to rest the security integrity of the NRP.

PAUL E. WORTHMAN
Colonel, USAF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Resume of Congressional Hearing

Committee: House Armed Services Committee
Subject: FY 70 RDT&E Authorization Request
Report No.: 7 - 8 May 1969 - AM and PM
Department: Air Force
Witnesses: Honorable Grant L. Hansen
Lt General Marvin L. McNickle
Mr. Joseph C. Jones
Maj General George S. Boylan, Jr.
Mr. Hyman Fine

1. (U) The information contained in this summary was obtained during closed hearings before the subject Committee. It will not be released outside Department of Defense agencies until published hearings have been released by the Committee, and then only to the extent that it is in accord with published hearings and security regulations.

DS 69-2308/25
2. (U) The above Committee met in executive session at 1011 hours, this date. In addition to Chairman Rivers, the following members were present during part or all of the morning session: Representatives Philbin, Arends, Bob Wilson, Bennett, Stratton, Pirnie, Pike, Hall, Ichord, Stafford, King, Whalen, Foreman, Hunt, Hicks, Whitehurst, Long, White, Nichols, Dickinson, and Daniel.

3. (S) After announcing that there would be an afternoon session which Mr. Philbin would chair, the Chairman welcomed Secretary Hansen, who made some brief introductory remarks. Thereafter, General McNickle read a blue-lined version of his prepared statement, the full text of which was submitted for the record. A copy of General McNickle's classified statement is on file in this office.

4. (S) During General McNickle's formal presentation, he was interrupted on a number of occasions. The Chairman asserted that he did not accept the General's rationale for deferring the LIT program. Expressing interest in AMSA's high and low altitude capability, the Chairman had General McNickle confirm that development award would be made in 1969. He next interrupted to inquire as to whether the various problems incurred with the F-111 have been corrected, and what improvements the follow-on engine for the F-111D would have. General McNickle responded that he believed most of this aircraft's problems have been resolved, and enumerated the improvements in the P-100 engine.

5. (S) On the F-15, Mr. Hall observed that the other service was developing a two place fighter because 72 per cent of air-to-air kills are from other than forward vision, to which the General replied that he was under the impression the two seater was tied to the fighter control system. Mr. Stratton asked if we were aware of the Army's experiences with caseless cartridges, and General McNickle answered that we were working with the Army on this, to which Secretary Hansen added that we plan to fall back to the cased ammunition if the caseless does not work out. General McNickle further told the Committee that none of the contractors had come in with a swing-wing proposal on the F-15.
6. After questioning the reduction from the Air Force original request on the AX, the Chairman made a similar inquiry concerning the deletion of the $10 million asked for on the Mark 18 re-entry vehicle. General McNickle told the Committee that DDR&E had cut it out because they were not convinced there was a sufficient ABM threat, but added that they had agreed to advance technology. He promised to supply for the record the differences between the Mark 18, Minuteman III and Poseidon. Mr. Morgan stated that he believed the Mark 18 had more warheads and could cover more targets. Along the same line of inquiry, Mr. Morgan queried the F-15 missile funding reduction and was told that it had been slowed down to phase in with that aircraft. Mr. Morgan than asked if it would not be advisable to proceed with development and testing so that the Air Force would know this missile would work on the F-15. General McNickle replied that this had been our philosophy but that DDR&E thought otherwise.

7. After General McNickle told the Chairman that the expected life of our communication satellites was three years, Secretary Hansen explained in great detail as to how a satellite is placed into synchronous orbit, and kept there. He then discussed the vulnerability of MIDAS with Mr. Dickinson, and the measures that are being taken to harden such detection satellites. He conceded that, regardless of such hardening measures, both we and the Soviets have the technology to kill each other's satellites. After Mr. Morgan noted the reduction in the MOL request, the Chairman made a similar comparison on DSDD and questioned whether the Air Force could do anything with the programmed reduced sum. General McNickle replied that we wanted four launches but had been approved for only two. Mr. Morgan interjected to say that the Air Force was only testing part of the system, and that he wondered if DDR&E would approve another two flights if the first two were successful. When the Secretary said that he thought they would, the Chairman questioned whether such a system has any potential. Assuring him it did and of the fact this technology could be applied to any system, the Secretary
explained the potential advantages of this non-nuclear kill approach.

8. After covering the Air Force original RDT&E budget submission and the cuts and adjustments to it since last October, the Chairman said he had a number of questions for the record which he would furnish the witnesses to answer.

9. Asking the Secretary if he had reviewed Northrup's F-5-21 proposal and receiving a response that he had, Mr. Blandford and the Chairman championed at great length the need for such a fighter aircraft for small countries, and particularly South Vietnam. They indicated that they were at a loss to understand why the Air Force did not enthusiastically support a proposal such as this, to which General McNickle replied that OSD has said this should be a commercial venture, and produced a 14 April 1969 memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to this effect. After a further and heated dialogue in which the Chairman and Mr. Blandford were the principal participants, Mr. Blandford asked Secretary Hansen to check with Secretary Laird to determine whether the position stated in his 14 April memorandum still holds true today. Illustrative of the tenor of this exchange, Mr. Blandford stated that he could get the $64 million for the F-5-21 out of the budget blindfolded, that no one could convince him that human resources studies were more important than aircraft for South Vietnam. He also asked whether General McNickle, in his professional opinion, thought the South Vietnamese did not need such aircraft, to which the General responded no. Mr. Blandford went on to say that the House Armed Services Committee had had to force the Air Force into procuring an airlift, i.e., buying -130s and -141s, and the Navy into moving on a nuclear submarine program. He concluded that the services expect the House Armed Services Committee to be enthusiastic about their proposals, but invariably are cool toward Committee suggestions. To this, the Chairman added that the services are infected with provinciality.

10. Mr. Bob Wilson, stating the Pike hearings two years ago indicated the Air Force was delinquent in
close air support, asked what we plan to do with the $12 million for AX. General McNickle responded that we would go to contract definition with this money, and Secretary Hansen added we would issue a RFP in the fourth quarter of this year.

11. (S) The Chairman, saying the Air Force could not do any better than the F-12 at $20 million a copy, inquired as to why we were considering the development of an advanced manned interceptor. Secretary Hansen replied that he had heard the F-12 cost to be more like $40 million an aircraft, but that it was a candidate for the advanced manned interceptor. Asserting that history is repeating itself, the Chairman stated that the Air Force junked the B-58 program in anticipation of the B-70, and that we are not only still using the former but also extending its life for another three years. General McNickle responded that the Air Force is not opposed to the F-12. At this point the Chairman said that, while the Committee might put money in, Systems Analysis would knock it out. He concluded that they were getting tired of selling aircraft, although they believed that they knew more about it than some of the people making the decisions.

12. (U) The Committee recessed at 1158 hours, and reconvened at 1411 hours with Mr. Philbin as Acting Chairman. Also present during the afternoon session were: Representatives Pirnie, Hall, Pike, Lennon, Dickinson, Whalen, Hunt, Hicks, White, Mollohan, and Daniel.

13. (S) Referring to a C-5A article in today's Washington Post, Mr. Pike inquired as to the cost assertions contained in it. Receiving what he considered to be unsatisfactory responses, he placed the entire article in the record and requested the Air Force answer it in toto. He also requested that the Air Force furnish the report of the cost team on the C-5A. He concluded that charges that the Air Force was changing its R&D figures to make its procurement funding look more attractive also should be answered.

14. (S) Noting the $84.5 million for SRAM, Mr. Pike asked how far this missile was behind schedule, and was told
two years. He then inquired as to whether there were any cost overruns in this program, to which General McNickle responded that we had not yet negotiated a production contract. Pressed as to the R&D aspect of this program, General McNickle said we had $60 million in overruns as of now, and promised to furnish the original cost estimate for the record.

15. (U) Mr. Pike told General McNickle that he had noticed in his unclassified statement that overseas research had been cut in Israel and raised in Lebanon. He cautioned that this could cause considerable trouble when this bill gets to the floor.

16. (S) Mr. Pirnie asked what the objectives of the MOL program were. Referring to a saying that the man who controls space controls the world, the Secretary replied that we want to put a man with military equipment in space and see what he can do with it. Mr. Dickinson said he wanted to know more of the details of the MOL program, to which Mr. Blandford replied that for the past four years only four members of the Committee had been briefed on it. Mr. Dickinson then inquired as to whether his clearance was not high enough. Secretary Hansen responded that he could discuss this program only with those members the Chairman designated. When Mr. Lennon took exception to this, Mr. Blandford stated that this policy has been in effect for the past 22 years, but that he knows of no reason why all Committee members should not be made aware of the details of the MOL program. Mr. Dickinson concluded by asking whether there was any treaty against the military use of outer space, to which the Secretary answered there was not except for a prohibition against nuclear bombs or destructive devices.

17. (S) After querying the $16 million reduction in the advanced rescue system, Mr. Hall turned his attention to the FAC/SCAR force, and was told by General Boylan that the Air Force is examining an aircraft that will better perform the FAC mission. Asked if it would be STOL or VSTOL, General McNickle replied that STOL would be cheaper for this
purpose, and that we propose using VSTOL for the LIT.
Mr. Hall then commented that the Committee has allocated dollars for years and that we are no closer to STOL or VSTOL than ever, to which the Secretary said that VTO imposes severe lift penalties. Referring to General McNickle's LIT comments, Mr. Hall asked when the Committee could expect production, and whether 1976 would be soon enough. General McNickle replied that we hoped to go to contract definition by May 1971, but that money for this program had been cut drastically this year. Mr. Morgan interrupted to inquire as to what made us think we could go to contract definition last year, and was told that you know what has happened to all the prototypes. Mr. Hall concluded by stating he thinks the Air Force should follow up with such developments within the state of the art.

18. (S) Mr. Hicks questioned General McNickle as to the strength, age and rate of production of the Soviet bomber force. He also inquired as to whether the Russian SST had any military significance, to which General McNickle replied that they could build a bomber from it. Mr. Hicks, General McNickle and General Boylan then discussed the size, payload and range of the AMSA, as well as that of the F-111. General Boylan told Mr. Hicks that the AMSA was designed for use against the Soviets, and not for use in South Vietnam. After General McNickle told Mr. Hicks that the AMSA could carry twice as much payload as the B-52, Mr. Nedzi asked that we factor out the bomb delivery cost of AMSA vis-a-vis the B-52. The Secretary replied that we would furnish this for the record, but was sure that the AMSA would be cheaper.

19. (S) In response to Mr. Foreman's inquiry concerning the R&D budget, Secretary Hansen stated that the national total was about $16 billion, OSD's about $8 billion and the Air Force about $3.5 billion. After assuring Mr. Foreman that coordinating panels supervise these expenditures, the Secretary quoted the FY 66 through FY 70 fundings for ARES, and stated this was a tri-service effort under the executive management of the Air Force.

20. (S) Mr. Stratton questioned the witnesses vigorously as to whether there was any reason to be optimistic
that the F-111 problems have been resolved. He asked why we are not using them in Laos, to which General McNickle replied that there were no targets there of sufficient complexity to warrant the use of the F-111 against them. Mr. Stratton challenged this by saying that we should assure the Congress and the public that this is a viable aircraft, and asked what has been done with the F-111 since it was withdrawn from Thailand. General McNickle stated he would submit for the record the daily flying hours and crew training being compiled on F-111 aircraft. Mr. Stratton particularly questioned our not deploying a unit of F-111s until 1970, and inquired how they happened to go to Vietnam a year or so ago. General McNickle responded that the Air Force convinced OSD to send them there on a test basis, and General Boylan added that the performance of the bombing system was satisfactory. Asked if Southeast Asia tests could be termed successful, General McNickle replied that we brought our F-111s home before completing them because of the bombing halt in November 1968. Later on, Mr. Nedzi asked when the last combat sortie in Southeast Asia was flown by an F-111, to which Secretary Hansen replied that it was in May 1968. Mr. Nedzi then asserted that the witness had been less than candid in trying to leave the Committee with the impression that the bombing halt caused the F-111s' return to the United States. Acting Chairman Philbin requested the Air Force to supply a statement for the record on this, after which Mr. Jones said the F-111s in Thailand returned to flight status in June 1968 and to terrain following in July.

21. Reading at length from Secretary Packard's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee with the view toward establishing that it was in conflict with Secretary Laird's 14 April 1969 memorandum on the F-5-21, Mr. Blandford asked Secretary Hansen if he had discussed this matter with Secretary Packard. The Secretary replied that Secretary Packard had not been available, but that he had discussed it with Secretary Seamans and recommended that they should get together with Secretary Packard on this matter. After reiterating the probability that the Air Force would have to meet the South Vietnamese aircraft
needs from its own inventory, Mr. Blandford asked why we were developing the AX when we had the A-7, A-1 and A-37. He went on to say that we could get the money for the F-5-21 here, to which General McNickle responded that the AX would have more power, bigger payload and so on. After a comparison of the payloads and unit costs of the A-37 and the AX, General McNickle told Mr. Blandford that the R&D for the AX would be $127 million, and that there had been no R&D money expended on the A-37. Mr. Blandford then suggested to the Chairman that the money needed for the F-5-21 come from the AX R&D funding request.

22. (U) Referencing basic research at universities and a movement toward legislation to limit federal assistance only to those universities that can control their students, Mr. Dickinson asked what impact this would have on Department of Defense research. Saying that research helps students as well as the Department of Defense, Secretary Hansen said that university problems fall under OSD Manpower, but that the Air Force is looking at what it will do if such research facilities are cut off. General McNickle added that such legislation would severely impair defense efforts, and that students would go after those universities that had research contracts with the Department of Defense.

23. (U) In adjourning the Committee at 1548 hours, Acting Chairman Philbin announced that they would reconvene at 1000 hours on Tuesday, 13 May, at which time the Committee would receive testimony on the Air Force FY 70 Aircraft/Missile Procurement Authorization Request.

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1. Option 1. Don't brief. Clear with the President. President clear with Speaker of House & Chairman of the Committee.

2. Option 2. Don't brief. Mr. Helms & Mr. Laird visit the Chairman and explain the problem, requesting waiver.

3. Option 3. Don't brief now; possibly later. Mr. Helms go to CIA Policy Committee, explain problem, and ask advice.

4. Option 4. Brief as planned. Mr. Helms give cautionary, introductory statement, discouraging questions. General Stewart give low key, broad concept briefing; no details; and hopefully no questions.

RULES FOR ALL CASES

1. "Clear" the course of action with Mr. Land.

2. Do not mention or infer the NRP.

3. Do not mention or infer current overflight of denied areas.