The NRO periodically reviews collections of records associated with a single historically significant NRO program or project for declassification and public release. This program is required by Section 3.4 of Executive Order 13526, Systematic Declassification Review.
A History of Satellite Reconnaissance (Perry Histories)
WS117L, SAMOS, and SENTRY (1956-1968)
WS117L served as the umbrella R&D program for Air Force reconnaissance satellites in the 1950s. It eventually included three main components: MIDAS (a space-based infrared sensor system capable of detecting ballistic missile launches on land and at sea, predecessor of DSP and SBIRS), SENTRY (later SAMOS, divided between visual "E" series and electronic intelligence "F" series reconnaissance systems), and DISCOVERER. The Air Force declassified the MIDAS R&D Program in its entirety in 1998.
CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD (1960-1972)
The CORONA satellite system was the United States' first successful photographic spy satellite program and was developed by the CIA and the Air Force to photograph Soviet bloc countries and collect vital intelligence during the Cold War, a crucial need after the loss of U-2 spy plane operations. These satellites captured high-resolution film images of vast areas of the Earth, which were then ejected in capsules to be caught in mid-air by an Air Force plane and developed by CIA officers. Over 800.000 images were collected by CORONA and declassified in 1995 by President Clinton.
SIGINT PHASE 1: AFTRACK Experiment (1960-1971)
The SIGINT proof-of-concept platforms were designed for electronic order of battle and general search missions. Platforms were placed on the Agena-based vehicles. The first platform launched on 11 October 1960 and due to a problem with the launch vehicle, did not attain orbit. The final launch was on 16 July 1971. Contributions of these platforms include gathering unprecedented details on Soviet antiballistic missile systems and locating Soviet missile locations.
SIGINT Phase II
NRO Historian's Note
Public Release of SIGINT Phase II Records
Since 1946, the United States had earnestly sought reconnaissance capability from space to protect and enhance the nation's security. The collection of signals intelligence (SIGINT) from space has been a critical component of this effort. This release of documents provides new insight into the essential need for SIGINT collection from space.
Following the release of a 1946 report calling for investment into satellites for national defense purposes, the RAND Corporation tenaciously researched and advocated space-based reconnaissance systems. The effort continued until RAND's publication of its seminal 1954 report, Project Feedback, which provided highly evolved concepts for reconnaissance satellites. RAND advocated for the more well-known photoreconnaissance satellites. Since public acknowledgement of Project Feedback, less attention has been given to signals collection capabilities called for in the report, and less has been publically disclosed about those capabilities. This release of documents is a major step forward in both revealing previously classified information on early satellite SIGINT collection and rebalancing understanding about the nature of the United States full national reconnaissance program.
Project Feedback led the United States to establish a program eventually known as Weapons System 117L (WS-117L) which included the SAMOS program. The United States Air Force (USAF) was responsible for overseeing the program and told the public that its primary purpose was to collect imagery from space and also provide early warning capability in the event of a Soviet missile attack. The public was not told of a secondary and originally less important mission, to collect signals intelligence from space. This was in keeping with the secrecy surrounding intelligence collection where signals collection efforts remained more cloaked than imagery collection efforts.
By the early 1960's, the Department of Defense cancelled the imagery collection efforts under the SAMOS program in favor of more promising programs at the time-namely CORONA and GAMBIT photoreconnaissance satellite programs. However, the efforts to collect SIGINT envisioned under the SAMOS program continued apace. Originally designed as secondary payloads to the primary imagery systems, the signals collection payloads evolved as the primary sensors that emerged from the remnants of the SAMOS program. The SIGINT collection satellites were renamed after the closure of the SAMOS imagery efforts, but they very much carried the SAMOS legacy forward-although covertly and long unacknowledged to the public.
The SIGINT records in this release provide insight and details about these early successes in SIGINT collection from space. This collection of documents joins the previous releases on the other signals collection satellites including GRAB, POPPY, and AFTRACK sensors. They were carried on the Agena control vehicle that the NRO used for CORONA and GAMBIT programs. This release reveals how signals collection grew from experimental payloads to providing key strategic and later tactical intelligence for the United States. Moreover, this release also sheds light onto how the United States focused on integrating reconnaissance satellite vehicles to serve as what might be called today a force multiplier. The integration amplified satellite collection capabilities and contributions.
Finally, in this collection of documents there are frequent references to the P-11 program and passenger payload satellites. These references provide clear hints as to future releases of documents on the nation's early signals collection satellites. We look forward to revealing more about these satellites, each of which have their own unique capabilities and histories.
Ultimately these releases are critical to help American citizens understand the nature and use of satellites for reconnaissance collection purposes-that they were launched to reveal insight into the monolithic capabilities of the Soviet Union. Those insights proved necessary to counter the Soviet threat and to secure the peaceful conclusion of the cold war.
