SECURITY SURVEY REPORT

PROJECT 102 (698BK)  EARPOP

SAFSP. EL SEGUNDO, CALIFORNIA

STC & 6594th ATW, SUNNYVALE, CALIFORNIA

JANUARY - MARCH 1963

SPECIAL SECURITY CENTER, OFFICE OF SECURITY CIA

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM

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This document contains information referring to Projects:

PROJECT 102 (698BK)
SURVEY REPORT

of

PROJECT 102 (698BK)

at

SAFSP, EL SEGUNDO, CALIFORNIA

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STC & 6594th ATW, SUNNYVALE, CALIFORNIA

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JANUARY - MARCH 1963
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SURVEY REPORT OF PROJECT 102 (698BK)

AUTHORITY

This survey of Project 102 was conducted pursuant to Section 12 of BYEMAN Directive No. 1 which directs the SSC/CIA to conduct periodic surveys of projects of the NRP.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this survey is two-fold: (1) to determine any necessity for changing Project 102 to a Covert Program; and (2) to determine what action is necessary to bring the processing of the into conformity with the BYEMAN Security Standards.

SCOPE

This survey was conducted in January and March 1963 and covered personnel, physical and operational security at the Secretary of the Air Force, Special Projects, El Segundo, California, Project Headquarters, and the STC Sunnyvale, California. Interviews were held with the Project Officer and key personnel involved in the program at both SAFSP and the STC. In addition considerable time was spent with the Director of Security of the 6594th Aerospace Test Wing at Sunnyvale, California which provides general security for the Project at the STC. In March 1963 a finished draft of this report was furnished to General Greer for his comments. These comments are set forth as an attachment to this report.

SYNOPSIS

The Programs which preceded 102 received a considerable degree of publicity of the "Spy in the sky" variety and were handled as generally Overt Programs. It is believed there is a definite thread connecting this program to its predecessors which would make it difficult to disconnect or cover up this project as it now operates. In the contractual area and the technical direction and management of the Project, all that has been necessary in the past has been a SECRET clearance and a "Need-To-Know" for access to the Control System.
the Project. Furthermore, "Need-To-Know" has not been a centralized controlled procedure. A much more strict "Need-To-Know" appears to have been exercised since approximately 1961 regarding the payload and its degree of mission achievement.

In terms of the BYEMAN System the operation of the STC where the 102 "take" is processed was found to operate in a generally secure manner with the exception of the lack of TOP SECRET clearances (which were not required until a decision was made to put it under the BYEMAN System) and the inadequacy of certain physical security safeguards utilized. Recommendations regarding the future operation of Project 102 and the recommendations for bringing the Project 102 operation of the STC into the BYEMAN System are set forth at the end of this report.

BACKGROUND

Historically the program from which 698BK developed was the Sentry Program 117-L starting in 1956 as an Air Force Program for satellite reconnaissance. This program was designated to cover photography, Elint, and Infra-Red for early warning purposes. In 1958 the management and development for this effort was turned over to Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) as a SECRET Project comprising R & D; Samos for multiple purpose, operational intelligence, Elint and photography; and Midas for early warning purposes. In 1959 this program was turned back to the Air Force as three separate projects at the SECRET level, Discoverer, Samos, and Midas. It should be noted that Samos and its predecessor programs received wide publicity as military Elint and photographic reconnaissance activities.

Samos was then cancelled as an Air Force Program in approximately September 1960, the management being taken over by the President, Secretary of the Air Force and a General Officer. The General Officer chosen was General Greer who, as Director of this program, was responsible only to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. In approximately December 1960 by order of General Greer two areas were established for the program, Category 1 and Category 2. As best can be determined, Category 1 required a TOP SECRET clearance or at least a background investigation. Access to Category 2 information was generally based on a SECRET clearance. All
Information regarding "take" was in Category 1. Information regarding pay load might be included in Category 1 or Category 2. In approximately February 1961 another full program was instituted under General Greer which was not related to Samos. This was the approximate time when 102 became known as a program of its own. Project 102 was changed to Project 698BK in approximately February 1962. Another number, 315 has been assigned to the program by the DOD; however, it is still referred to by Program Director A as 698BK. From approximately February 1961 to the present on order of General Greer, 698BK even though still an Air Force "White" contract at the SECRET level, was to be handled on a strict "Need-To-Know" basis.

698BK is handled as a SECRET Air Force contract with Lockheed Missile Corporation (LMSC) as the primary contractor and Airborne Instruments Laboratories, Long Island, New York (AIL) the principal sub-contractor. AIL produces the entire pay load and performs the environmental tests. LMSC is responsible for system integration tests, mating of the pay load to the Thor-Agena vehicle and the engineering analysis of the pay load operation. In addition certain facilities at the tracking station are supported by the Kellogg Engineering Company and at the launch facilities by Philco Corporation.

I. PROGRAM 698BK AT SAFSP, EL SEGUNDO, CALIFORNIA

A. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

The following information was furnished in substance by Colonel Joseph Reubel, Colonel Robert Yundt, and Colonel John Copley. Colonel Yundt as Chief of the Advance Developments Section, SAFSP, is responsible for the technical direction of several projects one of which is 698BK. The actual Project Officer for 698BK is Colonel John Copley. Technical management and over-all program direction is furnished by Colonel Copley to LMSC and also AIL. Necessary correspondence or transmission of documents is handled in the normal DOD SECRET Channels. It was determined that 698BK has operated since its beginning as an Air Force "White" contract meaning that it has been handled as an Air Force SECRET contract with the purpose not being closely held. The fact that 698BK is a satellite Elint collection program is more than likely known by an...
undeterminable number of persons at the SECRET level and possibly by a large number of persons at an unclassified level. Refer to recommendation No. 1 - All recommendations are contained on pages 17, 18, & 19 From approximately February 1961 to the present there has been a concerted effort to enforce a strict "Need-To-Know" concerning pay load information and to control access to the "take" from this operation. In this regard Colonel Copley indicated that while general documentation concerning the 698BK Program might be located in a wide variety of places at the SECRET level, that he retained all pay load information on hand at SAFSP within safes in his office.

On attempting to determine what area of knowledgeability existed concerning 698BK it appears that any number of administrative personnel with the SAFSP and SSD, support people in these elements, people in the contracting office, support people at LMSC, and LMSC Corporate officials would have to be included. Any person in these groups could upon their own determination of the "Need-To-Know" pass the information on to a person holding a SECRET clearance.

Colonel Copley indicated that the assembly of the pay load was handled in a restricted area at AIL and that a person must be on an access list to gain entry to the area. Colonel Copley had no idea of the number of persons who were aware of the Project at AIL. He felt that the Project was most likely known as 698BK.

Electrical communications between the Satellite Test Center (STC), SAFSP and the operational headquarters in the Pentagon concerning 698BK are handled at the SECRET level over a military circuit. Refer to recommendation No. 2

B. PHYSICAL SECURITY

Physical security for SAFSP is handled by the Aerospace Corporation Security Force (Tab A - Chart Aerospace Security Department) The Chief Security Officer is Richard J. Healy. Mr. Healy holds a TOP SECRET clearance granted 28 June 1960 by the Air Force. Services provided by Aerospace Corporation Security Department include guards, receptionists, visitor control, after hours guard patrols and a badge system. SAFSP occupies the 3rd and 4th floors of Building A of the Aerospace Complex located at 2400 El Segundo Boulevard, California. (Tab B - Location of
SAFSP, 3rd & 4th Floor plan Bldg. "A/C" & Tab C - 1st Floor plans Bldg. "A/C") It should be noted that the Aerospace Corporation possesses a DOD SECRET Facility Clearance.

All visitors are required to sign in and unless their clearances are properly certified they must be escorted by a cleared individual. A color badge system is utilized for permanent employees both civilian and military as follows: a red photographic badge denotes a TOP SECRET clearance, the green photographic identification badge is utilized to denote a SECRET clearance, a gray badge is utilized for the Char Force, cafeteria workers and other personnel required to be within the complex but do not have access to classified information. Badges must be worn exposed at all times within the complex. Processing of badges is done by the Industrial Security Department of the Aerospace Corporation.

All guards are cleared at least on a SECRET basis based on National Agency Checks and some of the supervising guards are cleared TOP SECRET based on a background investigation. The guards are armed and appear to be a neat and well-trained group. At the entrance to Building "A" there is a receptionist on duty during working hours and during the day there is a guard also on duty to assist the receptionist in any problem she might have from visitors. After hours the main entrance is manned at all times by a guard. On the 3rd floor of this building there is a guard post maintained from 0700 - 1900 to control access to the SAFSP area on that floor. This is handled by an exchange badge system whereby the person's badge is exchanged at the entrance to this area and picked up when they leave. This post is not operative at night and protection of the area depends on the guard patrol and the safekeeping equipment used. \[\text{Refer to recommendation No. 3}\]

From a perimeter security standpoint the greater part of perimeter security is provided by the building themselves and also small sections of wire fence and ornamental concrete fencing between buildings which have gates secured by padlocks. The concrete fence approximately 7 feet high could very easily be scaled and does not offer security protection although it is considered to be part of the perimeter fence. The windows of these buildings are solid panels of glass that do not open. The windows in the Project Area have not been subjected to any security protection.
Guard patrols within Building "A" are on approximately a two hour basis. The Char Force performs their clean-up after hours on a non-escort basis and are not cleared. Refer to recommendation No. 4. So far as Project 698BK is concerned no restricted areas or vault areas are utilized. All that is necessary is that the safekeeping equipment meet the requirements of the DOD which could be as low as safe file cabinets with a bar and combination padlocks. It was noted that there are various types of safekeeping equipment in use such as Mosler safes with three-way combination locks, Remington Rand with three-way combination S & G locks and file cabinets with bar and padlocks. Documents concerning 698BK could be transmitted either to the SAFSP through the main document control of SSD or directly through the SAFSP mail room located on the 3rd Floor of Building "A". A central registry is maintained on the 3rd floor mail room of SAFSP and the documents are logged out to certain personnel in each section of SAFSP who control them within the section by having them signed for by the recipient within the section. Major Kenneth Dunks is the TOP SECRET Control Officer for SAFSP and personally handles all TOP SECRET documents. Sub control points are not utilized in the TOP SECRET control system. Destruction of all TOP SECRET material is witnessed and handled by Major Dunks and the destruction of all SECRET documents is accomplished by two Air Force officers who witness the pulping of these documents at the SSD destruction facility.

C. OPERATIONAL SECURITY

According to Colonel Copley no special operational security procedures are in effect for 698BK at SAFSP aside from the fact that he stores all documents relating to the pay load information in his immediate office. Colonel Copley did state, however, that attempts were made at Vandenberg Air Force Base to protect knowledge of the pay load mission which might be obtained by observation of on-pad tests. This was accomplished by conducting the tests at night in order to lessen the possibility of distant visual observation of such things as the antennas which must be unfolded during the final testing which would be indicative of the nature of the satellite.
II. PROGRAM 698BK AT SUNNYVALE - 6594th AEROSPACE TEST WING (ATW) AND SATELLITE TEST CENTER (STC)

A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The operation of 698BK is basically handled in the STC in Building 171 (STC) and in [ ] The operation of 698BK at the STC comes under the general direction of Colonel Paul Villars who is the Deputy Commander of Space Systems Tests and is head of the STC. He is the Deputy Commander of the 6594th ATW, Colonel William K. Kincaid being Commander. (Tab D - Organization of 6594th ATW & STC) The Field Test Director and Program Officer for 698BK is Colonel W. R. Hammond. The processing portion of 698BK is handled in the STC in certain restricted areas under restricted conditions and utilizes contractor employees and Air Force military personnel. The contractual personnel assigned to the STC are called "66B" type personnel, meaning that by contractual arrangement these people are put under the administration and direction of the Air Force, although they are not Air Force civilians. Located in [ ] approximately a mile away from the Lockheed Complex and in a fairly remote suburban area is the LMSC 698BK Program Office headed by Mr. John Schaub. This group is concerned with such things as payload development, systems integration, space craft engineering, and post launch analysis of the payload.

B. PHYSICAL SECURITY

The physical security for the 6594th ATW and the STC is provided through the Director of Security (Provost Marshall) of the 6594th ATW. Security directives, instructions, and guidance are supplied through the Military Security Officer, Lt. Colonel Frederic Mau.

1. Guards

The guard force is operated by the Lockheed Security Department, however, those guards assigned to Building 172 which contains the 6594th ATW and the STC Building 171 are under the direction and control of Colonel Mau. (Tab E - Organization of LMSC Security Department; Tab F - Organization of 6594th Security Staff)
All guards assigned to posts in the 6594th ATW and the STC must have at least SECRET clearances based on National Agency Checks. The guard force appears to be a neat and well disciplined group; however, it is noted that they do not carry firearms. The detex clock supervision of guards is not utilized. They are monitored by the shift captain who checks on the various posts under his supervision. The guards while on patrols are not required to check in at any specific time; however, the guard center, Building 110, can contact the guard at any time through radios which are carried by the guards. During normal working hours, 0800 to 1645, three entrances to the building are manned by guards. (Tab G - Guard posts - 171, 172) After hours there is a guard post located at the main entrance to Building 171.

Refer to recommendation No. 6

In addition during working hours there is one guard on each shift who patrols Bldgs. 171 & 172. Refer to recommendation No. 7

It should be noted that Building 171 of the STC and Building 172 are adjoining buildings, access to either one allowing access to the other. They are joined in the lobby area of Building 171.

2. Building Construction and Description

Building 171 which is the Satellite Test Center is of a tilt-up concrete slab construction approximately 4 to 5 inches thick has basically concrete slab floors and has no windows. It is a one story building with a poured concrete roof. There is a considerable crawl space, approximately 4 to 5 feet, between the ceiling and the roof which houses various maintenance equipment including air conditioning ducts, etc. Under certain areas in the STC there is also considerable crawl space of approximately 3 feet which allows for upkeep and maintenance of the communications and computer equipment. Building 172 is a lightly constructed two story building. There are windows all around on the ground floor all the way around the first floor which are approximately 3 to 4 feet off the ground and which have no
3. Fences and Alarms

LMSC is comprised of a large group of buildings and utilizes no perimeter protection in the form of fences. Contact and ultra-sonic alarms are utilized for areas which are within the STC and on all exterior doors to the STC. These alarms report to a Central Station in Building 110 which is monitored on a 24-hour basis; an LMSC guard performs this duty. It is noted that alarms are not utilized on any windows in Building 172 and that the door at the east end of the building which is an entrance during normal working hours and which is secured after hours is not manned by a guard nor does it have any alarms connected to it. Refer to recommendation No. 8. It is secured by key lock. In addition just to the left of the main lobby and on the north side of the building is a glassed-in area which has double doors which are normally secured by key lock at all times but which are not alarmed. Refer to recommendation No. 9. (Tab G - Floor plan Bldg. 172)

4. Badges

A badge system is in existence which allows access to the 6594th ATW and the STC. A color badge system is utilized wherein a blue striped photographic identification badge indicates military or government personnel who possess a SECRET or TOP SECRET Security Clearance. A red striped photographic identification badge is used for all contractor personnel with a need for continuing access to these buildings which indicate a SECRET clearance. Contractor personnel who require access to the building such as vendors, maintenance personnel, repairmen and janitors are issued a photographic identification badge with a yellow stripe. A clearance is not a prerequisite for this type of badge. The only actual checks conducted on such personnel are local police checks. In addition there are provisions for blue visitor's badges which have a V inserted for people who possess a security clearance of SECRET or higher. A yellow visitor's
badge which has a yellow V inserted and requires the possessor to be escorted at all times. All visitors are required to register with the receptionist in the lobby of Building 171, and if they possess a clearance it must be on record before a badge will be issued. During non-duty hours any visitor must register with the guards in the lobby in Building 171. Whenever a visitor's badge is issued, it must be turned in when the visitor leaves the building and secured again when he reenters. The procurement and preparation of all badges is done by the Industrial Security Department, Plant Protection and Pass Identification Section of LMSC.

5. Char Force

The Char Force performs their clean up after hours on a non-escort basis. Clearances are not required for the Char Force. Restrictions on the Char Force exist to the extent that they are not allowed to clean in vaulted or restricted areas unless they are accompanied by a cleared person.

6. Document Control

Documents pertaining to 698BK which are normally SECRET are handled through the Central SECRET Mail Room located in the STC. Here the documents are logged in and then distributed on a receipted basis to personnel within the STC. It was determined that any documents or materials other than those consisting of raw Sigint data (handling of such data referred to elsewhere) related to 698BK might be located in any number of places within the STC, 6594th ATW, or LMSC; these documents or materials being protected in accordance with the normal DOD classification.

All TOP SECRET documents or materials for the STC or 6594th ATW are handled by Major Moody who is the TSCO. Major Moody stated his current inventory of TOP SECRET material consisted of approximately 14 to 15 documents.
C. INTERNAL SECURITY

There is in existence a system for additional security control and guidance at the 6594th ATW. The Security Officer of the 6594th ATW issues on a timely basis notices and instructions concerning proper office security routine; use of classified storage containers; classified waste destruction; control of access to restricted areas; and security instructions concerning the use of computers and computer areas for sensitive project processing. In addition there exists an Office Security Advisor Program. This Program established a military officer within each office who is responsible for furnishing guidance and promoting security in his office. These security officers are furnished security courses and periodic indoctrination programs by Colonel Mau, Director of Security 6594th ATW.

There is a military officer on duty as a staff duty officer every night. He remains in the STC to handle any problems that arise during non-duty hours and to give additional security protection to the area. Furthermore it was noted that very often personnel are working in the STC during the night hours.

Mr. Wayne Sharp, LMSC employee, Chief of the Operations Section under Colonel Villars, functions as the Security Officer for the STC. He is assigned to the Air Force by contractual arrangement and formerly was assigned to the LMSC Department of Security. He exercises security control of the guards in the STC and issues guard instructions through Colonel Mau, the Military Officer of Security. It appears that Mr. Sharp is doing a very conscientious and dedicated security job and is enforcing the security regulation pertaining to the STC and within the various restricted areas therein.

D. OPERATIONAL SECURITY

The following information was obtained in substance from Lt. Colonel Bailey A. Williams, Captain S. W. Mooney, and Stanley H. Landberg. During a 698BK operation information is normally received at the New Boston Tracking Station and the Vandenberg Tracking Station. The tapes received at New Boston are transmitted via courier to the STC utilizing registered Air Express as a means
of shipping. Information received at Vandenberg Tracking Station is retransmitted by microwave link to the STC and is received in Room 200, the Ground Data Handling Equipment Room (GDHE) where it is put on a magnetic tape and certain processing of the tape is accomplished. Here the decommutation process is accomplished, and the tapes are turned over to the Pay Load Analysis Branch for preparation of Brew 1 tapes and print outs and Brew 2 tapes and print outs. Refer to recommendation No. 9 This is handled under Major Edelman who is in charge of the Pay Load Analysis Branch. It was stated by Colonel Williams and Captain Mooney that the tapes without the Brew 1 processing would not be revealing of the degree of success of the intelligence collection operation (or that intelligence per se was being collected). It was the general opinion of Mr. Landberg, Captain Mooney, and Colonel Williams that while it was theoretically possible for the opposition to obtain information, from the practical standpoint it would be impossible.

Rooms 184 & 185 where Brew 1 and Brew 2 processing was being done are in a vault type area. Two of the walls are of masonry construction approximately 6 inches thick, two walls are of light plaster and metal lathe construction. The door to the area is a bank type Mosler door installed in a metal frame. A contact alarm is on the door and an ultra-sonic alarm covers the area. Access to the over-head crawl space from outside the area through trap doors in the building is controlled by a hasp and combination padlock. These trap doors are checked during the guard patrols. This area is not entirely complete in that the final internal finishing of one wall was not completed and in addition there is currently only a light weight wire mesh over the drop ceiling. A technical inspection has not been conducted. It should be noted that according to Colonel Mau and Mr. Sharp this vault area was constructed according to AF SSO specifications. (Tab H - Floor plan STC)

Brew 1 tapes and print outs are prepared by utilizing a master programing tape and the tapes which are received from Vandenberg plus certain ephemeris data that is added. The actual production of the Brew 1 tape and print out is done in the Computer Area Room 318 under the supervision of one of the personnel in the Pay Load
Analysis Branch who is cleared for access to the Sigint Intelligence Data. This is done under controlled conditions and the computer operator is not allowed to observe the print outs as they come out of the computer, or to handle the IBM cards. After the preparation of the Brew 1 tape and Brew 1 print out the master tape comes back to the tape library in Room 318 and then Brew 1 tape and print out are taken back to the Pay Load Analysis Branch now located in Rooms 184 & 185. Here additional processing is conducted on the Brew 1 tape and print outs consisting of eliminating certain signals which are not proper and utilizing an octal listing furnished by the GDHE and Geopositioning data. Corrections are made by the use of IBM cards. After certain adjustments and corrections have been made the Brew 1 tape with the IBM cards and the master tape are taken back to the computing area and a Brew 2 tape and print out are prepared under the same conditions as the Brew 1 tape. Brew 2 tapes and print outs are taken back to Rooms 184 & 185 of the Pay Load Analysis Branch and are turned over to Colonel Bailey Williams for transmittal to the 544th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron at SAC and for transmittal to NSA. One each of a Brew 1 tape and Brew 2 tape and print out are sent to the 544th and to NSA. (Tab I - Flow Chart for Sigint Processing)

No copies of the Brew 2 tape and print out are retained in the STC. The materials necessary to reconstruct a Brew 1 or Brew 2 tape and print out are retained for approximately a year and then destroyed in accordance with normal document destruction procedures. The Master Programming tape is maintained in the tape library Room 318 in the Computer Area Center and is furnished only to persons listed on an access list to receive such tapes. The computer program has a built in core clearing process which eliminates the possibility of any information being retained in the computer memory drums.

Both Brew 1 and Brew 2 tapes and print outs could be indicative of the quality and degree of success of the Sigint collection operation and it is considered necessary that they receive BYEMAN handling. Refer to recommendation No. 10 As of 11 January the following persons were cleared for access to the Brew 2 processes and Brew 2 materials:

EDDLEMAN, A. H. MC GHEE, B. F. II
LANDBERG, S. H. Mc FARRAND, R. W.
MOONEY, S. W.                  BROUGHTON, J. A.
HUGHES, J. R.                       MC KILLIP, W. R. (TWZI)
STAFFELD, R. D. Jr                  HAMMOND, W. R.
NEWMAN, R. D.                            BEEBE, W.
NEFF, F. H.                              WILLIAMS, B. A.
WHITE, G. D.                                KIRBY, J. B.
CARLOS, J. M. Jr                           JACKSON, A. H.
BARONE, L. F.                             VILLARS, P. E.
ANDERSON, R. C.                          EDWARDS, W. H.
KEY, H. A.                               HUTCHINS, S. K.
SUE, L. R.                                  KINCAID, W. K.

All of these people reportedly have at least a SECRET clearance based
on National Agency Checks. Refer to recommendation No. 11

Under the supervision of Colonel Bailey Williams, Major Carl
E. Horner and Major George H. Gritz are responsible for the packing
and mailing of the tapes to SAC and NSA respectively.

In order to get into the vault area Room 190 and the GDHE area
Room 200, it is necessary that your name be on an access list. A
guard posted with an access list in the entrance to the GDHE room
controls access to this room. Refer to recommendation No. 12

During the course of a survey of another Project in March
1963, a revisit was made to which time it was
disclosed that the 698BK operation in would be handled
by the contractor without an Air Force Officer being physically
assigned to the Area. Refer to recommendation No. 13

A part of the processing of 698BK "take" requires that copies
of the Brew 1 tape and Brew 1 print out must be transmitted to
for engineering analysis of the payload by the Lockheed Program Office. This material remains in this area for
approximately 30 days. The material is currently hand carried
by a cleared individual to and delivered to the intended
recipient. The LMSC document control clerk then comes down to
the program area and logs the material. The material is not physi-
ically transferred to the control clerk but is recorded in her log.
The physical security protection afforded this material in
would not meet BYEMAN physical security standards due to
the construction of doors, walls, use of bar and lock safe-keeping equipment and combination padlocks on area doors. It was noted that there is one guard per shift after hours and he is located at the main entrance to ____________ Alarms are utilized on exterior doors, however, they are local alarms. (Tab J - Floor Plan of ____________ / Refer to recommendation No. 14 / In addition what is considered to be sensitive program information, such as mission objectives and outlines of the 698BK Program were found on the walls of certain areas in chart form covered only by drapes. While the areas in which these charts were displayed are controlled during working hours, the only protection afforded them after hours is a wooden door with a combination padlock and a hasp. These documents are SECRET and were being open stored in a non-secure area. / Refer to recommendation No. 15 / In addition personnel in this area are not BYEMAN cleared.

Mr. Joe Barton, LMSC 698BK Program Office, who is concerned with system integration and interface between the pay load and the launch vehicle advised that the pay load is received at the LMSC as a classified shipment and is couriered by a cleared individual from the Systems Integration Section.

The pay load is then taken to ____________ under the supervision of Mr. Barton or someone from his area. System checks are conducted on the pay load and then taken in the same manner to Building 104 where the pay load is mated to the launch system for integration tests. Occasionally it is necessary for the pay load to remain in Building 104 which is a large industrial type building with individual bays for testing purposes for as long as a week at a time. The system integration tests on the pay load are always done under the supervision of a cleared individual and a guard is stationed in the area to preclude unauthorized access to the test area. There is a guard in the area after hours to protect the pay load from any unauthorized access.

When the systems integration tests are completed the pay load is normally shipped to the launch site at Vandenberg by a Lockheed security-type van which is secured and which is accompanied by a cleared individual.

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CONCLUSIONS

The predecessor programs of 102 (698BK) have received considerable publicity and furthermore have been handled as a normal DOD SECRET Contract. This being true it is believed that a large number of persons, including Air Force military personnel, Air Force civilian personnel and contractor personnel are aware of the nature of this program and that there is a large volume of documentation at the SECRET level concerning this program. In view of the existing situation, an attempt to convert 698BK to an entirely Covert or "Black" program would be extremely difficult, and it is doubtful that a positive switch could be achieved.

It is strongly believed that programs of this nature should be Covert. This position is supported by presidential direction concerning satellite intelligence activities relating to the degree of security protection which should be afforded such programs. In this connection the following excerpt from a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence from Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Presidential Advisor for National Security Affairs, in January 1962 concerning "Security Protection of Ultra-Sensitive Advanced Intelligence Collection Systems" is set forth. This memorandum references a recommendation by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board with respect to Intelligence Reconnais­sance Projects that,

"Prompt and stringent measures be taken within the Intelligence Community and with contractors to insure that the number of persons granted access be kept to an absolute minimum consistent with practical requirements."

This recommendation was approved by the President.

It does not appear that the contracting procedures nor the personnel and physical security requirements on a "DOD SECRET" level affords the required degree of protection. Therefore, it is concluded that the protection required for Satellite Intelligence Collection Operations can best be afforded through Covert contracting and security procedures.
Under a Covert concept, consideration should be given to having the pay load produced by another contractor as it would help remove the association with the Project 102 "White" contract.

The manner in which the processing of the raw Sigint data has been accomplished, at least during the past two years, seems to have been secure and limited to a reasonably small number of persons. The existing problem of placing this part of the 102 program into the BYEMAN System appears to relate to the personnel security clearance area. A number of persons now on the program have only SECRET clearances; a TOP SECRET clearance based on a background investigation is necessary. To a lesser degree, some improvements will be necessary in physical protection which has been afforded; however, most of these improvements appear to relate to [50X1] rather than the STC itself.

Specific recommendations regarding the application of the BYEMAN System to 698BK are set forth hereafter.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Upon delivery to LMSC of any pay loads currently in production at AIL, the contract should be cancelled as 698BK and reinstituted under Covert contract procedures. Project 102 should continue to operate as an Air Force "White" project insofar as contractual matters and technical management are concerned until the aforementioned cancellation can be accomplished. Hereafter any Satellite Intelligence Collection Program should be operated as a "Black" contract from its inception.

2. Any electrical communication pertaining to the degree of success of a project mission should be transmitted by a BYEMAN communications link.

3. Any project documents or materials which are classified should be stored in a safe file cabinet with a 3 way MP combination lock. Bar and padlock cabinets should not be used for storage of such documents.

4. Any Char Force persons utilized in the areas where project information is stored should be subjected to National Agency Checks and local police and credit checks.
5. The guard post at the main entrance to Building 172 should be arranged so that during the hours of 1800 to 0700 the guard could monitor the passage of anyone from Building 172 to Building 171 and that anyone entering or leaving the STC during these hours be required to log in and out.

6. Instead of one guard being used to patrol both the 6594th ATW Building 172 and the STC Building 171, there should be two guards for this purpose.

7. The door at the east end of Building 171 should be equipped with a contact alarm for use after hours.

8. The double glass doors just to the left of the main lobby of Building 172 should be equipped with contact alarms.

9. At such time as the processing is completed in the GDHE room, Room 200 and the tapes are turned over to the Pay Load Analysis Branch, the tapes are then considered to be BYEMAN material and subject to BYEMAN controls thereafter. The raw materials comprising work sheets, magnetic tapes, print outs which are used in the Brew 1 and Brew 2 processing need not be given BYEMAN control numbers or stamped with the BYEMAN control stamp unless they are to leave the area and not returned within the same day.

10. A BYEMAN Center should be established in the STC for processing of Brew 1 and Brew 2 and for storage of materials used in these processes.

11. All persons having access to Brew 1 or Brew 2 material should possess a TOP SECRET clearance based on a background investigation.

12. Entrance to the BYEMAN Area should be controlled by an access list and should be handled on a personal recognition basis.

13. Brew 1 material which is sent to [ ] should be transmitted from the STC BYEMAN Center to a 698BK cleared individual in [ ] under controls comparable to those for [ ]
The transmission of BYEMAN information. The information should not be logged in the LMSC Registry in Storage. Storage of the information should be limited to one area, preferably one safe which meets TOP SECRET standards; the combination to this safe being limited to two persons designated as responsible for the protection of this information while it is in The material should not be given BYEMAN Control numbers or marked with a BYEMAN control stamp but should be marked with their appropriate defense classification. The material should at all times receive handling comparable to that afforded by the BYEMAN System. The aforementioned procedures are necessary since is a contractors facility operated solely by the contractor and the BYEMAN System per se only applies to government. This is considered an exception to recommendation No. 9 with regard to time limitation of material being outside a BYEMAN Center.

14. Any alarm system used in this building should be connected to a central station.

15. Open storage of SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL documents in non-secure areas in should be discontinued.
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

MANAGER
M.W. McFARLIN

FIRE PROTECTION
MANAGER
D.B. WALLACE

GOVERNMENT SECURITY
MANAGER

DOCUMENT CONTROL
SUPERVISOR
T.P. SHELLABAGER

PLANT PROTECTION
MANAGER
R.A. WRIGHT

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* NO/
$ IF FACILITY ENTIRELY AF MANNED
@ 1 TO 2 YEARS

COMMANDER

* DIRECTOR OF SECURITY STAFF
   Lt. Colonel

* SECURITY INSPECTION
  TSgt

* PM - ASST DIR OF SEC
  AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
  CAPTAIN

* PROVOST SGT
  MSGT OR TSgt

* INSTALLATION
  SECURITY
  TSgt

* LAW ENFORCEMENT

* ADMINISTRATIVE SECURITY SECTION
  TSgt + AIC (CLERICAL)

* PERSONNEL
  SECURITY CLNO
  SECTION
  AIC Clerk

* CLASSIFICATION SEC
  TSgt + SSGt

* SECURITY EDUCATION
  & TRAINING SECTION
  SSGt

* STA OPERATIONS & ADMINISTRATIVE
  SECTION
  TSgt + AIC (CLERK)

VISITOR
   CONTROL
   AIC (CLERK)

* PASS & REGISTRATION
  SSGt + 2 AIC
  (CLERK)

* CIRCULATION
  CONTROL
  SUPERVISION
  SSGt (CLERK)

$ SECURITY GUARD FLIGHTS

FLT A

FLT B

FLT C

FLT D

FLT E

SURBORDINATE UNITS COORDINATION

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