James Outzen, Ph.D. NRO Historian Chief, Historical Documentation & Research Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance
SIGINT III - Detachable SIGINT Projects:
(U) The Detachable SIGINT Project platforms were designed for Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) and general search missions. Platforms were placed on the Agena-based vehicles and independent launch vehicles. The P-11/989 vehicles were detached from the primary satellite to perform their missions.
POPPY (1962-1977)
The U.S. Navy began the POPPY project as a successor to GRAB. In time, its mission expanded to collect radar emissions from Soviet naval vessels on the high seas. In July 1962, this U.S. Navy reconnaissance satellite project and the organizations that supported it formally became Program C of the NRO, funded through the NRP. The launch of POPPY 1 occurred five months later, in December 1962. By the time that POPPY 7 ceased operating on orbit in August 1977, the project's mission emphasized ocean surveillance for operational naval commanders. Each POPPY satellites averaged 34 months of useful life on orbit.
GAMBIT 206 (1963-1984)
GAMBIT (KH-7), also known as or partially contained in E-6, Project 307, EXEMPLER, CUE BALL, 483A, and Project 206, was a film return system. GAMBIT served as the first high-resolution surveillance satellite.
FULCRUM: Case Study and Competition for HEXAGON (1964-1966)
FULCRUM emerged in late 1963 as a CIA concept for an NRO system combining CORONA coverage with GAMBIT resolution.
Project UPWARD (1964-1967)
Project UPWARD was a joint project that began in 1964, when the NRO and NASA signed an agreement to transfer optical technology from the NRO to NASA. UPWARD was initiated as a low orbit, high resolution contingency program, should NASA's primary effort to certify lunar landing sites fail. The primary NASA lunar landing certification effort consisted of a high orbit camera program called Lunar Orbiter and a landing vehicle program called Surveyor. Since NASA's programs were successful in certifying four lunar landing sites, there were no further requirements for UPWARD. In 1967, NRO and NASA jointly decided to cancel the project.
QUILL (1964)
QUILL was an experimental Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite, based on the CORONA satellite and available SAR hardware. Because of diplomatic and security concerns the brief mission imaged only selected targets with the U.S. Those targets could be inspected on the ground to validate the intelligence value of orbital SAR without alerting the Soviets to the capability or touching off diplomatic protest over active illumination of sovereign territory. The mission provided proof-of-concept.
Aides
Declassified Histories
Two histories about QUILL have been declassified and released: Robert Perry’s 1972 “Radar in Orbit” history of the QUILL program and Robert L. Butterworth’s 2004 revision his own history, The First Imaging Radar Satellite.
Declassified QUILL Lecture
On August 14, 2011 a lecture about QUILL was given at NRO headquarters in Chantilly, Virginia by Dr. Jeffery Charleston. This lecture has been declassified and provided to the public here along with the pamphlet which was made available at the lecture. The declassified pictures used during the lecture can be found in the lecture transcript.
Declassified Documents
D-21 Drones Program
NRO Historian's Note
Public Release of D-21 Drones Program Records
The United States first successfully orbited national reconnaissance satellites in 1960, but for the next decade and a half continued to seek a reliable means of gaining intelligence in crisis situations. One such effort was the D-21 drone program, initiated by the CIA and later transferred to the National Reconnaissance Office. The D-21 program, although never operationally successful, left a critical legacy for other intelligence and national security programs.
The D-21 drone incorporated a number of technologies that would mature in future defense and intelligence technology programs including: unmanned aerial vehicles, stealth design features, and ramjet engine technology. The D-21 program was also unique because it involved personnel from both the intelligence community and Department of Defense elements, setting an example of collaboration that is more common in today’s post-9-11 era.
This collection of documents is significant for a number of reasons. First, the collection reveals additional insight into the technological development challenges faced by program managers and participants. Second, the documents describe how US defense and intelligence organizations cooperate to confront daunting challenges like collecting regular and reliable intelligence over denied areas, or in today’s parlance, against hard targets. Third, the documents identify the decision points necessary to determine when to continue a challenging technological program and when to discontinue the program in favor of a more promising option for solving a pressing intelligence problem or set of problems. Researchers who study these documents in detail will gain a greater understanding of the early promise of the D-21’s potential for providing critically needed intelligence. Researchers will also discover that despite the program’s cancellation, it informed and inspired other intelligence and defense technology program development. The D-21 program remains a unique chapter in the national reconnaissance program history, one that will remain of interest to students of the discipline.
James Outzen, Ph.D. NRO Historian Chief, Historical Documentation & Research Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance